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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Academic literature has examined how the transformation of a nation’s 
state power can give rise to shifts in national identity, and how such shifting 
identity can be represented in the form of the nation’s changing urban landscape. 
This thesis investigates that topic in the case of Taiwan, a de facto independent 
country with almost one hundred years’ experience of ‘colonial’ and then ‘settler’ 
rule. 
Both colonial rule and settler rule constitute an outside regime. However, 
the settler rulers in Taiwan regarded the settled land as their homeland. To secure 
their supremacy, the settler rulers had to strongly control the political, cultural, 
and economic interests of the ‘native’ population. 
Democratisation can be a key factor undermining settler rule. Such a 
political transition can enable the home population to reclaim state power, 
symbolising that the nation has entered the post-settler era. 
This thesis explores how the transition from Japanese colonial rule to 
Chinese settler rule and then to democratisation gave rise to changes in Taiwanese 
national identity, and to its reflection in the urban landscape of the capital city, 
Taipei. The thesis reveals the irony of a transition in which the collapse of settler 
rule has been unable to drive significant further change in the city’s urban 
landscape. In other words, the urban landscape of post-settler Taipei City is ‘stuck 
in transition’. The condition reflects the ambivalence in Taiwanese national 
identity caused by the unforgettable, yet not really glorious memory of settler rule. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Through a cross-disciplinary approach, one can understand how national 
identity can be represented within a nation‘s urban landscape. There are numerous 
academic works examining the nature of national identity. Dominant theories are 
concerned with historical reviews and political power competitions (see Anderson, 
1991; Held, 1992; Smith, 1991). Within the same themes, moreover, the existing 
literature has explored how government change, developing multiculturalism, and 
involvement into globalisation can give rise to shifts in national identity (see Brah, 
1996; Cohen, 1997; Hall, 1992; Scholte, 1996; Stevenson, 1999). Meanwhile, 
many urban studies also have pointed out how government change, developing 
multiculturalism, and globalisation would affect a nation‘s urban landscape. For 
instance, the new government would demolish the previous regime‘s urban 
legacies (see Kolbe, 2007; Vale, 2006). Moreover, the increasing immigrants 
would eventually forge specific ethnic enclaves in the city (see Hayden, 1995; Yip, 
2001). Furthermore, a nation‘s involvement in global capitalism can make the city 
become packed with global retailers, international entertainment venues, 
skyscrapers, and other symbols related to global culture (see Harvey, 1993; Sklair, 
2006). In other words, one can observe a nation‘s changing built environment to 
picture its shifting collective identity, and vice versa. 
While there are many nations being able to generate relevant stories 
regarding how shifting national identity can give rise to the nation‘s urban 
 2 
changes; Taiwan, the focal subject of the thesis, provides a rich context for this 
inter-disciplinary issue. According to Weitzer‘s definition (1990), Taiwan was a 
‗settler country‘. The region was occupied by the Chinese settlers in 1945. As 
being the newly-arrived minority, the settler rulers had once dictatorially 
controlled Taiwan‘s political, cultural, and economic affairs to secure their 
legitimacy. Simultaneously, the local population‘s self-identification was 
suppressed. Nonetheless, since the late 1980s, the nation began to experience 
democratisation. The condition eventually undermined Chinese settler rule. 
Ultimately, the political party, composed of the natives as the majority, won the 
direct presidential election in 2000; symbolising the coming of the nation‘s post-
settler era. 
This thesis investigates how government change, developing 
multiculturalism, and globalisation had implications for Taiwanese identity and its 
urban representations; in the context of settler rule‘s establishment, transition, and 
transformation. More details of the research background are elaborated in Section 
1.2. Section 1.3 then briefly explains how the analytic framework and research 
questions are developed; and how to carry out the empirical work. Section 1.4 
states the main findings and key messages emerging from the thesis. Finally, 
Section 1.5 draws the entire thesis‘s outline. 
 
1.2 Research Background 
From the thesis title Representing National Identity within Urban 
Landscapes: Chinese Settler Rule, Shifting Taiwanese Identity, and Post-settler 
Taipei City, one can realise that this study is set to examine how Taiwanese 
 3 
identity is represented within Taipei City‘s urban landscape. Nevertheless, one 
may be curious about the terms ‗Chinese settler rule‘ and ‗post-settler‘. Weitzer 
(ibid) suggests that like the colonial country, the ruling class in the settler country 
are formed by ‗people from outside‘, rather than the natives. The difference 
between the colonial country and the settler country is that the colonisers usually 
regard the colony as a land where they can exploit its natural resources or take 
advantage of its strategic importance; while the settlers regard the settled land as 
‗home‘. In order to secure their superiority at the ‗new home‘, the newly-arrived 
settler rulers need to have ultimate control of the natives‘ political, cultural, and 
economic interests.  
The establishment of Taiwan‘s settler rule resulted from complicated 
international relationships. Taiwan was a Japanese colony from 1895 to the end of 
the Second World War. After the colonisers departed, the US Government 
allowed the Kuomintang (KMT/Chinese Nationalist Party) Government, which 
represented the state of the Republic of China (ROC), to be in charge of Taiwan‘s 
post-war affairs. Thereafter, the KMT Government claimed that the region was 
‗restored‘ to be part of the ROC‘s territory; implying that the home population 
was governed by a newly-arrived outside political entity. Although the local 
people had tried to fight against the corrupt KMT Government, they were 
ultimately suppressed by the armed forces. Meanwhile, the KMT Government 
used martial law alongside public education and language restrictions to control 
Taiwanese society as well as to manipulate the local population‘s collective 
identity. In 1949, the KMT lost the Chinese Civil War to the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) on the Mainland China. Taiwan therefore became those Chinese 
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refugees‘ settlement, implying that Chinese settler rule became further rooted in 
the region. 
I was born in Taiwan in 1979. At the time, martial law still acted. I 
remember that when I was studying at the elementary school, the history and 
geography textbooks mainly featured Chinese history and geography, rather than 
those of Taiwan. In fact, some of my childhood friends‘ schools were forcing 
students to speak Mandarin and banning other mother tongues. I also remember, 
in the school‘s corridors, there were many flyers with the late President Chiang 
Kai-shek‘s words or the anti-Communism slogans on them. They would be 
important references if one wanted to get a good result in essay or speech 
competitions. 
Things began to change after martial law‘s abolition in 1987. I recalled 
that instead of teaching, some of my school teachers spent much time criticising 
the Government‘s policies. After finishing their comments, some teachers might 
add that they could have already been caught by secret agents if martial law still 
had acted. Moreover, there were increasing news reports about student, social, or 
political movements against the Government. I remember that a student 
movement was launched to appeal the Government to force the old National 
Assembly members to retire. My school teacher told the class that those old 
politicians were a privileged group. I did not exactly understand the teacher‘s 
words at the time. Nonetheless, those old Assembly members retired ultimately. 
In his study of the settler country‘s transformation into the post-settler 
country, Weitzer (ibid) suggests that democratisation can be the key driving the 
natives to regain their political, cultural, and economic interests; and therefore 
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undermine settler rule. Moreover, such a democratisation process can constitute a 
political transition period that ultimately leads the nation to enter the post-settler 
era in which the natives formally seize state power. Given this perspective and my 
personal experience presented above, one can suggest that martial law‘s abolition 
symbolised the beginning of Taiwan‘s democratisation as well as political 
transition. In fact, this political transition has already led Taiwan to its post-settler 
era. In 2000, the KMT lost the presidential election to the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP), the main opposition party claiming that it represented ‗local power‘. 
The result symbolised the formal beginning of Taiwan‘s post-settler era. 
Meanwhile, by consulting the relevant literature concerned with Taiwan‘s 
urban history, one can realise the connections between Chinese settler rule‘s 
transition and the nation‘s changing urban landscape. For instance, due to the 
coming of the nation‘s democratisation, the general public living in the city began 
to be able to appeal for the government institutions to improve the community‘s 
civic facilities, such as public parks (Huang, 2005a). Moreover, after martial law 
was abolished, some monuments initially erected to pay tribute to the important 
KMT figures were removed from the city‘s public spaces (Hou, 2000; Simon, 
2003). In short, when Taiwan‘s democratisation began to undermine settler rule, it 
also affected the urban elements and policies initially set up to serve the Chinese 
Settler State‘s interests. Moreover, given that those relevant urban changes were 
related to the Taiwanese‘s everyday living experiences and social practices, one 
can suggest that the changes also implied shifts in Taiwanese identity. 
However, the existing literature only focuses on significant changes 
happening during the nation‘s political transition period. Meanwhile, probably 
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because Taiwan just began to experience its post-settler era in 2000, there are not 
many academic studies exploring how post-settler Taiwan‘s changing urban scene 
reflects further shifting Taiwanese identity. In view of that emerging issue, I 
started the research project. The next Section gives more details of how the entire 
study was carried out in an academic context. 
 
1.3 Conceptual Approach, Research Questions, and Empirical Work 
Clearly, the starting point of this study is to review the relevant literature 
to construct an analytical framework concerned with the connection between 
national identity and urban landscapes. In this Section, I just briefly summarise 
the critical viewpoints derived from the literature review process. I define that 
national identity constitutes an imagined collective memory [see Chapter 2]; 
and urban landscapes constitute (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces [see 
Chapter 3]. This is to say, the state intends to forge hegemonic identity concerned 
with the nation‘s history and culture by practising specific social control, such as 
public education. Meanwhile, by creating the built environment where people gain 
their everyday living experiences, the state also can therefore create the nation‘s 
collective memory. However, national identification is a process consistently 
affected by the nation‘s government change, developing multiculturalism, and 
involvement in globalisation. It means that the state is unable to always maintain 
an unchanged collective memory among the nationals. In fact, the nationals not 
only keep ‗remembering‘ new history and culture, but also keep ‗forgetting‘ old 
ones. More importantly, things that are remembered today can be forgotten some 
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day and vice versa. Similarly, the urban elements that are demolished today can 
be rebuilt some day. 
Given that the analytical framework enables one to identify specific urban 
elements and policies related to the nation‘s shifting identity, it is applied to link 
the existing literature concerned with Taiwanese identity to those concerned with 
Taiwan‘s urban history. Hence, a general storyline about how shifting Taiwanese 
identity was represented within the nation‘s changing built environment can be 
produced [see Chapter 4]. 
However, the framework also enables one to point out several unexplored 
issues emerging from the existing studies. For instance, they do not investigate 
more potential urban elements that could serve the Chinese Settler State‘s 
identification schemes. Moreover, they do not examine settler rule‘s potential 
implications for the local minority‘s living space in the city. In addition, they do 
not explore how the Settler State dealt with globalisation‘s impacts on historic 
urban elements. Apart from these, as mentioned in the end of the previous Section, 
the most obvious gap among the existing studies is that only a few of them 
explore post-settler Taiwan. Given this condition, it is useful to look into other 
post-settler countries to search for the inspiration. In this study, South Africa is 
used to be the reference. It is because its settler rule transformation history is 
similar to that of Taiwan. Furthermore, it has already entered the post-settler era 
in 1994; and there have already been the relevant studies concerned with post-
settler South Africa‘s significant urban changes. By reviewing those studies, a 
proposition is developed to suggest that Chinese settler rule would make post-
settler Taiwan‘s urban landscape become ‗stuck in transition‘. It means that 
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although some urban changes related to settler rule‘s decline have taken place 
during the nation‘s political transition era, the DPP Government/Post-settler State 
still is unable to eliminate the settler urban legacies already rooted in people‘s 
everyday life [see Section 4.2]. 
These unexplored issues altogether generate the fundamental research 
question of the thesis: How has shifting state power in Taiwan, until the early 
beginning of the post-settler era, shaped the nation’s urban landscape in the 
form of (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces? Moreover, in consideration of 
the subjects that each unexplored issue relates to, three sub-questions are 
generated to enable me to narrow down the research scope: 
 
(1) How did the Chinese Settler State use iconic sites, national-cultural sites, 
and other urban elements, to practise its national identification scheme in 
Taiwan, and what implications for those urban elements have emerged 
after the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era? (This question implies 
examining physical urban elements that served the Settler State‘s political and 
cultural legitimatisation) 
 
(2) How did the Chinese Settler State affect Taiwan’s developing 
multicultural society and multicultural urban environments, and what 
implications for these environments have emerged after the coming of 
Taiwan’s post-settler era? (This question implies examining physical urban 
elements and urban policies concerning the ethnic minority groups‘ interests) 
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(3) How did the Chinese Settler State deal with the impacts of 
economic/urban globalisation in shaping Taiwan’s urban landscape, and 
what implications related to this globalised urban scene have emerged 
after the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era? (This question implies 
examining Taiwan‘s urban regeneration and conservation) 
 
It ought to be noted that although the questions seem to focus on urban policies 
and physical urban elements created by the KMT Government, they actually 
involve the investigation of the previous ruling political entities‘ legacies. After 
all, Taiwanese identity and the nation‘s built environments were not formed by 
the Chinese settler rulers only. 
In order to find answers to the research question, the case study of Taipei 
City was carried out. Why Taipei City, Taiwan‘s capital city, is the selected case 
is due to two reasons. Firstly, the theoretical framework suggests that the capital 
city usually acts as the nation‘s political, cultural, and economic centre where one 
can encounter many national identity‘s physical representations. Secondly, Taipei 
City is the predominant subject of the existing literature concerned with 
Taiwanese identity and its urban representations. Give these reasons, as an 
independent research student, Taipei City is a suitable spot for me to execute the 
fieldwork. Meanwhile, the case study findings also can solve the unexplored 
issues among the existing literature. 
The Taipei City case study involves the multiuse of four research methods, 
namely, documentary research, archival research, direct observations, and 
interviewing. Meanwhile, the theoretical framework enables me to target specific 
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urban elements and policies that are relevant to this research project. Those focal 
subjects can be classified into six categories: (1) the physical urban elements 
initially built to legitimise state power and national culture; (2) the identity and 
urban policies benefiting or oppressing specific ethnic groups; (3) the places 
constituting the specific ethnic enclave; (4) the places whose formation is related 
to the nation‘s economic globalisation; (5) the urban elements whose demolition 
is related to the nation‘s economic globalisation; and (6) the policies related to 
urban regeneration and conservation. 
 
1.4 Original Contributions 
Generally, the novelty of this study lies in providing a different 
perspective on looking at the formation of Taiwanese identity. In other words, it 
creates the connection between Chinese settler rule, Taiwanese identity, and the 
nation‘s urban landscape. 
From the result of the empirical work [presented from Chapters 6 to 9], it 
is found that since the newly-arrived Chinese settler rulers initially regarded 
Taiwan as a temporary settlement, they just intended to quickly secure state power 
by practising several identification schemes, including manipulating Taipei City‘s 
urban form; and therefore ignored comprehensive urban planning. Consequently, 
issues, such as the nationalist monument‘s legitimacy, the marginalisation of the 
ethnic minority‘s living territory in the city, and urban decline, were emerging. 
After the coming of Taiwan‘s democratisation, the general public and the private 
sector were able to make the Chinese Settler State deal with the issues and got 
certain achievements. One may think that after the Democratic Progressive Party, 
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claiming to represent local power, seized state power, symbolising the beginning 
of Taiwan‘s post-settler era, the new government would be able to deal with the 
issues more efficiently. Nevertheless, the fact was that many of the issues still 
existed or have even become more complicated in the nation‘s early post-settler 
era. In other words, post-settler Taipei City’s urban landscape was ‘stuck in 
transition’. This messiness of the urban form reflected the ambivalence of post-
settler Taiwanese identity. That is to say, although settler rule was not a pleasant 
collective memory, post-settler Taiwan still was unable totally to get rid of it; 
given that settler rule has already put down roots in Taiwan and caused deep 
influences on the nation‘s political, cultural, and economic conditions. 
It ought to be noted that this study is initially set to produce a clear picture 
of how different political entities in Taiwan‘s history gave rise to shifts in 
Taiwanese national identity alongside urban changes. Meanwhile, the study 
neither attempts to find a possible ‗result‘ of the future urban image in post-settler 
Taiwan nor to produce a conclusion applicable to other settler countries. After all, 
Taiwan‘s political landscape will continuously change and therefore affect 
national identity and its urban representations. Moreover, arguably, every settler 
country and its cities have different historical backgrounds. However, those 
uncertain factors inspire one to explore a broader range of research opportunities. 
More details are presented in Chapter 11. 
 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
After introducing the general idea and the setting of this study, this Section 
illustrates how the thesis is set to be presented. Following this Chapter, Chapter 2 
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conceptualises ‗national identity‘ by examining the relevant theories concerned 
with the origins of national identity and with the factors that can affect national 
identification. It is presented as a selective discussion of shifting national identity 
that is important in relation to the development of Taiwanese national identity. 
Built upon the debates, Chapter 3 then employs the relevant academic studies to 
explain the relationship between shifting national identity and changing urban 
landscapes. 
The literature-review process continues in the first half of Chapter 4 and 
begins to generate the connection between the thesis‘s main subjects, namely, 
settler rule, Taiwan, and Taipei City. Apart from elaborating on the definition of 
the settler country, the first half of Chapter 4 also looks into the case of South 
Africa to draw the potential trend of how Chinese settler rule‘s transition and 
transformation would have implications for Taiwan‘s urban landscape. It then 
introduces the nation‘s basic profile and examines the existing literature to find 
the relationship between Taiwan‘s transforming state power, shifting national 
identity, and changing urban scene. 
By considering the theoretical framework derived from those reviewed 
studies, the second half of Chapter 4 points out the issues among the existing 
literature concerned with Taiwan. A series of research questions are then 
developed and proposed. Chapter 5 outlines the methodology used to approach 
those questions. More specifically, it explains the reason for a case study approach; 
why Taipei City is the selected case; why certain research methods are employed; 
the entire data collection process; and the issues that I encountered in doing the 
fieldwork. 
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The thesis then moves on to the presentation and analysis of collected data. 
From Chapter 6 to 9, the empirical findings derived from the case study are 
presented. Although all of the four Chapters are set to demonstrate Chinese settler 
rule‘s implications for Taiwanese identity and post-settler Taipei City, they 
respectively focus on four themes, namely changing state power, transforming 
national culture, developing multiculturalism, and globalisation‘s impacts. 
Chapter 10 draws the findings together to provide an in-depth analysis directly 
reflecting the research questions. 
Finally, as the concluding chapter, Chapter 11 reviews the entire research 
project and highlights why and how this thesis can have contribution to wider 
academic debates related to settler rule, national identity, and urban landscapes. 
By considering this study‘s limits caused by specific factors, the Chapter ends by 
proposing future lines of research built upon those new insights developed in this 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW (I): 
CONCEPTUALISING NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter employs the relevant academic studies to examine the nature 
of national identity. Moreover, the Chapter essentially serves as a selective 
discussion of the issues that are important in relation to the development of 
national identity, especially in relation to Taiwan. From Sections 2.2 to 2.4, the 
focal subject is the connection between the nation, national identification, and the 
state. Section 2.5 reveals potential factors that are able to affect that connection. 
Section 2.6 briefly introduces how Taiwanese national identity was forged. A 
pertinent conclusion is given in Section 2.7. 
 
2.2 The Origin of the Modern Nation 
Anderson‘s study—Imagined Communities (1991)—presents a historical 
approach to examining the origin of the modern nation. In that study, Anderson 
defines the nation as ―an imagined political [my italic] community‖ (p. 6) and 
writes that: 
 
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will 
never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of 
them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion … In 
fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face 
contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined … [The nation] is 
imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality 
and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived 
as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that 
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makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of 
people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited 
imaginings. 
(Anderson, 1991: pp. 6-7) 
 
Apart from giving this definition, Anderson traces the history of West Europe and 
suggests that prior to the modern nation being conceptualised, there were two 
powers that drove West Europeans in different regions to imagine that they 
belonged to a community. First, it was the religious power that dominated 
people‘s thinking, behaviour, morals and values. The second power was the 
ancient ‗political‘ rulers, such as emperors and kings, who convinced the general 
public that their power came from the grace of God. 
Anderson suggests that these two powers, constituting ‗cultural roots‘ of 
ancient West Europeans, bound people together in an imagined cultural 
community, despite the fact that they were living in a land where they neither 
really knew each individual nor clearly indicated the land‘s boundary. In this 
community, people had the same religious disciplines that were recorded in 
Latin—the sacred language at a time when the majority of society were illiterate. 
Meanwhile, they were subject to a group of political/cultural elites who were able 
to read Latin and represented God‘s legacies in the earth. 
Nevertheless, Anderson points out that the ancient religious power in West 
Europe began to be challenged by the Religious Revolution taking place in the 
sixteenth century. The coming of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment period, in 
which people began embracing science and rationalism, also further undermined 
the religious power. Meanwhile, the ancient West European political regime also 
began to collapse in the late eighteenth century when political evolutions drove 
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people to perceive the power of political leaders should come from themselves, 
rather than God. 
With the collapse of these two powers constituting cultural roots of the 
ancient imagined community, the concept of establishing the modern nation began 
to emerge. It means that different groups of West Europeans with respective 
shared culture, language, living territory, and collective historical memories 
attempted to use a new system to make their respective existence clearly 
recognisable. This attempt, known as nationalism, then caused conflict when it 
would affect different groups of people‘s interests, such as the right of territory. 
Under these circumstances, the system of the modern nation began to develop. 
Different groups of West Europeans initiated their nation-building process 
including the nation‘s domestic union, the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with other nations, or waging war on others. Clearly, this modern nation-building 
process involved deliberate and systematic political operations. It is one of 
reasons Anderson coins the term ‗imagined political community‘ to refer to the 
modern nation. The other reason—how the state uses its political resources to 
create and maintain national identity—is explored in the next two Sections. 
From the above discussion, one can point out that the concept of the 
modern nation stemming from West European countries. Meanwhile, in terms of 
other areas in the world, the emergence of the concept was due to various 
international encounters, such as wars and colonialism. That is to say, the 
oppressed people in these regions were inspired by their oppressors to build their 
nation to defend themselves as well as to maintain their own culture and language 
in the recognised territory. This nation-building trend in non-West European 
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regions became worldwide since the nineteenth century. Likewise, this trend 
involved deliberate political operations (Held, 1992; Kohn, 1975; Snyder, 1954). 
 
2.3 The Origin of National Identification 
The previous Section has revealed how and why ancient religious and 
political powers were undermined; and how the concept of the modern nation then 
emerged and became eventually worldwide due to deliberate political operations. 
Meanwhile, this Section explains how ‗national identity‘ replaced ancient 
religious and political powers to make people imagine that they belong to a 
specific community, meaning the modern nation. In fact, it is also a story 
associated with the decline of ancient religious and political powers, and 
deliberate political operations. According to Anderson (1991), before the 
invention of print technology in the late fifteenth century, most people were 
illiterate. Nevertheless, the invention of print technology enabled words to be 
fixed on the printed page. The condition eventually gave rise to three associated 
implications: 
 
(1) The Bible, which was originally written in Latin, could be translated into 
different languages. Meanwhile, in comparison to original versions that were 
presented in the form of priceless manuscripts, those translations could be 
mass produced and spread among people. As a result, the power of religious 
elites was undermined because the ‗knowledge‘ stored in manuscript Latin 
Bible was no longer a secret held by them. This condition was also a crucial 
factor that gave rise to the Religious Reformation. 
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(2) Apart from religious elites, ancient political elites were the only social group 
that could read Latin at the time. Thus, they were willing to see the decline of 
the religious elites‘ power. However, fixed language through printing also 
began to facilitate the development of public education. Eventually, 
increasingly literate and civilised people began to question the legitimacy of 
the ancient political elites. As a result, political evolutions alongside modern 
nation-building movements were launched to overthrow those ancient ruling 
classes. 
 
(3) The third and most important impact was the emergence of ‗modern‘ national 
identification. 
 
This third impact of the invention of print technology needs to be 
elaborated further. It can be argued that ‗identity‘ is formed through unconscious 
‗learning‘ over time, rather than through innate consciousness at birth. In this light, 
identification is actually the focal point when one attempts to examine the origin 
of specific identity (Hall, 1992; Preston, 1997; Scholte, 1996). Before the 
invention of the print technology, the main methods that drove identity of the 
imagined cultural community to be ‗passed down‘ from generation to generation 
were oral teaching and everyday practices. Such an identification process could 
only be practised among a limited number of people in the group. However, after 
the invention of the print technology, this process was able to be executed at a 
much broader geographical scale through the spread of print matter whose 
contents could include the community‘s common language, history, culture and 
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geographical features. Clearly, meanwhile, the process needed to be practised 
through deliberate political operation. Anderson (1991) and McLuhan (1964) 
argue that since books appeared in the late fifteenth century in Europe, the 
political elites had controlled the printers and booksellers and enabled the book 
market to be capitalised. Under these circumstances, the general public could only 
read books that had been ‗reviewed‘ by the ruling class. Through the print 
matter‘s unchangeable contents, including ‗our‘ language, ‗our‘ history, ‗our‘ 
culture, and geographical features of ‗our‘ land, a collective imagination of the 
nation‘s profile was forged among the general public. In other words, people 
began to have collective identity concerned with their nation. As time goes by, 
such collective identity seemed to have become innate for people of the nation. 
Billig gives an appropriate description of this national identification process by 
writing that: 
 
National identity is not only something which is thought to be natural to 
possess, but also something natural to remember [my italic]. 
(Billig, 1995: p. 37) 
 
Reference to Billig‘s description of national identification, apart from the 
print matter, the phenomenon of ‗remembering your nation as well as who you 
are‘ can be created by other types of the mass media in people‘s everyday life. For 
instance, by reading the newspaper, one can perceive ‗his/her‘ and ‗others‘‘ 
national affairs. Moreover, the weather reports on television usually show maps 
and it actually reminds one of ‗his/her‘ as well as ‗others‘‘ national territories. 
Furthermore, by watching the film, one can perceive ‗his/her‘ and ‗others‘‘ 
national cultures. In short, those representations of national identity within the 
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mass media consistently make people unconsciously remember their nation and 
who they are. It ought to be noted that like the ancient political elites eager to 
control the print matter, the modern political force running the nation—the state—
also can use its political resources to control the information delivered by the 
mass media. For example, in a nation with a strong religious faith, the state can 
control the mass media to block information concerned with other religions (Hall, 
1992). In other words, the state is able to intervene in the national identification 
process. The next Section explores more about what role the state plays in forging 
national identity. 
 
2.4 The State and National Identification 
Organisationally, or functionally, the ‗state‘ can be defined as a set of 
government institutions that legitimises laws, orders, defences, and traditional 
values within a bounded territory; and therefore conveys its superior power over 
the inhabitants of the region (Dunleavy and O‘Leary, 1987). Although the modern 
state and the modern nation originally emerged at the same time, ‗state-making‘ 
and ‗nation-building‘ are two different subjects. The former refers to a political 
entity‘s establishment and legitimisation within a nation‘s territory. Meanwhile, 
the latter refers to a process of the nation‘s determination to become recognisable. 
Nonetheless, given the fact that the state represents the nation to deal with 
domestic and international affairs, state-making and nation-building may be 
interconnected during the initial stage of a nation-building process (Held, 1992). 
As a legitimised political entity of the nation, the state plays an important 
role in the national identification process. For instance, as already mentioned at 
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the end of the previous Section, the state can apply mass-media censorship to 
control national identification. Meanwhile, the state can also control the 
educational materials concerned with the nation‘s history, culture, and 
geographical features (Guibernau, 1999; Hall, 1992). As a matter of fact, Billig 
(1995) indicates that the state can create various banal symbolic objects, activities, 
and events in people‘s everyday life to forge national identity. For instance, the 
official coins and bank notes usually feature national emblems legitimised by the 
state. Furthermore, the state can designate national days for reminiscences of the 
nation‘s memorable events. And people are usually expected to stand up and be 
serious when the national flag is raised or the national anthem is sung or broadcast. 
In short, those symbolic events, activities, images, and objects altogether 
constitute national-identity representations produced by the state. Under these 
circumstances, people‘s everyday experience is actually a national-identification 
process where they unconsciously remember their nation and who they are. 
 
2.5 Shifting National Identity 
From the previous Section, it may appear that the state needs only to apply 
particular symbolic objects and activities to ‗remind‘ people of their national 
identity, because it has already produced an ‗unchangeable‘ collective identity. 
However, national identity can eventually shift due to certain interrelated factors. 
They can be categorised into three subjects presented in the following subsections: 
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(1) Government change 
Arguably, the state‘s intention to forge and maintain the nation‘s collective 
identity can be interpreted as the means by which the state tries to create 
hegemonic identity serving its interests, meaning to maintain its political 
legitimacy (Billig, 1995; Guibernau, 1999; Hall, 1992; Smith, 1991). However, 
due to war, coups d'état, public elections, or many other reasons, the state‘s 
administrative system can change with the coming of a new set of government 
institutions. The new government‘s coming can imply the beginning of a new 
identity manipulation process affecting the ‗old‘ identity. For example, after the 
end of colonial rule, the post-colonial state can enable the previously oppressed 
natives to begin to ‗reclaim‘ their identity by compiling new history textbooks; 
creating the new national holiday; releasing the new bank notes (Hall, 1992; 
Papastergiadis, 1997). Incidentally, this example is associated with what is 
mentioned in the end of Section 2.2 [pp. 16-7] explaining how the concept of the 
modern nation became rooted in non-Western areas of the world. That is to say, 
through war or colonialism, modern Western states‘ oppression eventually stirred 
up nationalism among the oppressed people who began to imitate their oppressors 
by forming their own state as well as their nation to efficiently fight back. After 
becoming independent, meanwhile, the newborn non-Western state also used 
similar methods, which had been used by its Western counterpart, to forge a new 
collective identity among the ‗new‘ nation. 
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(2) Multiculturalism and cultural hybridisation 
It can be acknowledged that ‗culture‘ is one of the crucial factors shaping 
national identity. However, throughout human history, various factors, such as 
slave trading, wars, immigration, colonisation, and tourism, have made many 
nations consist of different ethnic groups. Although individuals with different 
ethnic backgrounds can be recognised by the state as citizens, each of them can 
still fiercely keep their cultural identity, including language, religion, and custom. 
In other words, a nation can constitute a multicultural society. What is more, in 
such a society, an individual can adopt other cultures and simultaneously ‗lose‘ 
part of his/her original cultural practices. These circumstances eventually gave 
rise to cultural hybridisation among the nation. It implies that local cultures are 
changeable. More importantly, it also implies that the state is unable to maintain 
hegemonic collective identity in a nation with developing multiculturalism (Brah, 
1996; Cohen, 1997; Hall, 1992; Scholte, 1996). 
 
(3) Globalisation and cultural hybridisation 
Arguably, in the age of ‗globalisation‘, advanced technology makes 
people‘s trans-national movement (e.g. immigration and tourism) become easy 
and frequent. The condition reinforces a nation‘s developing multiculturalism; and, 
as mentioned in the previous subsection, cultural diversity and hybridity therefore 
emerge and affect national culture. Despite cultural diversification and 
hybridisation, however, this subsection focuses on how ‗global culture‘, one of 
implications of globalisation, affects national identity. The formation of global 
culture is due to global capitalism and the advanced technology by which culture 
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is integrated into commodity production or information distributed worldwide. 
Under these circumstances, people in different nations can share similar everyday 
life experiences. Many nations‘ adaptation to Hollywood films, international 
fashion clothing lines, and global fast food chains provide relevant examples 
(McGrew, 1992; Thompson, 1992). Meanwhile, as the state is keen to maintain 
hegemonic national identity, it may actually be unable to resist global culture‘s 
formation and subsequent impacts on national culture. It is because capitalism and 
advanced technology, which give rise to global culture, can improve the nation‘s 
economy alongside modernisation; the condition can simultaneously reinforce the 
state‘s political legitimacy (Smith, 1991). 
It is worth noting that Western countries are usually regarded as producers 
of global culture, due to their colonial, military, and commercial activities. In 
other words, Westernisation seems to be equated with not only modernisation, but 
also globalisation. However, instead of acting as the receivers of Western culture, 
the individual in the non-Western country also can be the distributor as well as the 
seeker of his/her own cultural features. For example, the diasporas in a given 
Western country can use different types of the mass media to voice or to access 
information concerned with their ‗motherland‘. Meanwhile, in consideration of 
targeted consumers of a specific region, the culturally-sensitive Western capitalist 
may deliberately produce the products related to the locals‘ demands. For example, 
the global fast food chains will have different recipes in different countries in 
order to cater for local customers. In short, people in different places of the world 
can live within the same framework of various accessible/adoptable cultural 
symbols paradoxically signifying ‗global‘ or ‗local‘. It implies global culture, 
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cultural diversification and cultural hybridisation can coexist in the nation 
experiencing globalisation. Meanwhile, it also implies the state is unable to 
maintain hegemonic national culture, let alone national identity (Hall, 1992; 
Scholte, 1996; Stevenson, 1999). 
 
Although it cannot be denied that national identity remains vital in terms 
of issues of civil rights and immigrant mobility, it can be suggested that national 
identity has been consistently shifting due to the nation‘s government change, 
developing multiculturalism, and involvement in globalisation. 
 
2.6 Shifting Taiwanese National Identity 
Building upon the previous selective dissection concerned with the nature 
of national identity and with factors being able to affect national identification, 
Section 2.6 briefly examines how Taiwanese national identity was formed by 
looking into the nation‘s complicated historical background. This discussion is 
amplified in Chapter 4. 
In the seventeenth century, European navigators began to pay attention on 
potential natural resources and the strategic importance of Taiwan Island, in 
which the Han People emigrating from the Mainland China and the Taiwanese 
Indigenous People coexisted without being ruled or governed by specific national 
political entities. In 1624, the Dutch Colonial Government became the first 
political entity of the region by establishing a colonial base in southwest Taiwan 
Island. In order to develop the colonial base‘s agricultural industry, the Dutch 
colonisers encouraged the Han Chinese, who had sufficient agricultural skills, to 
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immigrate from Mainland China. Eventually, the Han People became the majority 
in Taiwan Island‘s multicultural society. The significant impact of this condition 
on Taiwanese national identification was that Han Chinese culture became 
dominant when cultural hybridisation took place among different native groups. 
The condition was reinforced after 1662, when Chen Cheng-kung, a remaining 
officer of the Ming Empire, which was replaced by the Qing Empire on the 
Mainland China, drove off the Dutch colonisers. He made southwest Taiwan 
Island his base for restoring the Ming Dynasty, and therefore brought more Han 
immigrants. Meanwhile, other areas of Taiwan Island began to be explored due to 
its increasing population (Brown, 2004). 
In 1683, the Qing Empire eliminated Cheng‘s remaining power. The Qing 
Empire‘s significant contribution to Taiwanese national identification was that 
Western cultures, in the form of consumer products, living style and philosophy, 
were swiftly imported into Taiwan Island after the mid 1800s, given that the 
Empire lost wars to Western countries and was forced to let Western 
businesspeople and missionaries to enter the region (Su, 2005). 
In 1895, the Qing Empire lost the Sino-Japanese War to Japan and ceded 
Taiwan Island and other small neighbouring islands to the Japanese Empire. 
Naturally, when the Japanese Colonial Government governed the region, Japanese 
culture was hybridised with local culture. Meanwhile, it ought to be indicated that 
the Japanese colonisers also deliberately introduced aspects of Western culture to 
colonial Taiwan, given that the colonisers were keen to learn Westernisation at the 
time (Ibid). The circumstances made the natives‘ collective identity more 
complicated. 
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In 1945, the Japanese Empire lost in the Second World War. The 
Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) Government represented the state of China at the 
time and therefore took over Taiwan. Although the newly-arrived Chinese 
Mainlanders and the Taiwanese majority were both the Han People, different 
social-political experiences had made them become distinct groups. The new 
Government began to impose Chinese national identity on the local Taiwanese in 
a dictatorial manner. In 1949, the Kuomintang lost to the Communist Party of 
China in the war on the Mainland and was forced to retreat to Taiwan. The region 
eventually became the Chinese settlers‘ ‗permanent‘ settlement. Meanwhile, the 
Kuomintang Government‘s national identification schemes were implemented 
more intensely (Manthorpe, 2005). 
Apart from directly imposing Chinese national identity, the Kuomintang 
Government also intended to maintain its legitimacy by developing Taiwan‘s 
economy. After a series of successful economic restructuring policies were 
implemented, Taiwan eventually played an important role in global economic 
interaction. Meanwhile, a Western style consumer society was formed in the 
1970s (Chou, 2005). In other words, global culture and subsequent cultural 
hybridisation began to affect Taiwanese national identification. 
In the late 1980s, the Kuomintang Government began to loosen its strong 
control over Taiwanese society. Hence, many social movements against the 
Government‘s policies were able to take place. Meanwhile, given that the 
Kuomintang Government no longer intended to strongly impose Chinese national 
identity on the general population, the issue of what was Taiwanese national 
identity began to emerge. The Democratic Progressive Party, the main opposition 
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party composing of the locals as the majority, was officially recognised due to the 
nation‘s democratisation (Manthorpe, 2005; Roy, 2003). In 2000, the Party won 
the Presidential Election. The new Government began to set up new education 
curriculums and use political discourses to emphasise Taiwanisation, although 
those actions were often criticised by the Kuomintang, which became the main 
opposition party after the 2000 Presidential Election. In other words, although the 
Kuomintang Government, initially founded by the Chinese settlers, lost state 
power, its remaining power still affected the formation of Taiwanese national 
identity (Manthorpe, 2005). 
The above discussion generally shows how government change, 
developing multiculturalism, and globalisation affected the formation of 
Taiwanese national identity. A specific point relevant to this study and making 
Taiwanese national identity an interesting issue needs to be pointed out is that 
Taiwan was governed by the Chinese settler rulers after 1945. In other words, 
Taiwan was a settler country. In comparison to the colonisers who did not 
deliberately impose their own cultural roots on the natives, the Chinese settler 
rulers tried to impose Chinese national identity on the local Taiwanese. What is 
more, although settler rule was symbolically undermined when the party claiming 
to represent local power seized state power in 2000, it still had implications for 
Taiwanese national identification. A more detailed discussion concerned with 
settler rule is given in Chapter 4. 
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2.7 Conclusion:  National Identity—Imagined Collective Memory 
In consideration of the above debates, it is suggested that national identity 
constitutes an imagined collective memory. This term does not mean that every 
individual of a nation would have exactly the same ‗memory‘. Instead, it is used 
to denote the nature of national identity. That is to say, in order to make a specific 
group of people keep ‗collectively imagining‘ that they belong to the same nation, 
the state has applied an education system and various banal national-identity 
representations to make people unconsciously ‗remember‘ the state-approved 
information relevant to the nation‘s political, cultural, and economic features from 
the past to the present. However, government change, the formation of 
multicultural society, and globalisation can make people, in an everyday context, 
gain and lose factors associated with the nation‘s profile created by the state. In 
other words, national identification is a continuing ‗memory‘ reconstruction 
process in which people keep remembering or forgetting things related to the 
nation. 
In terms of Taiwan, the focal point of this thesis, the nation‘s imagined 
collective memory was also affected by government changes, developing 
multiculturalism, and globalisation. Specifically, the nation was once governed by 
the Chinese settler rulers who regarded Taiwan as their permanent homeland and 
therefore imposed Chinese national identity on the home population. In other 
words, the settler rulers intended to make the local Taiwanese collectively 
imagine/remember they were Chinese. The more detailed discussion concerned 
with settler rule‘s implications for Taiwanese national identity is given in Chapter 
4. 
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This Chapter has indicted how the state uses several banal objects (e.g. the 
national flag, coins and banknotes), and events (e.g. national holiday) as the 
physical representations of national identity to forge and maintain such an 
imagined collective memory. The next Chapter explores how built environments 
can also be the physical representations of the nation‘s imagined collective 
memory. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW (II): 
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND URBAN LANDSCAPES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 has conceptualised national identity, an imagined collective 
memory forged by the state; yet continuously changing due to the nation‘s 
government change, developing multiculturalism, and globalisation. Built upon 
the debates, this Chapter examines urban landscapes‘ role as physical 
representations of national identity. More specifically, Section 3.2 firstly 
examines the relationship between the state, national identity, and the city. It then 
focuses on investigating when shifts in national identity occur due to the 
aforementioned three factors, how the nation‘s urban changes would take place 
respectively. Following the discussion, Section 3.3 gives the relevant concluding 
remarks. 
 
3.2 Representing National Identity within Urban Landscapes 
Section 2.4 [p. 21] has applied several examples showing that national 
identity can be represented in the form of certain banal objects (e.g. the national 
flag and the national anthem). Meanwhile, a similar perspective given by Edensor 
(2002) is that national identity also can be represented through what he calls 
‗iconic sites‘. He elaborates on this viewpoint by citing that: 
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Typically these spatial symbols connote historical events, are either 
evidence of past cultures, providing evidence of a ‗glorious‘ past of 
‗golden age‘ and antecedence (Stonehenge, the Great Pyramids, the Taj 
Mahal), or they are monuments erected—often within larger 
memoryscapes—to commemorate significant episodes in an often 
retrospectively reconstructed national history (Statue of Liberty, Arc de 
Triomphe, Nelson‘s Column). They also frequently celebrate the 
modernity of the nation, are symbols of its progress (Empire State 
Building, Petronas Towers, Sydney Opera House). As such, the 
destruction of the ‗twin towers‘ of the World Trade Centre proved to be a 
potent attack on the idea of ‗America‘. In addition, there are a host of 
sites which symbolise official power: the royal palaces, halls of justice, 
military edifices, presidents‘ house, parliamentary building, and so on, 
which provide the materialised spaces of national rule.  
(Edensor, 2002: p. 45) 
 
Moreover, Edensor argues that iconic sites can constitute popular tourist 
attractions. In addition, their images are frequently captured by the mass media. 
Furthermore, they are usually the venues to host state-organised activities such as 
celebrations of particular events or festivals that are associated with the state 
national identification scheme. 
Apart from iconic sites, Edensor suggests that sites such as show grounds, 
religional institutions, and public entertainment venues also function as national 
identity‘s physical representations due to their association with the nation‘s 
cultural features (e.g. the national/state religion and the national sport). Although 
he does not coin a specific term to refer these sites, I intend to call them ‗national-
cultural sites‘. Meanwhile, Edensor also writes that:  
 
[T]he style and materiality of suburban working-class housing, the 
design of parks, the prevalence of leisure facilities such as football and 
rugby pitches, pubs and the mundane codes reinforced by street 
names … This regular pattern of spatial distribution means that little jars 
us out of our accustomed habituation of such landscapes. 
(Ibid: p. 51) 
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In other words, even a subtle urban element can constitute national-identity 
representations due to their consistent unchanged features and certain symbolic 
meanings that made people become familiar with as well as remember them. 
Edensor‘s insights inspire one to further consider how urban landscapes 
can be interpreted as physical representations of national identity, which the 
previous Chapter terms an ‗imagined collective memory‘. Clearly, the discussion 
so far is unable to be associated with two subjects examined in the previous 
Chapter. The first subject is the state‘s role in forging national identity. The 
second is shifts in national identity. In other words, it needs to create the 
connection between the state, shifting national identity, and urban landscapes. By 
consulting the relevant literature, the following four subsections explore that 
connection: 
 
(1) The capital city 
According to Hall (2006), some capital cities (e.g. London) combine all or 
most of the highest national-level functions related to politics, commerce, finance, 
media communication, education, etc. Furthermore, some capital cities (e.g. 
Washington) are designated as the political capital without significant economic 
functions. Moreover, some ex-capital cities (e.g. Berlin) constitute ancient 
historical and cultural references of the nation. In addition, some cities (e.g. New 
York) play a capital-city-like role, because they function as the nation‘s window 
for international cultural and economic interactions. Given these examples, one 
can suggest that a nation‘s capital city can be an appropriate spot for one to 
explore how national identity is represented within urban landscapes since 
 34 
national identity is an imagined collective memory related to the nation‘s political, 
cultural, and economic features. 
According to the literature concerned with different capital cities‘ 
establishment, it can be argued that iconic sites, such as government buildings, 
monuments, and landmarks, have been vital for a given capital city‘s design and 
planning. For instance, in colonial New Delhi, the British Colonial Government 
erected magnificent official buildings to symbolise the British Empire‘s superior 
power over the colony (King, 1976). Moreover, in Imperial Paris, Nazi Berlin (see 
Hall, 1998 and Tinniswood, 1998), Fascist Rome (see Tinniswood, 1998), and 
Soviet Moscow (see Hall, 2002; Tinniswood, 1998), the states constructed 
splendid statues and buildings in capital cities to symbolise the nations‘ strength 
and simultaneously to legitimise state power. Furthermore, in the case of 
Washington DC, the city was packed with landmarks to narrate the US‘s nation-
building story (Hall, 2002; Tinniswood, 1998). 
Apart from the iconic sites that may directly be associated with state 
power, national-cultural sites, such as national theatres, operas, museums, 
galleries, and libraries, are also significant features in a given capital city‘s 
planning project since they symbolise the nation‘s civilisation and cultural 
characteristics, notwithstanding that some of their functions is to store or exhibit 
the nation‘s historic or cultural relics. According to Kolbe (2007), in many post-
Communist Eastern European capital cities, the states dedicated themselves to 
national-cultural sites‘ construction to create the image denoting the resurgence of 
the nations‘ previously oppressed cultural development. 
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It is worth noting that a capital city‘s central business districts, packed 
with global retailers, international entertainment venues, and skyscrapers, also can 
be physical representations of the nation‘s economic achievement alongside 
modernisation. For instance, after George IV seized state power, in order to forge 
the image of Britain‘s promising economy and simultaneously to demonstrate his 
capability to run the nation, he created Regent Street in London to host many 
financial institutions and luxury goods retailers (Hall, 1998; Olsen, 1986). A 
similar example is that many post-Communist states in Eastern Europe began to 
implement new business districts in the capital cities to create the nations‘ new 
images as well as to boost the domestic economy (Kolbe, 2007). 
From the above discussion, overall, one can realise the close connection 
between the state, the capital city, and national identity. 
 
(2) Government change and the post-colonial city 
Section 2.5 [p. 22] reveals that the transformation of the state‘s 
administrative system can give rise to shifts in national identity alongside changes 
of national-identity representations. Likewise, the urban landscape can be changed 
due to the same condition. For instance, after the fall of the Soviet bloc, many 
communist monuments in Eastern European countries were demolished (Edensor, 
2002). Moreover, the former government buildings representing communist state 
power nowadays have lost their original meanings and been transformed into 
tourist attractions (Kolbe, 2007). 
By examining the urban history of former Western colonial cities in Asia 
or Africa, one can find more relevant links between government change, shifting 
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national identity, and changing urban landscapes because those cities have 
experienced three distinct periods, including pre-colonial, colonial, and post-
colonial eras. Numerous literatures
1
 have suggested that prior to the Western 
colonisers‘ arrival, religious buildings usually played the role as iconic sites as 
well as centres of the natives‘ living territory. However, the newly-arrived 
colonisers would then introduce urban planning to build their ‗ideal‘ colonial city 
whose building styles hybridised those of the West and the native. Those hybrid 
urban buildings symbolised the beginning of the colony‘s new history. Meanwhile, 
the natives‘ original built environments might be partially damaged even entirely 
demolished for the sake of colonial urban planning‘s implementation. 
It ought to be noted that the ‗new‘ history that the Western colonisers 
intended to create for the colony was a history implying not only becoming 
modernised, but also legitimising the colonisers‘ superiority. For instance, 
relevant ‗modern‘ political, cultural, and economic institutions and public 
facilities (e.g. financial centres, museums, schools, churches, sports grounds, etc.) 
were erected within the colonial city. Moreover, streets and places were 
deliberately named after important colonisers. In some cases, racial segregation 
was implemented to force the natives to live in the backwater. Given these 
examples, one can suggest that the colonial city‘s construction could change the 
natives‘ living experiences alongside their imagined collective memory. 
The coming of the post-colonial era in those Asian or African countries 
meant that the natives began to be able to reclaim their identity. Under this 
                                                 
1
 e.g. British Colonial New Delhi, see Hall (2002), James (1997), Jyoti (1992); King 
(1976) and Metcalf (2005); British Colonial Kenya, see Mazrui (2001); British Colonial Singapore, 
see Yeoh (1996); French Colonial North African cities, see Hamadeh (1992); Lamparkos (1992) 
and Rabinow (1992); French Colonial Pondicherry, see Chopra (1992); Italian Colonial Libya, see 
Fuller (1992) 
 37 
condition, the colonial urban legacies might be affected by the post-colonial state. 
For example, the street- and place-names might be replaced by those related to the 
natives‘ heroic figures (Lewandowski, 1984). However, it does not mean that the 
post-colonial state would intend to reshape the city into what it looked like during 
the pre-colonial era. In fact, many colonial urban legacies, denoting the 
colonisers‘ past control, can stand still in the post-colonial era since they 
constitute the city‘s significant infrastructures or people‘s regular visiting places 
(e.g. museums, banks, and playgrounds) (Alsayyad, 1992; McClintock, 1994; 
Vale, 1992). Apart from these physical constructions, moreover, the unbalanced 
urban development caused by the colonial city‘s racial segregation may also 
remain. It means that the former backwater where the colonised lived would 
become the low-income social groups‘ residencies after the coming of the post-
colonial era (Hall, 2002). What is more, those Asian or African post-colonial 
states may even actively add Western architectural features to post-colonial urban 
landscapes. For example, the new official buildings, combining the Western and 
native architectural styles, could be erected to symbolise the nation‘s 
independence as well as its capability to pursue modernisation without the former 
Western colonisers‘ guidance (Vale, 2006). Overall, these examples show that 
colonial experiences have already become part of the nation‘s imagined collective 
memory; and it is evidenced by colonial urban planning‘s permanent implications 
for the post-colonial city. 
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(3) Multicultural society, diaspora spaces, and ethnic-cultural sites 
Section 2.5 [p. 23] has indicated that the emergence of a multicultural 
society would give rise to shifts in national identity. In terms of this condition‘s 
implications for the nation‘s urban landscape, according to the relevant literature2, 
it can be acknowledged that under the circumstances where international traders, 
economic immigrants, tourists, or even the military stationed overseas have been 
participating in the locals‘ everyday life, these newcomers would introduce 
different cultures to the region. Meanwhile, the locals may also actively provide 
services (e.g. food and entertainment) that the newcomers are familiar with. As a 
result, not only through the physical urban elements‘ architectural styles, the city 
can also demonstrate cultural diversity and hybridisation through food, music, 
religions, clothing, and entertainment. 
It ought to be noted that the nation‘s multiculturalism also can give rise to 
the formation of specific ‗diaspora space‘ in the city. Clearly, individuals of 
different immigrant groups can demonstrate their respective cultural symbols or 
activities (e.g. speaking mother tongue or engaging in traditional entertainment) in 
the city‘s general public places, such as parks or squares (Rishbeth, 2004; 
Sandercock, 1998). Nonetheless, the disapora space is a symbolic territory where 
a group of specific immigrants and their following generations settle together. 
Notwithstanding, in this space, the ethnic group can freely sustain their cultural 
practice as well as identity. Meanwhile, the ‗others‘ in the nation would also 
recognise this space‘s symbolic meaning (Cohen, 1997). 
                                                 
2
 e.g. the East African cities, see Gensheimer (2001); Mombasa, see Mazrui (2001) 
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The diaspora space‘s formation in the city may involve immigrants with 
the same ethnic background attempt to live together. Such formation may result 
from the immigrants‘ marginalisation by the predominant ethnic group or even by 
the native authorities. In this case, the diaspora space was usually formed in the 
suburbs with lower rent prices
3
. 
Nevertheless, with the development of the nation‘s multiculturalism, the 
oppression of the ethnic minority can be lifted. Meanwhile, the construction of the 
theme museum or restoration of the diaspora space can take place to symbolise 
that the identity of ethnic minority is acknowledged. The government institutions 
may actively get involved into these places‘ constructions in order to demonstrate 
its determination to pursue ethnic harmony. For example, when the US and Japan 
confronted each other in the Second World War, the Japanese Americans‘ living 
quarter, nicknamed Little Tokyo, in Los Angeles declined since the US 
Government forced many residents to move to specific camps to keep them under 
watch. After the end of the War, several non-governmental organisations began to 
dedicate themselves to Little Tokyo‘s symbolic restoration by setting up the 
Japanese cultural centre and the theme museum in the area. Ultimately, the 
government institutions also began to participate in the relevant projects (Hayden, 
1995). Overall, one can suggest that these ‗ethnic-cultural sites‘ represent not only 
a specific ethnic group‘s imagined collective memory of being part of a diaspora, 
but also part of the development of the nation‘s multiculturalism. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 e.g. non-slave African America in St Louis prior the 1861 American Civil War, see 
Mooney (2001); Mexican and Italian immigrants in Los Angeles, see Ghirado (2001); Chinese 
immigrants in California, see Yip (2001); Japanese immigrants in Los Angeles, see Hayden (1995) 
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(4) The globalising city 
Section 2.5 [pp. 23-5] suggests that in the era of globalisation, different 
cultures can be spread worldwide due to global capitalism and people‘s trans-
national movement. The condition can give rise to the formation of global culture, 
cultural diversification, and cultural hybridisation in a nation, implying changes of 
the nations‘ imagined collective memory.  
The previous subsection has mentioned how cultural diversification and 
hybridisation created from immigrant groups changed a nation‘s urban scene. In 
the case of global culture, meanwhile, one can perceive it through a city‘s 
commercial areas where global retail stores, fast food chains, and relevant 
entertainment venues are located. Such a scene symbolises not only the nation‘s 
involvement in global capitalism, but also the locals‘ adoption of global culture 
(Clark, 2003; Wong, 1997). 
Clearly, the state can collaborate with the private sector to construct the 
city‘s central business district where office buildings, financial service centres, 
theatres, hotels, department stores, and skyscrapers are erected to attract global 
entrepreneurs. Although this globally-standardised business district‘s appearance 
and even function may not have many references (e.g. architectural styles and 
entertainment activities) related to the locals, it can improve the nation‘s economy 
as well as image. Simultaneously, the state‘s legitimacy can be reinforced (Hall, 
2002; Kaika and Thielen, 2006). Incidentally, such ‗modern‘, and local-culture 
free, central business districts were initially erected to regenerate declining cities 
in the US during the 1970s. With accelerated globalisation, eventually, this kind 
of commercial place without distinct local cultural references became the symbol 
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of modernisation and has been adopted by many countries around the world 
(Harvey, 1993). 
However, the globally-standardised urban landscape‘s creation may also 
affect urban elements representing the locals‘ old collective memory. For example, 
although a new commercial district‘s implementations may be able to boost the 
local economy or improve the area‘s image, the residents may still disagree with 
the plan carried out by the government or the private sector to transform their 
familiar living environments into a globally-standardised commercial spot, while 
the urban conservationists would protest if the plan would affect historic buildings. 
Under these circumstances, conflict can surface between different interest groups, 
including the government institutions, architects, historians, real-estate 
entrepreneurs, planners, and local residents. In short, the nation‘s globalising 
urban landscape can give rise to localism; meaning an emphasis on urban 
conservation, rather than on economic/urban globalisation (Boyer, 1996; 
Hannigan, 1998; Harvey, 1993; Sklair, 2006). 
 
3.3 Conclusion: (Re-)remembered and (Re-)forgotten Spaces 
From the above discussion, it can be summarised that the nation‘s urban 
landscape constitutes a physical representation of national identity. After all, the 
city is a space where people‘s everyday experiences and socio-cultural practices 
take place; the condition eventually generates people‘s collective memory/identity. 
Meanwhile, the state plays an important role in setting this physical representation. 
For instance, the state can erect an iconic site (e.g. a monument or a government 
building) to denote a specific national event or the state‘s superiority. Moreover, 
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the construction of a national-cultural site, associated with the nation‘s cultural 
features such as religion, entertainment, and tradition, can also result from the 
state‘s deliberate operation. Furthermore, the state can create commercial areas 
packed with global retailers and international entertainment venues to symbolise 
the nation‘s economic success and modernisation. In fact, even subtle urban 
elements (e.g. street names and architectural styles), which may be less associated 
with the identity of the state, can be contributory factors in forging national 
identity since their permanence of these features make them familiar to people. 
The capital city is usually a distinct place for one to observe those physical 
representations, given that its history and functions have close connections to the 
nation‘s political, cultural, and economic standings. 
Meanwhile, changes in the nation‘s urban landscape can imply shifts in 
national identity taking place due to the nation‘s government change, developing 
multicultural society, and involvement in globalisation. For instance, an iconic 
site built by the former government may be demolished or functionally changed 
by the new government. Moreover, the development of the nation‘s 
multiculturalism can result in the formation of the diaspora spaces where a 
specific ethnic group settle and strongly keep their cultural identity. In addition, 
the creation of globally-standardised central business districts in the city can 
symbolise not only the nation‘s economic improvement, but also the dominance 
of global culture in the nation. 
It ought to be noted that although shifts in national identity alongside 
urban changes may imply the emergence of new urban elements and the 
demolition of old ones, the latter still can be symbolically re-emerged someday. 
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For instance, the post-colonial state can erect new iconic sites representing native 
identity that was oppressed by the colonisers. Moreover, the construction of an 
ethnic-cultural site symbolises that the previously oppressed ethnic minority‘s 
identity ultimately gained its recognition in the nation. In addition, urban 
conservation can become a significant issue when the existence of a local historic 
place is threatened by a globally-standardised business district project. 
Reflecting the previous Chapter‘s conclusion that national identity is an 
imagined collective memory and national identification is a recurring process 
involving remembering, forgetting and reconstructing, it is suggested that the 
nation‘s changing urban landscape constitutes (re-)remembered and (re-)forgotten 
spaces. That is to say, the built environment consists of physical national-identity-
representations that the state intends to make people remember. Nevertheless, due 
to the nation‘s government change, developing multiculturalism, and globalisation, 
new urban elements representing new memories can appear. Meanwhile, although 
old urban elements representing old collective memories may be demolished, they 
can still be reconstructed some day; and even be replaced by the previously ‗new‘ 
urban elements that had once replaced them. In short, the nation‘s urban landscape 
is a battle ground where a continuous contest between remembering and 
forgetting the nation‘s profile through those physical national-identity-
representations is taking place. 
Built upon the above arguments concerned with the connection between 
the state, national identity, and urban landscapes, the next Chapter employs the 
relevant literature to introduce the basic profile of Taiwan, the focal subject of the 
 44 
thesis; and to examine how shifting Taiwanese identity has been represented with 
the nation‘s (re-)remembered and (re-)forgotten spaces. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LITERATURE REVIEW (III): 
THE CHINESE SETTLER STATE AND TAIPEI CITY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 has conceptualised national identity and briefly investigated 
how Taiwanese national identity was forged. Meanwhile, Chapter 3 examined 
how national identity can be represented within urban landscapes in the form of 
(re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces. This Chapter employs the relevant 
academic studies to reveal how shifting Taiwanese identity was represented 
within the nation‘s changing urban scene. More importantly, by reviewing these 
existing studies, the Chapter also develops and presents the research questions of 
the thesis. 
It ought to be recalled that Chapter 3 suggests that a nation‘s government 
change can give rise to shifts in national identity and the urban landscape‘s 
respective changes. Meanwhile, many cases exemplifying this viewpoint are 
concerned with the nation in the context of a post-Communist or post-colonial 
state. However, in terms of Taiwan, the thesis‘s focal subject, the nation‘s 
historical background is complicated beyond post-Communist or post-colonial 
countries; given that it has experienced not only Japanese colonial rule, but also 
Chinese ‗settler rule‘. Section 4.2 explains the definition of the settler country. 
Moreover, it applies the relevant literature to illustrate how settler rule‘s transition 
and transformation can have potential implications for the nation‘s built 
environments. Section 4.3 then applies the existing literature to examine the 
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implications of Chinese settler rule for Taiwanese identity and its urban 
representations. Section 4.4 presents conclusions from the existing literature and 
points out the issues that remain. Section 4.5 then develops the research questions 
of the thesis. 
 
4.2 Transforming Settler Rule and Changing Urban Landscapes 
In his study Transforming Settler States, Weitzer (1990) describes the 
settler country‘s features: 
 
Settler rule is one of form of political domination that is in decline 
around the world … They share in the general historical decline of 
colonialism, but settler states have shown more resilience because they 
represent permanent home to a dominant group that is prepared to resist 
metropolitan pressures for change and any hint of native resistance … 
Settler societies are founded by migrant groups who assume a 
superordinate position vis-à-vis native inhabitants and build self-
sustaining states that are de jure or de facto independent from the mother 
country and organized around the settler‘s political domination over the 
indigenous population … In some cases (Rhodesia, South Africa, 
Liberia), economic interests (exploitation of natives and prosperity of 
settlers) provide a key rationale for political domination; in others 
(Northern Ireland, Israel, Taiwan), economic considerations have been 
secondary to other imperatives: maintaining a specific religious or 
cultural order (Northern Ireland, Israel), a refuge or homeland (Taiwan, 
Israel). To constitute a settler state, the descendants of settlers must 
remain politically dominant over natives, who present at least a latent 
threat to the settlers‘ supremacy … Settlers considered the territory their 
permanent home; this paramount interest shaped all social, economic, 
and political relations with the indigenous population. Compared to the 
minimalist coercive apparatus of the classic colonial state, a settler state 
is institutionally strong: the security core of the state has at its disposal 
substantial resources (finance, personnel, weaponry), and the exercise of 
repression is determined by settlers‘ assessments of security, not 
metropolitan approval. Independent control over state coercion 
empowers settler regimes to resist domestic threats and foreign 
machinations; thus attempts to transform them have been more 
problematic than those to decolonize conventional colonies. 
(Weitzer, 1990: pp. 25-6) 
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Arguably, from a broader view, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the 
US can also be regarded as settler countries; given that they were white settler 
colonies. Nevertheless, why Weitzer just cites those nations, including Rhodesia, 
South Africa, Liberia, Northern Ireland, Israel, and Taiwan, is because the focal 
point of his study is how the settler country can transform into the post-settler 
country and the implications of this process. Weitzer suggests that although each 
of these settler countries has its unique historical background, a common feature 
is that strong political control or even authoritarian governing is the general way 
applied by the settler rulers to secure their legitimacy and predominance. Under 
this condition, democratisation plays an important role in the settler country‘s 
transformation since it can empower the natives to participate in political decision 
making, and; perhaps, to gain state power ultimately. In other words, the 
democratisation process constitutes a crucial political transition era that can 
transform the settler country into the post-settler country. 
Although the focused nations in his study are Northern Ireland and 
Zimbabwe, Weitzer still briefly expresses his perspectives on other settler 
countries‘ political contexts. In terms of Taiwan, the subject of this thesis, he 
writes that: 
 
Few contemporary settler regimes have attempted to open the polity to 
the extent of threatening continued settler supremacy. Taiwan may prove 
to be a deviant case. Since 1987 the regime has lifted martial law (which 
had been in effect for thirty-nine years), tolerated the formation of 
opposition parties, eased press restrictions, and freed political prisoners. 
A native Taiwanese has become president (after the sudden death of 
Chiang Ching-kuo [(the settler ruler)]). Despite these significant reforms, 
repressive emergency laws remain in effect; [Chinese] mainland settlers 
(14 percent of the population) are vastly overrepresented in the three 
legislative bodies (more than 80 percent); and powerful military elites 
and ruling party stalwarts remain opposed to further democratization and 
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liberalization. According to one observer, the bottom line is that the 
ruling party (the Kuomintang) will not allow itself to be dislodged from 
power, and the softening of authoritarian rule should not be confused 
with genuine democratization. It remains to be seen if a reformist 
solution will indeed make Taiwan unique among settler states. 
(Ibid, 1990; p. 34) 
 
However, Weitzer‘s perspective on Taiwan‘s ‗contemporary‘ condition 
was published in 1990. Since then, Taiwan‘s democratisation eventually led the 
nation to the post-settler era in 2000, in which the Kuomintang (the Chinese 
settler rule) lost state power. The result confirms Weitzer‘s view: democratisation 
is the key to the settler country‘s transformation. 
Meanwhile, Weitzer‘s perspective on settler rule inspires one to consider 
how shifts in Taiwanese identity could occur through the nation‘s settler-
governing, political transition, and post-settler eras; and how such shifting identity 
could reflect on the nation‘s urban changes. Prior to exploring this emerging issue, 
the urban history of South Africa provides an insight into Taiwanese cities‘ 
potential changes. Why the case of South Africa is employed here is due to two 
reasons. Firstly, although two countries‘ history timelines are not exactly the same, 
South Africa and Taiwan both were settler countries respectively governed by the 
White minority and the Chinese minority. Secondly, South Africa has experienced 
settler rule‘s establishment, transition, and transformation. Therefore, there have 
been the relevant studies (Beall et al., 2002; Bollens, 1999; Saff, 1998) showing 
significant urban changes during the nation‘s different political periods. 
By reviewing those studies, it can be indicated that after the British 
established colonial rule in South Africa, unsurprisingly, colonial urban planning 
in major cities, such as Cape Town and Johannesburg, was designed to benefit the 
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White minority, while the Non-white majority were forced to live in squats in 
suburbs. The situation remained unchanged after the coming of the settler-
governing era in which the colony formally became the Republic of South Africa 
in 1961. Nonetheless, since the late 1980s, settler rule began to be undermined by 
several democratisation movements. Under this condition, more and more Non-
whites were able to rent properties in White residential districts. Such a change 
became more evident after the governing Nationalist Party formally gave up its 
authoritarian rule in 1990, symbolising the beginning of the nation‘s political 
transition. 
However, it ought to be noted that those positive changes only benefited 
the wealthy Non-white population. Many Non-whites were still living in squats. 
The situation remains unchanged after Nelson Mandela became the first Non-
white South Africa President in 1994, symbolising the coming of the country‘s 
post-settler era. That is to say, the new government has still been unable to 
regenerate those suburbs with their high concentration of low-income population 
and many social problems. Given this condition, it can be suggested that post-
settler South Africa‘s urban scene to a certain extent is ‗stuck in transition‘. 
From the above brief review of White settler rule‘s implications for South 
African cities during the nation‘s transition and post-settler eras, one can infer that 
a similar trend would happen in Taiwan. That is to say, although Chinese settler 
rule‘s unequal urban policies were affected by the nation‘s political transition; 
urban problems still were unable to be further resolved after Taiwan entered into 
the post-settler era. What is more, given that those South Africa urban studies are 
policy-oriented, one can further consider whether the relevant physical changes, 
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such as the specific urban elements‘ construction or demolition, would happen 
due to settler rule‘s transition and collapse in Taiwan. In addition, one can also 
consider how Chinese settler rule‘s transition and transformation would affect the 
nation‘s cultural and economic conditions; and how the circumstances would 
subsequently affect the nation‘s urban landscape. 
The next Section focuses on literature that illustrates the relationship 
between shifting national identity and urban landscapes in Taiwan. Those studies, 
however, are not just concerned with Taiwan‘s settler-governing, transition, and 
post-settler eras. I, therefore, trace back to Taiwan‘s pre-settler-governing era that 
involved the participation of several political entities. This historical approach 
generates a comprehensive view on how relevant urban elements has been (re-
)remembered/(re-)forgotten within Taiwan‘s capital city. 
 
4.3 Reviewing Literature of Taiwanese History and Taipei City 
In this Section, I describe the stories of Taiwan‘s shifting national identity 
alongside Taipei City‘s changing urban landscape in chronological order. 
However, details of some specific historical events are cited in Appendices of this 
thesis: 
 
The Dutch colonial era (1624-1662) 
Taiwan, a geographic term referring to Taiwan Island and several small 
islands neighbouring it, lies between Asia‘s eastern seaboard and the west Pacific, 
separated from the Mainland China by the Taiwan Strait [see Figure 4.1, p. 51]. In 
the late sixteenth century, the Portuguese navigators encountered the Island and 
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Figure 4.1—The location of Taiwan 
called it ‗Ilha Formosa‘, meaning the beautiful island. Thereafter, IIha Formosa‘s 
natural resources began to attract European navigators‘ attention. However, prior 
to the coming of the Dutch colonisers, the Island was still an open land where the 
Han People immigrating from the Mainland China and the Indigenous People 
lived without state control
4
 (Manthorpe, 2005). 
In 1624, the Dutch colonisers established a colonial base in the southwest 
Taiwan Island, around present-day Tainan City. Thereafter, in order to develop 
the region‘s agriculture, the Dutch Colonial Government deliberately encouraged 
the Han People, who had the basic knowledge of agriculture, to emigrate from 
China to Taiwan. Eventually, the Han People become the Island‘s majority. 
Meanwhile, cultural hybridisation also emerged among the Han and Indigenous 
Peoples (Brown, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 See Appendix 1 for more details of Taiwan‘s history prior to the Dutch colonial era. 
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Cheng Cheng-kung’s regime (1662-1683) 
During the mid-seventeenth century, the Ming Empire was replaced by the 
Qing Empire on the Mainland China. Cheng Cheng-kung, one of the Ming 
Dynasty‘s remaining officials, led his troops to keep fighting with the Qing 
Empire. Ultimately, Cheng drove off the Dutch colonisers and made Taiwan 
Island his base for restoring the Ming Empire. Under such condition, the Han 
People who did not want to be ruled by the Qing Empire also emigrated to the 
Island
5
. Although Cheng still used the Dutch colonisers‘ base in the southwest 
Taiwan Island as the administrative centre, the immigrants started to explore other 
parts of the Island. Therefore, cultural hybridisation among the Han and 
Indigenous Peoples was extended. Being the majority, the Han People were more 
predominant within this cultural-hybridisation process (Ibid). 
 
The Qing-ruling era (1683-1895) 
In 1683, the Qing Empire terminated Cheng‘s power in Taiwan Island. 
Thereafter, it just sent troops to exploit the Island‘s natural resources, rather than 
developing the region. In fact, the Qing Empire even forced the Island‘s Han 
population to ‗move back‘ to the Mainland and prevented the Mainland‘s Han 
People from moving to the Island. These policies implied that the Qing Empire 
initially treated Taiwan Island as a colony. However, since more and more foreign 
countries showed their interest in occupying the Island, the Qing Empire 
                                                 
5
 The Ming Empire was established by the Han People, the majority of the Chinese 
community in the world. Meanwhile, the Qing Empire was formed by the Chi People originally 
living around the northeast Mainland China. Because of it, some Han People did not want to be 
ruled by the Qing Empire and therefore emigrated to the Taiwan Island. Nonetheless, after 
establishing their imperial rule on the Mainland, the Chi People eventually adopted Han culture 
(Manthorpe, 2005). 
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Figure 4.2—The locations of Mengja, Dadaocheng, and Chengnei 
The left picture shows the Japanese Colonial Government‘s 1905 Taipei City urban 
planning. One can see a square formed by four bold lines representing the stone walls 
originally bounding Chengnei. The colonisers destroyed the walls and allowed their base to 
become four boulevards. Meanwhile, the right picture illustrates colonial Taipei City‘s 
residency distribution. It can be seen that in addition to Chengnei, another two areas in the 
west and the north were intensely populated. They were Mengjia and Dadaocheng 
respectively, adjoining the Danshuei River passing west Taipei Basin. 
eventually recognised Taiwan Island‘s strategic importance, and thus made it an 
administrative province in 1887 (Manthorpe, 2005). 
Prior to Taiwan Province‘s creation, like Cheng Cheng-kung‘s regime, the 
Qing Empire‘s administrative centre was located at southwest Taiwan Island 
where the basic infrastructure were already founded by the Dutch colonisers. 
However, given the fact that foreign powers kept invading the Island‘s northern 
areas, the new administrative centre was decided to be located at present-day 
Taipei Basin, where two small commercial towns, namely Mengja and 
Dadaocheng, were already formed
6
. In 1884, a stone-walled ‗city‘—called 
Chengnei, meaning ‗inside the city‘—was established as the future administrative 
centre [Figure 4.2] (Su, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 See Appendix 2 for more details about the formation of Mengja and Dadaocheng. 
 54 
Liu Ming-chuan was one of the few Qing officials who believed that 
Western countries‘ industrial and technological modernisation experiences would 
benefit the Empire. However, his thinking was criticised by conservative senior 
officials. Thus, when he became the first Governor of Taiwan Province, Liu used 
stone-walled Taipei City as the laboratory for his modernisation schemes. For 
example, he set up the electric streetlight and the railway. But when the senior 
Qing officers on the Mainland were aware of Liu‘s Westernisation projects, he 
was forced to leave his post in 1891 (Manthorpe, 2005). 
It ought to be noted that although the Qing Empire claimed Taiwan Island 
to be its administrative province, it did not really control the whole Island because 
the Island‘s east areas were dominated by the Indigenous population. In other 
words, the Qing Empire was ‗ruling‘ the Island, rather than ‗governing‘ the entire 
region (Ibid). The condition echoes Anderson‘s (1991) arguments that the pre-
modern state (kingdoms or empires) was not able to practise sovereignty within a 
clearly defined territorial boundary, let alone being able to forge a hegemonic 
imagined collective memory among the ‗nation‘. 
The capital Taipei‘s construction process also shows the Qing Empire‘s 
inability to govern Taiwan Province. According to Su (2005), although the City‘s 
location was chosen by the administrative government, its construction depended 
on the local wealthy business and cultural elites. It is because these social elites‘ 
coordination and financial contribution enabled them not only to possess 
properties or shop fronts in the stone-walled City, but also to become ‗quasi-
officials‘, levying taxes on the locals. This backdrop story implies that the Qing 
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Empire‘s state power was not really executed in the capital Taipei from the very 
beginning, let alone the entire Taiwan Island. 
 
The Japanese colonial era (1895-1945) 
In 1895, due to the Qing Empire‘s defeat in the First Sino-Japan War, 
Taiwan Island and its neighbouring small islands were ceded to Japan. The 
geographical term ‗Taiwan‘ was therefore defined. More importantly, in contrast 
to the Dutch colonisers, Cheng Cheng-kung, and the Qing Empire, all of which 
‗ruled‘ only part of Taiwan, the Japanese Colonial Government was the first 
political entity ‗governing‘ the entire Island (Brown, 2004; Manthorpe, 2005). It 
can be inferred that the Taiwanese imagined collective memory began to emerge 
at this time. 
By learning Western technology and political system, Japan eventually 
became a powerful country in the Far East from the late 1860s. Hence, when the 
Japanese colonisers arrived at Taiwan, even Liu Ming-chuan‘s ‗modern‘ capital 
Taipei was regarded as a crude product, not to mention the rest of Taiwan. In fact, 
Su (2005) indicates that the Qing Empire did not have adequate knowledge of 
geographical survey and census, nor of urban planning. This implies that the Qing 
Empire was unable to comprehend and master the region. Meanwhile, it also 
reflects the previous subsection‘s statement [p. 54] that the Qing Empire was not a 
modern state being able to execute state power in its territorial boundary. 
After struggling with the hot weather, adverse living environments, and 
the natives‘ rebellions, the Japanese Colonial Government decided to start from 
scratch. Through the use of a census and the survey of colonial Taiwan‘s cultural, 
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natural, and geographical conditions, the colonisers began to efficiently control 
their first colony. It symbolises the first time in which state power was able to 
govern across entire Taiwan (Ibid). 
Meanwhile, the state power‘s direct intervention on urban development 
demonstrated the Japanese colonisers‘ preference for Westernisation. For instance, 
Chengnei‘s stone walls were demolished in order to create a wide field of vision. 
The urban elements, including the sewer system, public parks, statues, and 
monuments, that did not exist previously in Taiwan, were constructed in the City. 
Western entertainment places, such as cafés and theatres, appeared in the newly-
built central business district. In addition, the government buildings and the 
museums symbolising state power as well as colonial identity were erected. It is 
worth noting that many new colonial buildings were constructed in hybrid styles 
with a mix of classic Western architectural features. The natives were also 
encouraged to build their dwellings featuring these mixed styles. Overall, these 
changes served the Colonial Government‘s intention to make colonial Taipei City 
become ‗Oriental Paris‘ (Ibid). 
During the process of colonial Taipei City‘s modernisation, the natives 
were affected by colonial urban planning. For instance, the colonisers needed to 
negotiate with the natives if a public construction project would affect their living 
quarters or religious centres, but in some cases, these old sites were demolished. 
Moreover, public facilities, such as parks and public transportation, were provided 
in areas dominated by the Japanese population (Ibid). In short, although the 
Japanese Colonial Government did not force the natives to live in slums, which 
would be against the name of ‗Oriental Paris‘, the ‗difference‘ between the 
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colonisers and the colonised was still observable through colonial Taipei City‘s 
urban landscape
7
. 
 
The settler-governing era: prior to the political transition (1945-1987) 
After the end of the Second World War in 1945, Japanese colonisers were 
forced to leave Taiwan. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang (KMT)
8
, which represented 
the state of Republic of China (ROC) since 1912, took over the region and 
claimed it to be a province of the ROC territory. Although the local majority and 
the newly-arrived Chinese Mainlanders were both Han People, different socio-
political experiences made them become two distinct groups. In fact, the KMT 
Government claimed that the local people needed to be re-educated since they 
were brainwashed by Japanese colonisers. Consequently, Mandarin immediately 
became the locals‘ ‗national‘ language. Moreover, Chinese literatures, history, 
and geography also became the subjects of the state-edited textbooks (Manthorpe, 
2005). These circumstances mean that the home population was unable to become 
self-governing despite the end of Japanese colonial era
9
. 
Despite its dedication to forging the new imagined collective memory of 
the national identity among the home population, the KMT Government was 
unable to deal with post-war Taiwan‘s economic recession and conflicts between 
locals and KMT officials and soldiers. Ultimately, a severe clash between the 
local population and the settler rulers, called the ‗2-2-8 Incident‘ in present-day 
Taiwan, broke out in the capital Taipei in 1947. The Incident subsequently caused 
                                                 
7
 See Appendix 3 for more details of Japan‘s colonial urban planning. 
8
 ‗Kuomintang‘, the Party‘s official English name, is the Mandarin term for ‗Nationalist 
Party‘. Incidentally, the Party‘s whole name ought to be translated as ‗Chinese Nationalist Party‘. 
9
 See Appendix 4 for more details of origins of the ROC and Taiwan‘s controversial 
international status. 
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nationwide riots
10
. After bloodily suppressed the rebellions, the KMT applied 
strict polices and secret agents to eliminate the local social elites who were 
supposed to have the potential to threaten its political legitimacy (Ibid). 
In May 1949, since the KMT was struggling with the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) in the Chinese Civil War on the Mainland China
11
, martial law 
alongside stronger linguist restrictions, education policies, and media censorship 
were implemented in Taiwan in order to reinforce not only the KMT 
Government‘s legitimacy, but also anti-Communist ideology (Ibid). 
In the late 1949, the KMT lost the War with the CPC and retreated to 
Taiwan. During this period, approximate 2,000,000 Mainlanders came to Taiwan. 
These newcomers accounted for 14 per cent of Taiwan‘s population at that time. 
Approximate 600,000 of them were KMT soldiers and their dependents. Under 
these circumstances, Taiwan became the KMT‘s base for re-conquering the ‗lost‘ 
Mainland. However, the fact is that the KMT has never re-conquered the 
Mainland. Therefore, Taiwan ultimately became these newly-arrived 
Mainlanders‘ ‗home‘ (Ibid). 
There have been some academic studies revealing how the KMT 
Government used the capital Taipei to serve its identification scheme. For 
instance, many new government institutions and landmarks were deliberately 
designed to represent imperial-palace architectural styles at Mainland China (Tay, 
1995). Furthermore, new road and place names were adopted, which were 
associated with nationalistic slogans and terms, those names in the Mainland 
                                                 
10
 See Appendix 5 for more details of the 2-2-8 Incident. 
11
 See Appendix 4 for more details of the Chinese Civil War. 
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China, and KMT figures (Leitner and Kang, 1999). Moreover, statues of KMT 
figures became essential features in public parks and squares (Hou, 2000). 
In addition to using physical urban elements, the KMT Government also 
attempted to legitimise its political control by strengthening Taiwan‘s economy. 
With the support and advice of the USA, Taiwan‘s economy was improved from 
the 1950s
12
. In 1971, with the support from the USSR, the CPC‘s People‘s 
Republic of China (PRC) replaced the ROC in the United Nations (UN). 
Consequently, the ROC became a de facto independent country without any 
international community‘s recognition 13 . This diplomatic crisis reinforced the 
KMT‘s determination to apply economic achievements to secure state power (Hsu, 
J. Y., 2005). 
Such a series of economic developments as well as of power legitimacy 
schemes were also represented by Taiwan‘s changing urban scene. For instance, 
in the 1950s, lands initially belonging to heavyweight landowners were 
redistributed towards sharecroppers. Thereafter, the KMT Government allowed 
those agricultural lands to be used for industry, to promote Taiwan‘s light 
industries, such as shoe and cloth making. Under these circumstances, 
urbanisation was accelerated. Subsequently, rural-urban migration also emerged 
(Ibid). 
Moreover, in the 1960s, in order to develop Taiwan‘s export-oriented 
manufacturing industry, the KMT Government applied the new policies, such as 
tax cuts, to attract foreign investors. Taiwan‘s cheap labour also helped the 
industry‘s promotion. As a result, many factories and warehouses were erected in 
                                                 
12
 See Appendices 4 and 5 for more details of the relationship between the US and 
Taiwan. 
13
 See Appendix 6 for more details of Taiwan‘s diplomatic crisis. 
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east Taipei City, which constituted the capital city‘s suburbs with a lower 
population density (Chou, 2005). 
Furthermore, in the 1970s, at the beginning of Taiwan‘s diplomatic crisis, 
the KMT began to reinforce its political legitimacy by embarking on mega 
infrastructure constructions, such as the motorway, to stimulate economic 
developments throughout Taiwan. Ultimately, the service industry began to 
emerge, evidenced by the growing number of finance institutions, insurance 
companies, and real estate agents, and also by hotels and department stores 
erected in Taipei City during the mid-1970s (Ibid). These newly-built glass-
concrete-steel skyscrapers in the capital city represented the nation‘s flourishing 
economic development during that period (Tay, 1995). 
Since the 1980s, cheap labour in China and other Southeast Asian 
countries became a threat to Taiwan‘s export-oriented manufacturing industry. 
Given this new threat, the KMT Government began to develop high-tech 
industries, such as computer and micro chip manufacturing (Hsu, J. Y., 2005). 
Thus, several science and high-tech parks were built in the capital Taipei and its 
neighbouring cities (Chou, 2005). As a matter of fact, due to the growth of the 
middle classes resulting from economic development, Taiwan itself also faced 
labour shortages. Hence, the KMT Government began to allow foreign labour to 
participate in certain public construction projects and private caring services. This 
condition led to Taiwan‘s multiculturalism. Incidentally, the other distinct group 
of new immigrants were immigrant spouses. Their participation in the Taiwanese 
society resulted from Taiwan‘s increasing social polarisation that drove the low-
income Taiwanese males to find civil partners in Southeast Asian countries 
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through match-maker companies‘ operation. In terms of Taipei City, the 
immigrant spouses were concentrated in the suburbs due to their partners‘ socio-
economic backgrounds (Tai, 2005). 
From the above discussion, it seems that the KMT successfully developed 
Taiwan‘s economy since the 1950s and thereby established the capital Taipei as a 
multicultural city. However, this economic restructuring as well as power 
legitimacy process also had other significant impacts. For instance, the 
complicated and fragmented land ownership, resulting from the 1950s‘ land 
reform, eventually became an obstacle to urban renewal since the 1980s; because 
the government institutions have to negotiate with a large number of landowners 
who have different interests (Chou, 2005). Moreover, in order to strengthen 
human resources and economic development, the KMT Government dedicated 
itself to constructing schools and transportation infrastructure, but, the 
construction of civic facilities, such as parks and community centres, was ignored 
(Huang, 2005a). In addition, public housing schemes only favoured civil servants, 
educators, and military figures composed of the Chinese Mainlanders (Chen, 
2005). In fact, prior to the beginning of democratisation, the general public and 
even the local authorities were unable to appeal to the high-level government 
institutions to deal with issues regarding their living environment (Huang, 2005a). 
 
The settler-governing era: the political transitional period (1987-2000) 
After the KMT leader and five-term ROC President Chiang Kai-shek died 
in 1975, Taiwan‘s political landscape began to change and gradually undermine 
Chinese settler rule. For instance, more and more locals, including those without 
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KMT membership, were able to be employed by higher government institutions. 
Moreover, President Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek‘s son, was highly 
tolerant of ‗illegal‘ social movements, including those against the KMT 
Government. Ultimately, the KMT Government formally abolished martial law in 
1987; and thus accelerated the nation‘s democratisation (Manthorpe, 2005; Roy, 
2003). Recalling Weitzer‘s viewpoint (1990) mentioned in the previous Section [p. 
47], the abolition of martial law can be seen as the symbolic beginning of the 
political transition from settler-governed Taiwan. 
After the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988, Vice President Lee Teng-hui 
became the first ‗native-born‘ ROC President. Without the restrictions of martial 
law, Lee freed the mass media, improved the right of free speech, and allowed 
opposition parties to be established. Hence, the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP), the main opposition party composed of the local people as majority 
members, was officially recognised and began to grow. In addition, the issue of 
Taiwan‘s future, whether to be united with China or to be independent, could be 
discussed publicly
14
 (Ibid). 
Taiwan‘s changing urban scenes also reflected the nation‘s developing 
democratisation. For instance, statues of significant KMT figures were no longer 
vital elements in public spaces. Some of them were even removed (Hou, 2000; 
Simon, 2003). Furthermore, until 1993, the Mayor of Taipei was still appointed by 
the KMT Government, but in 1994, the DPP‘s Chen Shui-bian became the City‘s 
                                                 
14
 See Appendix 7 for more details of Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee Teng-hui, and Taiwan‘s 
independence dilemma. 
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first directly elected mayor. Under Chen‘s governing, the ‗2-28 Memorial‘15 was 
erected in Taipei Park in 1995. Meanwhile, the Park was renamed 2-28 Peace 
Park. As a result, on 28th February of every year, the site not only becomes the 
place for the Incident victims‘ descendants to hold memorial services, but also the 
venue for different parties‘ politicians to make speeches emphasising ethnic 
harmony (Simon, 2003). 
In 1996, the DPP‘s Taipei City Councillors proposed changing the name 
of Chiehshou Road, which lies in front of the Presidential Building, as they 
considered it to be the product of an authoritarian regime. In Mandarin, 
‗chiehshou‘ signifies ‗long live Chiang Kai-shek‘, who led the KMT 
Government‘s retreat to Taiwan where he seized state power until his death. 
Although this proposal triggered criticism from other Councillors representing 
KMT and other conservative parties
16
, it was adopted. From approximately 7,000 
suggestions forwarded by the City‘s residents, the new name of the road was 
decided to be Ketagalan Boulevard. ‗Ketagalan‘ was the name of a Taiwanese 
Indigenous tribe that had lived in the area surrounding the present-day Taipei 
Basin. The new name symbolised that Taiwan‘s ‗local roots‘ had begun to get 
attention (Leitner and Kang, 1999). 
Apart from these obvious physical changes, democratisation also enabled 
the local authorities and the general public to appeal to high-level government 
institutions to improve their inadequate living conditions. In Taipei City, for 
example, many non-governmental organisations and community-based networks 
                                                 
15
 The incident happened on 28th February 1947. In English, it should be called ‗2-28 
Incident‘. However, the Taiwanese call it ‗2-2-8 Incident‘ in Mandarin. Meanwhile, this thesis 
adopts the official English names of the sites related to the Incident. 
16
 See Appendix 7 for more details for the formation of relevant conservative political 
parties in Taiwan. 
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were formed to carry out projects concerned with living environment 
improvement, such as constructing public parks or community centres. 
Incidentally, in most cases, these community-based networks were formed by 
middle- or upper-middle-class residents, because they had a basic understanding 
of how to access the relevant official institutions as well as how to deal with the 
bureaucracies. Although the condition implies the lower-class communities‘ 
marginalisation, it cannot be denied that the capital Taipei‘s living environment 
was improved in a great extent (Huang, 2005a). 
Apart from allowing the general public to become involved in creating a 
better living environment, the KMT Government also loosened the restrictions on 
the private sector‘s participation in urban development. Although this change 
inevitably caused the real estate market to be manipulated by large enterprises, 
many large-scale projects were able to be implemented effectively. In terms of 
Taipei City, this change gave rise to the construction of ‗Xinyi Planning District‘; 
currently the most global-like central business district of Taiwan. The District‘s 
origin can be traced back to the 1990s when the KMT Government, considering 
the significance of globalising economic interactions, attempted to make the 
capital Taipei become the ‗Asian Financial Center‘, and therefore carried out the 
project of Xinyi Planning District. Owing to the private sector‘s participation, the 
metro, large office buildings, grand hotels, luxurious residential complexes, and 
department stores were constructed in the District. Although the KMT‘s ambition 
to make Taiwan Asia‘s financial centre was not achieved, due to the nation‘s de 
facto independent status and the Chinese Government‘s obstruction, the District‘s 
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accomplishment was successful in giving a global city image to the capital Taipei 
(Jou, 2005). 
Incidentally, one can regard the Xinyi Planning District as an evidence of 
how Taiwan‘s economic restructuring gave rise to the importation of global 
culture. Cultural diversification and hybridisation can be seen also in other 
Taiwanese everyday lives. For instance, although traditional markets were 
affected by the arrival of international supermarket chains from the 1960s, those 
old marketplaces remain important for urban planning as well as for the everyday 
life of Taiwanese people. The traditional market can sell foreign products, and the 
local entrepreneur can be a shareholder in the foreign supermarket chain. In other 
words, the Taiwanese‘s daily consumption in urban spaces constitutes an 
experience of cultural diversity and hybridity (Wu, 2005). 
 
The post-settler era (2000-) 
In 1998, the DPP‘s Chen Shui-bian was defeated by the KMT‘s Ma Ying-
jeou in Taipei Mayoral Election. In 2000, however, Chen represented the DPP to 
win the ROC Presidential Election by a margin of 39 percent of the votes over the 
other two candidates with a KMT background (Manthorpe, 2005). It can be 
suggested that the result marked the end of the Chinese-settler-governing era and 
the coming of Taiwan‘s post-settler era. 
Although the DPP‘s pro-independence stance raised concerns from both 
the CPC and the USA
17
, the DPP did not officially raise the independence issue 
after it came to state power. Nevertheless, the DPP Government still emphasised 
                                                 
17
 See Appendices 6 and 7 for more details of the relationship between the ROC, the CPC, 
and the USA. 
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Taiwan‘s ‗local roots‘ in subtle ways. For instance, DPP officials might 
deliberately use their mother tongue, rather than Mandarin, to speak in public. 
Moreover, a new language curriculum was introduced despite the criticism from 
the opposition parties, including the KMT and its allies (Ibid). 
In 2004, despite Taiwan‘s economic downturn and many DPP politicians‘ 
involvement into corruption scandals, Chen Shui-bian won the Presidential 
Election by a margin of 0.2 percent of the votes. However, the KMT subsequently 
won the Legislation Yuan (National Assembly) Elections and became 
predominant in the Yuan. Under these circumstances, the party political 
competition between the DPP, the KMT, and their respective allies became even 
more intense
18
 (Ibid). 
Taiwan‘s complicated party political issue affected the nation‘s urban 
development. For example, after the DPP came to state power in 2000, some 
significant projects, such as the metro linking the international airport and the 
capital Taipei, proposed by the KMT-led Taipei City Government, were rejected 
by the DPP-led Central Government. The DPP Government said that it was 
because the City Government‘s projects would spend too much of public revenue, 
and thus affect other Taiwanese cities‘ development. However, one may surmise 
that it was just because the City was administered by the KMT (Ching, 2005). 
 
4.4 Conclusion and Issues Emerging from the Former Literature 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that, just as Western colonisers 
created their ideal colonial cities [see Section 3.2, pp. 35-6], so, too, in Taiwan, 
                                                 
18
 See Appendix 7 for more details of Taiwan‘s Presidential Elections. 
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Japanese colonisers dramatically changed the capital Taipei‘s urban landscape. 
This new urban form not only represented colonial state power, but also 
symbolised the beginning of Taiwan‘s new history. On the other hand, unlike 
those Western colonial cities where the natives were forced to live in slums, 
although the Japanese Colonial Government enabled Japanese residents to have 
easy access to public facilities, it did not really force the native Taiwanese to live 
in backwaters. It was because the Japanese colonisers attempted to create a 
flawless colonial city. 
After the end of the Japanese colonial era, Taiwan was occupied by the 
KMT Government, claiming the region to be part of China‘s territory. In other 
words, the end of Taiwan‘s Japanese colonial era actually was the beginning of a 
period of settler government. The situation became clearer by 1949 when the 
KMT was forced by the CPC to settle in Taiwan, implying that the region became 
those newly-arrived Chinese Mainlanders‘ ‗home‘. Reflecting Weitzer‘s view 
(1990) on the settler state‘s features, in order to secure its legitimacy, the KMT 
Government strongly controlled Taiwan‘s political, cultural, and economic affairs. 
Such control directly affected the home population‘s imagined collective memory 
and the built environment. In the capital Taipei, for example, many new urban 
elements, such as government buildings and statues, were built to denote the KMT 
Government‘s superior power. 
Taiwan‘s democratisation, taking place in the late 1980s, began to 
undermine settler rule. This political transition ultimately enabled the DPP, with 
the local population as the majority, to win the 2000 presidential election. The 
result symbolised that the nation had entered into the post-settler era. Meanwhile, 
 68 
this transformation process reflects Weitzer‘s argument about how the settler 
country‘s political transition can give rise to the coming of the nation‘s post-
settler era. 
Like cities in South Africa [see pp. 48-9], whose White settler rule, 
transition and transformation history is similar to that of Taiwan, Taipei City‘s 
changing urban scene represented the impacts of political transition by Chinese 
settler rule. For example, the urban elements associated with the KMT 
Government‘s early authoritarian rule were changed or even demolished. 
However, a clear gap in the existing literature is that only a few writers 
have explored conditions in post-settler Taiwan. What is more, recalling the 
discussion in Chapter 3 concerned with national identity‘s urban representations, 
it can be questioned whether there were other urban changes, such as specific 
ethnic enclaves‘ construction, or historic sites‘ restoration, that resulted from 
Chinese settler rule‘s establishment, transition, and transformation. The next 
Section elaborates on this point and develops the research questions of the thesis. 
 
4.5 Discussion Leading to Research Questions 
By reviewing the relevant academic studies, Chapters 2 and 3 provide an 
analytical framework considering how a nation‘s domestic- and international-
political, cultural, and economic changes are able to affect national identification 
and simultaneously to change urban scenes. Moreover, Section 4.2 examines the 
settler country‘s features. In addition, in view of the fact that its historical context 
is similar to that of Taiwan, the Section refers to literature concerned with South 
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Africa‘s urban changes to show how the transition and collapse of settler rule 
would have potential implications for the nation‘s urban landscape. 
Built upon that theoretical framework, Section 4.3 reviewed the literature 
concerned with Taiwan‘s political history and Taipei City‘s urban changes, and 
showed how Chinese settler rule‘s establishment, transition, and collapse affected 
Taiwanese identity, and how the circumstances were reflected from capital 
Taipei‘s changing urban scene. As a nation having experienced colonial, post-
colonial/settler-governing, and post-settler eras, the case of Taiwan also reinforces 
the previously developed theoretical framework. For instance, unlike many 
conventional Western colonial cities where buildings hybridised Western and 
native architectural styles, due to their enthusiasm for Westernisation, the 
Japanese colonisers erected many new buildings representing mixed classic 
Western architectural features. In addition, Chinese settler rule‘s transition and 
transformation alongside shifts in Taiwanese identity provided a different picture 
of how a nation‘s changing administrative system would affect its imagined 
collective memory. Furthermore, in comparison to those policy-oriented studies 
on how settler rule‘s transition affected housing distribution in South African 
cities, Section 4.3 shows settler rule‘s transition also could have physical impacts 
on the urban scene. 
Taking the overall theoretical framework and Taiwan‘s contemporary 
condition, one can point out several unexplored issues emerging from the 
literature review concerned with the shifting identity of Taiwan and its urban 
representations. They are expressed in following five subsections: 
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(1) Urban elements associated with the KMT Government’s identity policy 
Literature shows how the KMT Government used iconic sites and banal 
urban elements (e.g. government buildings, memorials, street and place names, 
and statues) to legitimise its political control and to simultaneously impose the 
new imagined collective identity on the home population. However, in view of 
various examples in relation to national identity‘s urban representations given in 
Chapter 3, it can be questioned whether there were other urban elements that also 
served the pre-transitional KMT Government‘s identification schemes. For 
example, previous studies do not show whether the KMT Government had built 
relevant national-cultural sites (e.g. museums) to Mainland China‘s culture. 
 
(2) The KMT Government and Japanese colonial urban legacies 
It has been suggested that a post-colonial government may either destroy 
or keep colonial urban legacies [see Section 3.2, pp. 36-7]. However, the literature 
reviewed in Section 4.3 does not clearly indicate how the KMT Government, 
constituting not only Taiwan‘s settler state but also post-colonial state, dealt with 
the capital Taipei‘s Japanese colonial legacies. 
 
(3) Evolving multiculturalism 
Contemporary Taiwan‘s ethnic groups can generally be categorised as 
Chinese Mainlanders, local Han People, and Indigenous People. Globalisation has 
also brought immigrant spouses and workers and thus reinforced Taiwan‘s 
multicultural society. In fact, several studies also indicate that Taiwan, due to its 
geographical location, has attracted international explorers, businesspeople, 
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colonisers, and strategists since the seventeenth century. However, in 
consideration of the theoretical framework suggesting how the nation‘s 
multiculturalism can be reflected in its urban landscape [see Section 3.2, pp. 38-9]; 
it can be pointed that the existing literature does not clearly explore how Taiwan‘s 
urban scene possibly represents its long-time evolving multiculturalism (e.g. the 
formation of specific diaspora spaces), nor how the KMT Government possibly 
affected the local population‘s living space in the city. 
 
(4) Effects of globalisation on urban landscapes 
Previous studies have explored how the KMT Government promoted 
economic development to secure its political legitimacy and therefore gave rise to 
Taipei City‘s ‗global city‘ urban scene. The literature also indicates how this 
economic/urban globalisation process affected the citizens‘ interests (e.g. the lack 
of parks and community centres). Nonetheless, in view of the fact that the city‘s 
globalisation process is able to affect its historic urban elements [see Section 3.2, 
p. 41], it can be pointed out that the existing literature has not explored whether 
Taiwan‘s economic/urban globalisation could cause the demolition of the urban 
elements representing the old imagined collective memory. 
 
(5) Post-settler city? Recalling the case of post-settler South Africa 
Recent studies have briefly mentioned how the party political disputes 
between the Post-settler State (the DPP Government) and the Chinese Settler 
State‘s remaining power (the KMT and its allies) affected post-settler Taipei 
City‘s urban development. Nevertheless, probably because Taiwan is a young 
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post-settler country born in 2000, there is not much in the literature about 
potential changes in post-settler Taiwan‘s urban landscape. 
Recalling the case of South Africa described in Section 4.2 [pp. 48-9], it 
was found that although some positive urban changes had taken place during the 
nation‘s political transition era, the new post-settler government still had 
difficulties to deal with some urban problems originally caused by White settler 
rule. As a result, post-settler South Africa‘s urban scene is ‗stuck in transition‘ to 
a certain extent. 
In the light of South Africa‘s experience, it can be questioned whether 
Chinese settler rule would have similar implications for post-settler Taiwanese 
cities. In other words, would it be difficult for the DPP Government to deal with 
the relevant settler urban legacies, including not only biased urban policies, but 
also physical urban elements associated with the KMT Government‘s 
identification scheme? More importantly, how would the condition of being 
‗stuck in transition‘ affect Taiwanese national identity? 
 
In consideration of these unexplored issues directly connected to Taiwan‘s 
political-historical context, the aim of this thesis is to use the constructed 
theoretical framework to explore relevant issues that have not been thoroughly 
dealt with in existing academic studies concerning Taiwan‘s shifting national 
identity alongside its changing urban landscape. The fundamental research 
question is How has shifting state power in Taiwan, until the early beginning 
of the post-settler era, shaped the nation’s urban landscape in the form of 
(re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces? 
 73 
By focusing on the unexplored issues highlighted in this Chapter, the 
fundamental research question can be seen to have three dimensions. Each of 
them takes the form of a distinct research question. They are briefly expressed 
below: 
 
(1) How did the Chinese Settler State use iconic sites, national-cultural sites, 
and other urban elements, to practise its national identification scheme in 
Taiwan, and what implications for those urban elements have emerged 
after the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era? (Apart from exploring the 
relevant urban elements built by the KMT Government, this question is also 
concerned with how the KMT Government treated the Japanese urban legacies 
having national identification functions). 
 
(2) How did the Chinese Settler State affect Taiwan’s developing 
multicultural society and multicultural urban environments, and what 
implications for these environments have emerged after the coming of 
Taiwan’s post-settler era? (Exploring how the Chinese settlers, the 
suppressed local population, international traders and strategists, and global 
economic immigrants affected Taiwan‘s urban scene in the nation‘s different 
socio-political contexts). 
 
(3) How did the Chinese Settler State deal with the impacts of 
economic/urban globalisation in shaping Taiwan’s urban landscape, and 
what implications related to this globalised urban scene have emerged 
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after the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era? (Apart from exploring how 
Taiwan‘s economic restructuring caused early-developed urban areas‘ decline, 
this question focuses more on how the Taiwanese governments dealt with 
issues related to the conservation and restoration of historic urban elements). 
 
4.6 Summary 
Built upon the analytical framework with regard to the representation of 
shifting national identity within (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten urban landscapes, 
and the impacts of the transforming settler rule on South Africa cities, the first 
half of the Chapter reviewed the existing literature to examine connections 
between shifting Taiwanese identity and changing urban landscapes in the context 
of Chinese settler rule‘s establishment, transition, and collapse. The literature 
review revealed that after occupying Taiwan in 1945, the Chinese Settler State 
began to manipulate the nation‘s imagined collective memory to sustain the 
Settler State‘s legitimacy. The condition simultaneously affected the capital 
Taipei where landmarks and street and place names were used to forge collective 
memory serving the Settler State‘s interests. Nonetheless, the nation‘s 
democratisation taking place in the late 1980s began to affect settler rule‘s 
legitimacy. As a result, some of those urban elements related to the Chinese 
Settler State‘s identity were changed or demolished during this political transition 
era. 
The second half of the Chapter identifies several unexplored issues among 
previous studies concerned with shifting Taiwanese national identity and its urban 
representations. For instance, they do not consider the KMT Government‘s role 
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not only as the settler state but also as the post-colonial state, and how the 
condition would affect Japanese colonial urban legacies in Taiwan. Furthermore, 
they do not consider the locals‘ and international immigrants‘ potential 
implications for the nation‘s multicultural built environments. In addition, they do 
not consider how the settler government and the post-settler government would 
react to globalisation‘s potential impacts on Taiwan‘s historic urban elements that 
represent local identity. 
More importantly, very few existing literature deals with Taiwan‘s 
contemporary condition, even though the nation entered its post-settler era in 2000. 
Thus, existing literature has not addressed how Taiwan‘s urban landscape can be 
said to represent post-settler Taiwanese identity. 
These issues provide the basis for the thesis and its research questions. In 
short, I intend to apply the theoretical framework to examine how Taiwanese 
identity has been affected by the nation‘s government change, developing 
multiculturalism, and globalisation, and how such shifting identity was 
represented within the nation‘s changing urban landscape until the early beginning 
of the nation‘s post-setter era. 
How the entire research is designed, how certain ideas derived from the 
theoretical framework, guide me to find answers to the questions, and how the 
empirical work is executed are elaborated in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 has stated that my research purpose is to apply the theoretical 
framework to investigate the unexplored issues emerging from the existing 
literature concerned with shifting Taiwanese identity and its urban representations. 
It also outlined the thesis‘s main research question, generated from those 
unexplored issues, is How has shifting state power in Taiwan, until the early 
beginning of the post-settler era, shaped the nation’s urban landscape in the 
form of (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces? Three sub-questions are 
derived from this fundamental question. 
This Chapter explains how these research questions are approached. 
Sections 5.2 and 5.3 discuss the research strategy. Section 5.4 explains how the 
theoretical framework is applied to develop the basic approaches to each research 
question. Section 5.5 then presents the research methods and sources of evidence 
to be employed in this study. The overall research process is explained in Section 
5.6. Finally, Section 5.7 discusses the issues emerging from the entire research 
design and process. 
 
5.2 Case Study as the Research Strategy 
There are different research strategies (e.g. survey, historical study, and 
experiment) that can be used by researchers in their pursuit of answers to their 
research questions (Yin, 2003). Given that this study involves investigations of 
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certain urban elements that have been demolished, one may suggest that historical 
study is a research strategy that can be applied to carry out the research project. 
However, this study is also concerned with Taiwan‘s contemporary conditions. 
Hence, it needs a more comprehensive strategy. 
Case study, according to Yin (ibid), is a form of research strategy in which 
the researcher investigates the cases relevant to his/her research interests derived 
from existing academic works, analyse them so as to confirm, challenge, or 
extend the previously constructed theoretical framework. Specifically, case study 
can be applied to deal with the research project involving any of following three 
conditions. Firstly, unlike doing experiments in the laboratory, the researcher 
cannot really control the investigated subject. Secondly, the subject being focused 
on is a ‗contemporary‘ phenomenon. Thirdly, the case is ‗unique‘. 
Recalling the research purpose and questions stated in Section 4.5, one can 
recognise four characters of my study echoing Yin‘s conditions on using case 
study as the research strategy: 
 
(1) The theoretical framework is used to examine how Taiwanese identity is 
represented within the nation‘s built environments. Thus, the outcome of the 
study can confirm or even extend the original analytical framework. 
 
(2) Government change, multi-ethnic society, and the nation‘s involvement in 
globalisation are the objective facts triggering shifts in national identity. 
Clearly, these factors cannot be manipulated by the researcher. 
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(3) Although this thesis looks for ‗forgotten‘ urban elements in the past, it also 
intends to investigate currently existing urban elements in Taiwan. 
 
(4) As a nation having experienced colonial, post-colonial/settler-governing, 
settler-transitional, and post-settler eras, arguably Taiwan itself is a unique 
case. 
 
In this light, case study is a suitable research strategy for this research project. 
 
5.3 Taipei City as the Case Study 
After deciding on case study to be the research strategy, the next question 
is how to select the appropriate case/city for study? In this research project, Taipei 
City, Taiwan‘s capital city, was chosen. The reason is explained below. 
The theoretical framework has suggested that the capital city‘s urban scene, 
in general, represents the nation‘s political, cultural, and economic character in 
view of its unique role as the nation‘s political, cultural, and economic centre [see 
Section 3.2, pp. 33-5]. That is why, in Section 4.3, the capital Taipei was used to 
demonstrate how settler rule‘s transition affected Taiwan‘s urban scene. 
Meanwhile, the existing literature showed that the City has been closely 
connected with the state through Taiwan‘s Qing-ruling, Japanese colonial, settler-
governing, and post-settler eras, and therefore became the place where physical 
representations related to the nation‘s changing political, cultural, and economic 
experiences were constructed, demolished, or re-constructed. From the literature 
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review, it was clear that Taipei City is predominant in existing literature 
concerned with Taiwan‘s urban change. 
In the light of this, there were two other advantages in choosing Taipei 
City as the selected case. Firstly, as an independent researcher with limited time 
and financial support, I could easily find all relevant urban elements in one city 
that represented shifting Taiwanese national identity. Secondly, it will be argued 
that the findings from the case study of Taipei City are able to address the 
research questions arising from the reviewed literature. 
Overall, the above discussion explains briefly why Taipei City was a 
suitable case for the empirical work. The City‘s basic profile (e.g. areas and 
populations) is given in Appendix 8. 
 
5.4 Approaches to Each Research Question 
As a comprehensive research strategy, case study enables the investigator 
to apply different research methods to triangulate various types of data sources 
that are ultimately converged to explain a specific phenomenon. Meanwhile, the 
validity of the study is also improved owing to such a multi-source approach. 
However, not until the investigator decides how he/she is going to approach 
research questions, can the relevant research methods to be applied to the project 
be identified (Yin, 2003). Section 4.5 has stated that the fundamental research 
question of the thesis is ‗How has shifting state power in Taiwan, until the 
early beginning of the post-settler era, shaped the nation’s urban landscape 
in the form of (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces?‘. The questions arising 
from this are approached as follows: 
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(1) Question 1 
 
How did the Chinese Settler State use iconic sites, national-
cultural sites, and other urban elements, to practise its national 
identification scheme in Taiwan, and what implications for 
those urban elements have emerged after the coming of 
Taiwan’s post-settler era? 
 
To answer Question 1, firstly I have to explore how different national 
governments in Taiwanese history practised specific identification schemes (e.g. 
legitimising state power or creating national culture) when they were/are in power. 
From this, I can then begin to explore which spatial features in Taipei City are 
related to these identity policies. Referring to the theoretical framework, these 
spatial features are classified into three categories below: 
 
(i) Iconic sites 
These sites are buildings, landmarks, or places associated with state power, 
particularly with historical meanings, and/or the nation‘s economic achievements. 
They are usually important government institutions or tourist venues. In addition, 
their images are frequently exploited by the mass media, such as news reports and 
tourist guides. 
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(ii) National-cultural sites 
These sites can take the form of state-legitimised museums representing 
‗national‘ culture and history. They can also be religious buildings or public 
leisure centres reflecting Taiwanese folk life or public culture. However, even folk 
life or public culture may still be the product of the state‘s identification scheme. 
Like the iconic sites mentioned in the previous category, these national-cultural 
sites can frequently be shown by the mass media. 
 
(iii) Other subtle banal urban elements 
In the research-design process, it is difficult to precisely identify this 
category of urban elements, since each country has its own subtle banal urban 
elements perceived as physical representations of national identity. For example, 
previous studies demonstrate that street and place names in many countries are 
used by the states as a tool of national-identification. On the other hand, although 
Edensor (2002) indicates that London‘s public phone booths can be regarded as a 
banal urban element representing British identity owing to their long-time 
unchanged appearance, this by no means suggests that other countries‘ phone 
booths in their capitals convey the same meaning. Given this fact, I can only 
identify urban elements included in this category in the data collection process. 
Nonetheless, public facilities or general housing constructions bearing a specific 
pattern or design are a clue to my exploration. 
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(2) Question 2 
 
How did the Chinese Settler State affect Taiwan’s developing 
multicultural society and multicultural urban environments, 
and what implications for these environments have emerged 
after the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era? 
 
To answer this question, I have first to identify Taiwan‘s ethnic 
composition. According to previous studies, the ‗local population‘ include the 
Han and the Indigenous Peoples. Chinese Mainlanders became part of Taiwanese 
society from 1945. Apart from these three groups constituting ROC nationals, 
earlier studies also revealed or implied that there have been many new immigrants 
(e.g. international capitalists and immigrant workers) settling in Taiwan for 
different reasons. Prior to exploring how such a multi-ethnic society gave rise to 
cultural diversity and hybridity alongside a multicultural living environment, I 
have to first identify these ethnic groups‘ origins. What is more, I have to 
investigate how the state, in Taiwan‘s different political periods, promoted or 
suppressed a specific ethnic group‘s self-identification, and how such promotion 
and/or suppression were reflected in Taipei City‘s urban landscape. Referring to 
the theoretical framework, three factors are significant in this context: 
 
(i) Biased urban policies 
Since the Chinese Mainlanders were the politically dominant group, I have 
to explore the extent to which urban policies benefiting the newly-arrived 
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Mainlanders. I also have to investigate the policies‘ concurrent impacts (e.g. racial 
segregation, building restrictions, or unequal urban development plans) on the 
home population. Finally, I need to examine the implications of the policies for 
the capital Taipei in Taiwan‘s political transition and transformation eras. 
 
(ii) Ethnic enclaves/Diaspora spaces 
Apart from identifying those relevant places in Taipei City, I also have to 
trace their origins. Some of the ethnic enclaves and diaspora spaces were formed 
‗organically‘ (e.g. the minority were marginalised in society and therefore 
collectively settled in a specific area of the city). On the other hand, the formation 
of some areas might result from the state‘s policy serving the interests of a 
specific ethnic group. 
 
(iii) Ethnic-cultural sites 
Like investigating ethnic enclaves and diaspora spaces, the purpose of 
examining ethnic-cultural sites in Taipei City is to explore their origins. Clearly, 
an ethnic-cultural site‘s formation symbolises the state‘s recognition of a specific 
ethnic group, usually the minority. However, it still needs to be considered in 
what context the state began recognising the minority (e.g. the ethnic minority 
might launch grassroots social movements to claim their right to be recognised). 
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(3) Question 3 
 
How did the Chinese Settler State deal with the impacts of 
economic/urban globalisation in shaping Taiwan’s urban 
landscape, and what implications related to this globalised 
urban scene have emerged after the coming of Taiwan’s post-
settler era? 
 
To answer Question 3, firstly I need to investigate global capitalism‘s 
implications for Taipei City‘s urban landscape. The existing literature shows that 
the formation of the City‘s several important business districts were resulted from 
global capitalism. Moreover, the literature also indicates how the KMT 
Government embraced global capitalism, thereby tolerating unbalanced urban 
development alongside old communities‘ decline. Nonetheless, apart from further 
exploring these business districts and urban-development issues, my approach to 
Question 3 is how this economic/urban globalisation process impacted on Taipei 
City‘s historic urban elements and how the state and other relevant interest groups 
reacted to this. 
All these preoccupations imply that I have to examine Taipei City‘s urban 
regeneration history. Meanwhile, I also need to investigate laws, achievements, 
and main issues regarding Taiwan‘s urban conservation. 
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5.5 Research Methods and Sources of Evidence 
After considering the basic approaches to each research question, I decided 
to apply four research methods, namely, documentary research, archival research, 
direct observations, and interviewing, in my fieldwork. Why and how I employ 
each method alongside sources of evidence is explained in the following four 
subsections: 
 
(1) Documentary research 
Documentary sources are essential in case study research because the 
investigator would apply various documents to facilitate the basic understanding 
of investigated subjects, and therefore execute empirical works (Yin, 2003). In 
terms of this study, prior to the fieldwork, documentary sources provide me with a 
basic understanding of shifting Taiwanese identity and Taipei City‘s urban history. 
Meanwhile, they also enable me to recognise potential urban features that need to 
be examined. 
The contents of various types of documentary sources are not restricted to 
text as they can include images. Specifically, visual materials are vital to this 
thesis since they can help readers gain a clearer understanding of the written 
descriptions of investigated urban elements. 
Furthermore, documents can take both physical and electronic form. In 
fact, during the data collection process, I realised that electronic documents were 
significant sources for the following two reasons. Firstly, I only had limited time 
to conduct the fieldwork in Taipei City [explained in the next Section]; therefore, 
in the UK, electronic documents, such as online news reports, were useful for me 
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to gain updated information on Taiwan‘s concurrent events that were relevant to 
my study. Secondly, it was inevitable that most documents were written in 
Traditional Chinese (Taiwan‘s written language), particular efforts were made to 
find English-written documents in order to facilitate comprehension and source-
tracking for non-Mandarin readers. Hence, Taiwan‘s government websites and 
online news agencies became useful since they were often able to provide 
English-version contents. Clearly, these electronic documents are drawn from 
credible websites maintained by the government institutions or news agencies. 
The obvious disadvantage of using documentary sources is that the 
researcher needs to recognise that they may have bias. For instance, government 
publications and news reports may be manipulated to support the state‘s policies 
(Yin, 2003). Even visual images do not always provide objective information, 
given that some photographers‘ goal is to provoke specific emotional reactions 
(Cronin, 1998). Thus, apart from my objective interpretation of documents, other 
research methods, explained below, are simultaneously employed as a means of 
checking whether different types of sources corroborate and are compatible with 
one another. 
Generally, different types of documentary sources used in this study can 
be put in four categories below: 
 
(i) Government-authorised documents 
These documents include progress reports, internal records, news letters, 
urban policies (laws), and general tourist guides. All of them are released by 
government institutions. These documentary sources provide insight not only on 
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the basic profiles of Taiwan and Taipei City, but also on the urban elements that 
are being explored. 
 
(ii) Academic literature 
Documents in this category include academic studies relating to this 
research. They provide additional details with regard to Taiwan‘s political history, 
Taipei City‘s urban history, and information on the urban elements that are being 
examined. 
 
(iii) Non-academic literatures 
Such documents include publications that use Taipei City as their topic of 
discussion (e.g. novels or graphic books). From these documents, a folk-based 
perspective on Taipei City is drawn. Meanwhile, they also enable me to 
understand the City‘s basic profile and to identify urban factors relevant to my 
research interests. 
 
(iv) Mass-media reports 
Documents included in this category consist of news clippings and articles 
publicised via the mass media (i.e. newspapers, magazines, television, and online 
news agencies). Their function is similar to that of non-academic literature since 
they offer an independent perspective on the subjects under investigation. Also, 
they are likely to provide relatively ‗newer‘ information in comparison with other 
types of documents. 
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(2) Archival research 
In terms of how to search for relevant documentary sources (excluding 
those I came across before and during the formal data collection procedure), the 
bulk of them were found within government institutions (e.g. National Central 
Library, the Council for Cultural Affairs, the Taipei City Government, and the 
Taipei City Archive) that stored documents relevant to Taiwan‘s changing 
political, cultural, and economic conditions, and to Taipei City‘s urban history. In 
other words, the knowledge of certain documents‘ existence is derived from 
archival research. In fact, the difference between documentary and archival 
sources can be rather vague. For instance, an archive, such as a museum, can store 
manuscripts, print matter, and illustrations that can all be regarded as 
documentary sources (Iredale, 1973). Furthermore, government websites and 
online news agencies may serve as online archives providing electronic 
documents. 
Why I intentionally distinguish between documentary and archival 
research is because some items stored or exhibited in an archive (e.g. a museum) 
may lack references, such as author names, titles, and publishers, which are 
usually found in conventional documentary sources. In these cases, I can only 
indicate that the source comes from the specific archive and the date I visited it. 
Like documentary sources, bias also can exist in archival sources. Hence, 
impartial interpretations of the sources and other research methods‘ applications 
are vital (Yin, 2003). 
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(3) Direct observations 
This research method is able to provide additional information or new 
primary sources relevant to the researcher‘s understanding of the investigated 
subject. Meanwhile, it also enables the researcher actively to test the validity of 
other types of sources (May, 2001; Yin, 2003). In this way, direct observations 
become a crucial method for my fieldwork. That is to say, after identifying the 
potential targets—the urban elements in Taipei City—and by consulting other 
types of sources (e.g. documents, archives, and interviews), subsequent 
observation (e.g. investigating a specific urban element‘s contemporary condition 
or recording people‘s behaviour in a particular place) enables me to confirm 
whether different types of sources can corroborate each other, or to find new 
information they do not include. 
It ought to be noted that observations can also be made unintentionally 
during the researcher‘s data collection activities within an everyday setting 
(Gillham, 2000a; Silverman, 2001; Yin, 2003). Incidentally, apart from textual 
records, I also present some observed sources in the form of photographic 
materials in this thesis. 
 
(4) Interviewing 
In contrast to the application of a structured questionnaire, the use of 
interviews is regarded as a qualitative research method based on guided 
conversations which can provide a case study investigator with significant 
primary information (Yin, 2003). Thus, it can be argued that interviewing 
provides me with supplementary information that documentary, archival and 
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observational sources lack or do not elaborate on. For instance, if at any point 
confused by documentary and archival sources‘ descriptions, I can interview the 
key people to obtain a more clear-cut picture, if they are still alive and willing to 
participate. Moreover, interviewees may raise issues that I did not take into 
account previously during my observational data-recording process. In other 
words, the information from a variety of sources (documents, archives, 
observations, interviews) all contributes to building up a picture of the subject of 
the research. 
Clearly, oral data also can be obtained informally. For example, through 
listening to and/or engaging with other people‘s conversations which respondents 
may give out information that is relevant to the research interests (Gillham, 
2000a). Besides these conventional ways of conversation, I used semi-structured 
interview by setting, in advance, a general structure involving the theme to be 
covered and the main questions are to be asked. Initially, the interviewee can 
answer at some length in his/her own words. Subsequently, the interviewer will 
prompt the interviewee with follow-up questions to get him/her to clarify, or 
expand, on the answers previously given (Gillham, 2000b). 
The obvious distinction between an unstructured (natural) conversation 
and a semi-structured interview is that the latter targets specific respondents. The 
targeted interviewees in this study are categorised into two groups below. 
Additional information on each respondent (e.g. current positions and interview 
dates) is presented in Appendix 11. 
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(i) Local authorities (community representatives) 
Potential interviewees from this category are elected political 
representatives of Taipei City‘s wards (as known as ‗li‘ in Mandarin), the 
primary-level unit in Taiwan‘s local self-government system. In other words, 
these interviewees are community representatives. Since they tend to be residents 
who have lived in their areas for long periods of time, they are expected to have 
sufficient knowledge on local affairs, such as local histories or specific policies‘ 
implications for communities. Arguably, they may also have a political stand 
point to defend and may not be ‗objective‘. Thus, other research methods‘ 
applications are important. 
 
(ii) Staff of the public sector or the private sector 
Interviewees in this category include staff (preferably, from the urban 
planning and cultural affairs departments) of the Central or Taipei City 
Governments. Others are members of non-governmental organisations (e.g. 
human rights organisations) or private construction corporations. And some are 
staff working for a particular sites‘ management (e.g. the ethnic-cultural site). 
Their job-related experience and knowledge is relevant to an understanding of 
issues around ethnicity, economic development, and Taipei City‘s changing urban 
landscapes. 
 
The application of each of the research methods in approaching the 
research questions is presented in Table 5.1 [see p. 92], while Table 5.2 [see p. 92] 
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categorises the contribution of each method as ‗secondary sources‘ and ‗primary 
sources‘: 
 
Table 5.1—Research questions and corresponding method 
Method 
Question 
Documentary research / 
Archival research 
Direct observations Interviewing 
Main Question 
Knowing Taiwan‘s and Taipei 
City‘s profiles / Identifying 
each national government‘s 
identity policies / Identifying 
and investigating targeted 
urban elements and policies 
Investigating targeted urban 
elements‘ contemporary 
condition (if they currently 
exist) / Investigating people‘s 
behaviour in particular sites 
Investigating targeted urban 
elements and policies 
Question 1 
Knowing Taipei City‘s profiles 
/ Identifying and investigating 
targeted urban elements and  
Policies 
Question 2 
Question 3 
 
Table 5.2—Types of sources of evidence 
Origins 
Types 
Method Details 
Secondary 
sources 
Documentary and 
archival research 
Academic studies relating to Taipei City / Non-academic literature (e.g. news 
coverage) relating to Taipei City 
Primary 
sources 
Documentary and 
archival research 
Policy documents and official reports from the Central or City Governments 
Direct observation Textual and visual fieldwork records 
Interviewing With relevant actors in public and private sectors 
 
 
5.6 Data Collection and Analysis 
The research process, including data collection and analysis, started from 
December 2006 and ended in February 2008. The data collection combined both 
desk-based research and field research. Apart from the collection of data from 
online sources (from government and private news agency websites) that could be 
done at any time, there were two stages of fieldwork conducted within Taipei City. 
In the first stage (from 15/12/2006 to 08/02/2007), I used all four research 
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methods to collect as much data as I could in a limited time span. More 
specifically, via the documentary and archival sources, I identified potential urban 
elements and places that I needed to investigate. Thereafter, direct observations 
were carried out. After analysing the information from these sources, I identified 
the information they did not provide and set out to interview key people in order 
to obtain necessary data. 
Through analysis of data from the first stage of fieldwork, I identified gaps 
on which to focus in the second stage (from 12/10/2007 to 6/12/2007). The entire 
data collection process was finished in January 2008. However, several official 
statistics (e.g. population figures) used in this study were not released until 
February 2008. 
 
5.7 Issues and Limitations 
The previous Sections have explained how I planned and accomplished the 
empirical work. Three issues arise from the research design and the fieldwork. 
They are elaborated as follows: 
 
(1) The issue of the single-case-study approach 
The capital Taipei is the only case/Taiwanese city being studied in this 
research. Some have argued the problems of generalisation from a single-case–
study approach, when generalisation is often a goal in traditional social-scientific 
research (Donmoyer, 2000; Lincoln and Guba, 2000; Schofield, 2000). 
Nevertheless, as a researcher who is engaging in the project independently and is 
affected by limited time and financial support, a single case study can be a 
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practical decision. A broadening of case studies to include other cities is a 
potential line of further research which is beyond this thesis. This possibility is 
discussed further in Chapter 11. 
 
(2) The sensitivity of Taiwanese identity 
This issue emerged in my first interview. The interviewee was a senior 
volunteer working in a museum exhibiting items relating to the 2-2-8 Incident, a 
severe conflict between the local people and the KMT Government [see Appendix 
5]. After telling me about the museum‘s origin, the interviewee asked my ethnic 
background. After knowing that I was local Han Taiwanese, the same as her, she 
began to tell me more about how the former Taipei Mayor, a second-generation 
Chinese Mainlander, seemed to try to affect the museum‘s management [see 
Appendix 9, p. 333]. 
This experience reminded me that some of themes of this thesis, such as 
‗national identity‘ and ‗ethnicity‘, might cause the interviewees to worry and 
make them reluctant to answer my questions. Bearing this in mind in my other 
interviews, although I just needed to ask the respondents questions about their life 
experiences or professional knowledge, such as changes in the community‘s 
physical environment or the origin of a specific urban policy, I actually avoided 
mentioning the topic of my thesis whenever I could. Instead, I told them that I was 
a UK-based research student currently investigating Taipei City‘s urban history. 
Although such a strategy does involve research ethics (de Laine, 2000; 
Homan, 1991), it enabled me to avoid the interviewees‘ potential 
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misinterpretation of my motivation. In fact, I did not encounter again the 
experience that I had in the first interview. 
 
(3) The unexpected events 
The final issue arising from the fieldwork was that I had to deal with 
concurrently-happening events relating to my research interests. The whole data 
collection process was initially planned to end in May of 2008 since it would be 
the end of the DPP‘s second term of being the governing party, a point 
symbolising the end of a specific time period in Taiwan‘s political history. 
However, considering that this would delay the completion of the thesis, the data 
collection process was rescheduled to end in September 2007. 
During the data collection period, an event that happened in Taiwan 
actually related to my research [the story of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, 
see Section 6.5, pp. 124-31]. In consideration of the event‘s significance, I 
decided to keep watching its development. As a result, the entire research process 
was extended until January 2008. This timescale change reflects the nature of case 
study research mentioned in Section 5.2—the researcher is investigating a 
situation that is uncontrollable and contemporary. Meanwhile, it also implies that 
as a young post-settler country, Taiwan‘s national identity and its urban 
representations have been changing swiftly. This condition inspires one to 
consider several future research subjects. More details are discussed in Chapter 11. 
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5.8 Summary 
In summary, I used case study as the approach to addressing the research 
questions and achieving the overall goal of this thesis. Considering the questions 
arising from the literature review, the limitation of time and financial support, and 
the nature of the capital city, Taipei City was chosen to be the case for study. 
Moreover, I applied the theoretical framework in identifying specific policies and 
urban elements that are relevant to this study. Four research methods—
documentary research, archival research, direct observations, and interviewing—
are employed in the empirical work. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS (I): 
TRANSFORMING ICONIC SITES IN TAIPEI CITY 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 examines several iconic sites in Taipei City. Why those sites are 
chosen is because they are associated with state power‘s representation and 
legitimisation. More importantly, their stories behind them reflect different 
political entities‘ establishment and collapse in Taiwan. Section 6.2 examines the 
building of the nation‘s Presidential Office, which has represented state power 
since it was built in the Japanese colonial era. Section 6.3 then investigates the 
Ketagalan Boulevard. It is in front of the Presidential Office and is the stage 
where important national events take place. Section 6.4 focuses on exploring how 
the Zhongshan North Road was transformed from a linear iconic site into an 
ordinary traffic route due to Japanese colonial rule‘s collapse and Chinese settler 
rule‘s transition. Finally, Section 6.5 looks into how the legitimacy of the Chiang 
Kai-shek Memorial Hall, which was built in 1980 to pay tribute to the late settler 
state leader, caused conflict between the DPP-led Central Government and the 
KMT-led City Government in 2007.   
 
6.2 The Office of the President 
The theoretical framework indicated that a given nation‘s central 
government building usually is the iconic site that represents both national 
identity and state power [pp. 31-2]. In the case of Taiwan, that site is the Office of 
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Figure 6.1—The Office of the President 
the President [Figure 6.1]. This Section reveals the relevant stories behind the 
building: 
 
The Japanese colonisers’ goal of Westernisation 
After the Qing Empire‘s ceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895, the Qing 
Empire‘s highest administrative institution in the capital Taipei—the Office of 
Logistics and Defence Bureau [see Figure 6.2, p. 99]—became the temporary 
office of the colonial Governor-General. It was not until the Colonial Government 
had entirely controlled Taiwan that the project of erecting the Office of the 
Taiwan Governor-General was proposed in 1906 (Office of the President, 2005a). 
The land for the Office originally belonged to two wealthy Taiwanese clans, 
which had already built ancestral temples at the site. By 1907, after compensating 
the clans for their loss of the land, the Colonial Government built a sports club on 
it (Kao, 2004). Nevertheless, in view of its location‘s proximity to the centre of 
colonial Taipei City, the land subsequently became designated to host the Office. 
The construction work then started in 1912 (Office of the President, 2005a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 99 
Figure 6.2—The Office of Logistics and Defence Bureau 
After the Japanese colonisers built the Office of the Taiwan Governor-General, this 
Qing-Empire legacy was moved to the location of the present-day Taipei Botanical Garden. 
After the KMT took over Taiwan, it became the Forestry Research Institute‘s exhibition hall 
(The Office of Logistics and Defence Bureau, visit on 02/12/2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Office was completed in 1919. The architectural styles reflected the 
Japanese Empire‘s admiration for Westernisation via the application of elements 
such as British-style brick construction, colonnades, gables, vaulted windows, 
Roman columns, and composite columns. Moreover, the deliberately imposing 
60-meter tower became the colonial capital‘s highest landmark at that time (Office 
of the President, 2006a; Yang, 2001). The Office‘s image also subsequently 
appeared in postcards, postmarks, posters, and paintings (Office of the President, 
2005b). 
From the above discussion, it can be argued that the Office of the Taiwan 
Governor-General‘s origin and construction reflect some common features of 
colonial urban planning. For instance, although ancestral temples are supposedly 
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an important symbol for the native Taiwanese, the Japanese colonisers still 
obtained the land, on which two native clans‘ ancestral temples were located, to 
erect the Office. Although the documentary sources report that the Colonial 
Government had compensated the clans, one can assume that it might also be 
difficult for the clans to reject the Government‘s acquisition. In addition, the 
Office‘s geographical location (the centre of the capital city) and physical features 
(the highest building) were also conveying symbolic meaning related to the 
colonisers‘ predominance and superiority. 
It is worth noting after the Office‘s completion, the printed media played a 
role in enabling the Office‘s image as well as its symbolic meaning to be diffused 
across colonial Taiwan. One can argue that the circumstances reinforced the 
natives‘ collective imagination of being collectively governed by the Japanese 
Colonial Government. 
 
The Chinese Settler State leader’s birthday gift 
Prior to the end of the Second World War, the Office of the Taiwan 
Governor-General was damaged by US air bombardments. However, after the 
KMT took charge of Taiwan‘s post-war affairs, the building was immediately 
reconstructed to be the 60th birthday gift presented to Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT 
leader as well as the ROC President, born in 1887. Meanwhile, the restored Office 
was renamed ‗Chiehshou Hall‘. In Mandarin, ‗Chiehshou‘ implies ‗long live 
Chiang Kai-shek‘ (Ko and Chuang, 26/03/2006). 
Despite the severe economic downturn during the early post-war period, 
the local people were forced to contribute financially towards the costly 
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reconstruction project (Taipei 2-28 Memorial Museum, visited on 19/12/2006). It 
can be suggested that the KMT‘s dedication to the Office‘s restoration and their 
simultaneous ignorance of local people‘s hardship signified the beginning of the 
settler state‘s strong control over the local population. 
The Chiehshou Hall was fully restored by 1948. It initially served as the 
Office of the Taiwan Provincial Governor. Nevertheless, after the KMT lost the 
war with the CPC on the Mainland China and was forced to retreat to Taiwan in 
1949, the building also became Chiang Kai-shek‘s Office of the President (Office 
of the President, 2006a). Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek literally began to work in 
the building he had been given as a birthday present. 
 
Liberalisation of the Office of the President 
It ought to be noted that the Office was not guarded as heavily as might 
have been expected during the Japanese colonial era. In fact, the general public 
were able to have access to the building to handle their affairs (Office of the 
President, 2005c). This condition somewhat reflects colonial Taipei‘s urban 
planning that represented the colonisers‘ superiority (e.g. public facilities were 
concentrated in areas where the colonisers‘ were in the majority) yet without 
severely marginalising the native. 
The public accessibility to the Office continued during Taiwan‘s early 
post-war period. However, after the KMT formally retreated to Taiwan in 1949, it 
became a forbidden building for the general public. Meanwhile, its surrounding 
area was under strict supervision (Ibid). This change subsequently influenced 
capital Taipei‘s urban planning. In 1963, the Urban Planning Commission of the 
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Taipei City Government changed the designation of the land around the Office 
from commercial to administrative use (Office of the President, 2005a). One can 
suggest these changes implied the creation of settler rule‘s superiority and 
legitimacy. 
Nonetheless, with the coming of Taiwan‘s democratisation, the site began 
being ‗liberalised‘. For instance, in 1995, President Lee Teng-hui allowed the 
building to be opened to the general public on certain holidays. In 2000, Taiwan 
formally entered the post-settler era; President Chen Shui-bian even allowed the 
public to book in advance its visits to certain areas of the building on weekdays 
(Office of the President, 2006b; Yang, 2001). Overall, the Office of the President 
has become more people-friendly due to its increasing accessibility. 
On 25th March 2006, the DPP Government announced that the name of 
the building ‗Chiehshou Hall‘ was officially changed to ‗Presidential Building‘. 
Although the opposition politicians criticised this change as a boring and pointless 
political gesture (Ko and Chuang, 26/03/2006), the Office‘s Department of Public 
Affairs asserted that: 
 
[The change] attests to the fact that Taiwan has successfully transformed 
from an authoritarian to a democratic country, and has embodied 
Taiwan‘s democracy and its people‘s popular sovereignty … [the old 
name] is a product of a special time in Taiwan‘s history … the 
―Presidential Building‖ perfectly complies with the function of the 
building and bears constitutional significance. 
(Office of the President, 2006c: lines 6-16) 
 
It is worth noting that prior to the DPP Government‘s announcement, the 
Taiwanese media and general public were already used to calling the building 
‗Presidential Building‘, rather than ‗Chiehshou Hall‘. Thus, the opposition parties‘ 
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claim that the change was pointless may be justified to a certain point. The fact 
that ‗Chiehshou Hall‘ was not frequently used by the Taiwanese highlights the 
change‘s symbolic meaning. 
 
6.3 The Ketagalan Boulevard 
The existing literature revealed how, during Taiwan‘s transition era, the 
DPP-led Taipei City Government took the opportunity to rename the road in front 
of the Presidential Building from ‗Chiehshou Road‘ to ‗Ketagalan Boulevard‘ in 
order to pay tribute to the Taiwanese Indigenous People, rather than honoured 
Chiang Kai-shek, the late Settler State leader [see Section 4.3, p. 63]. In fact, the 
road has played a role as the nation‘s iconic site since the Japanese colonial era. 
This Section explores the relevant stories: 
 
The stage of the national identification performance 
When Taiwan was under the Qing Empire‘s rule, the Road‘s name was 
‗Tungmen Street‘, meaning ‗East Gate Street‘ since it stretched from the East 
Gate of the stone-walled Taipei City [see Figure 6.3, p. 104] (Leitner and Knag, 
1999). After the establishment of the Office of the Taiwan Governor-General, the 
Road was frequently used to hold fairs and exhibitions to demonstrate the 
Colonial Government‘s technical or economic achievements (Office of the 
President, 2005c). Moreover, it was the venue for the Colonial Government to 
hold military parades in specific ceremonies (Discovery Center of Taipei, visited 
on 07/02/2007). In short, the site was used by the Colonial Government to hold 
different national identification activities. 
 104 
Figure 6.3—The location of the Ketagalan Boulevard 
VIEW 
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In 1946, following the KMT‘s occupation of Taiwan, the Road was 
officially renamed ‗Chiehshou Road‘ to imply ‗long live Chiang Kai-shek‘ 
(Leitner and Knag, 1999). It remained a public space accommodating state-run 
fairs. Nonetheless, following the KMT‘s retreat to Taiwan in 1949, the Road 
became strictly overseen since the KMT Government kept the general public 
away from the Office of the President. Under these circumstances, the rare chance 
for the public to approach the Road and the Office was on New Year‘s Day or the 
ROC National Day (10th October) since the KMT Government would organise 
relevant national activities there (Office of the President, 2005c). An article 
released by the Office of the President (when the DPP was the governing party) 
gives an illustration of how the KMT Government had dedicated itself to the 
National Day ceremony: 
 
The preparations begin long before October 10, as participating 
organizations and groups begin to organize and practice for the National 
Day activities weeks in advance. At the end of September, troops that 
will march in front of the reviewing stands gather in Taipei … In 
addition to supporting every celebration, the students of different schools 
have had many complicated rehearsals to perfect their performance. 
School honor guards have practiced extensively, and civilian groups 
invited to participate in the programs have also made their preparations 
early … [T]he front of the Presidential Building is decorated with 
colourful billboards and red ceremonial arches are erected on Chiehshou 
Road … In the past, slogans were very political, such as: ―All success in 
the anti-communist campaign and the establishment of the nation.‖ … 
[or] ―Unifying China under freedom and democracy.‖ … On National 
Day, the flag-rising ceremony kicks off a series of activities and is 
followed by a highlight—the National Day message delivered by the 
President. During those distressful years of ―not yet recovering the lost 
territory [(the Mainland China)],‖ the President‘s address has never been 
a joyful one; instead, it has always shrouded by a solemn, tragic and 
painstaking atmosphere. During the 1960s and 1970s, as full diplomatic 
relations with foreign countries declined, few high-ranking foreign 
guests attended the occasion. In response, National Day messages would 
often begin with such words as: ―The international community allowed 
the adverse current to run unabated…‖ and ended with encouraging 
words such as ―…behaving solemnly and righteously in strengthening 
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Figure 6.4—The 1987 National Day ceremony 
People marched into the nationalist slogans and the national flag on the Chiehshou 
Road 
the nation, and remaining calm in adversity‖ … A military review 
follows the presidential message … In the past, when hostilities with 
Beijing were intense, the troop review served as a demonstration of 
military strength and a symbol for developing national power. 
(Office of the President, 2005d: lines 5-32) 
 
From the above description, it can be seen that the ROC National Day was 
a significant occasion for the KMT Government to forge the imaged collective 
memory and simultaneously to legitimise state power. Meanwhile, the Chiehshou 
Road played a key role in enabling the relevant messages to be diffused because 
of the national identification activities held on it [Figure 6.4]. Many Taiwanese 
were able to collectively experience such a national identification performance via 
the mass media. 
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Liberalisation of the Ketagalan Boulevard 
With the coming of Taiwan‘s political transition and transformation, the 
Road no longer played the aforementioned role as the stage of radical national 
identification performances. For instance, after martial law was lifted, the 
National Day ceremony began to include folk performances of different 
Taiwanese ethnic groups, symbolising that the state put emphasis on Taiwan itself 
(Discovery Center of Taipei, visited on 07/02/2007). Furthermore, after the DPP 
became the governing party in 2000, slogans related to Chinese nationalist 
discourses were no longer heard or seen on the road during the occasion. In 
addition, there are no scenes where the masses chant slogans to show their loyalty 
to the national leader (Office of the President, 2005d). 
Apart from being disconnected from the state‘s extreme national 
identification scheme, there were other changes happening to the site since 
Taiwan‘s democratisation. Being the road in front of the building representing 
state power, Chiehshou Road could serve as the site where people could hold 
demonstrations against the state. With the coming of democratisation, marches 
against the KMT Government‘s dictatorial rule were indeed held on the Road 
(Office of the President, 2005c). Moreover, in 1995, the DPP Mayor Chen Shui-
bian launched an unprecedented outdoor dance party on the Road (Discovery 
Center of Taipei, visited on 07/02/2006; Lee, 2001a; Office of the President, 
2006d). In addition, after changing the name of the site from Chiehshou Road to 
Ketagalan Boulevard in 1996, Mayor Chen lifted the ban on bicycle and 
motorcycle traffic on it (Yang, 2001). The memory of the site‘s once stern 
character began to fade. 
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Figure 6.5—Locations of iconic sites on the Zhongshang North Road 
6.4 The Zhongshan North Road 
For the contemporary Taiwanese populace, the Zhongshan North Road in 
Taipei City may be a landscape beautified by trees neatly planed along it, rather 
than an iconic site with significant meanings created by the state. Nevertheless, 
during Taiwan‘s colonial and early settler-governing eras, the Road was a linear 
iconic site linking several other iconic sites related to state power‘s representation 
[Figure 6.5]. This Section unfolds the stories of the Road‘s forgotten iconic status: 
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The forgotten road leading to the residence of the gods
19
 
‗Shinto‘ originally was a Japanese folk religion. After having restored the 
Imperial Family‘s power in the late nineteenth century, the Japanese Meji 
Emperor applied Shinto to deify himself and therefore reinforced the Imperial 
Family‘s legitimacy. Meanwhile, Shinto also became Japan‘s state religion (in 
present-day Japan, however, Shinto is more like a custom than a religion). Under 
these circumstances, after Taiwan became a Japanese colony, several ‗jinja‘, the 
Japanese term of Shinto shrine, were constructed in the region. In 1900, the 
Colonial Government launched a project to build the Taiwan Jinja in the capital 
Taipei. Being an Imperial-sponsored jinja, its rank would exceed those sponsored 
by individuals, the local authorities, or the central government (Wang, 2005). 
Traditionally, the jinja needs to be based on and surrounded by the natural 
environment. Hence, the Taiwan Jinja was arranged to be located on the Jiantan 
Mountain. This arrangement was due to not only the Mountain‘s fine natural 
scene, but also to the consideration that it was able to symbolise how the gods, 
living in the Jinja, would view the colonial capital from their high position. 
Although the land there belonged to the French Embassy, a wealthy Taiwanese 
businessman, and a local temple, the Colonial Government still seized it (Ibid), 
thus implying the Government‘s ultimate superiority. 
Following the Taiwan Jinja‘s completion in 1901, the Japanese colonisers 
began to visit it to worship gods during the New Year or festival periods. Some 
native Taiwanese were also influenced by the colonisers to follow the same 
religious ritual. With the stabilisation of Japan‘s colonial control, the Jinja 
                                                 
19
 In addition to the information extracted from documentary sources, meanings of 
‗Shinto‘, ‗jinja‘, and ‗jingū‘ mentioned in this subsection are contributed by my Japanese 
colleague, Kazuko Kakegawa. 
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Figure 6.6—The Taiwan Jingū, the 1930s 
eventually became a tourist spot for people in Taiwan. In 1926, the Colonial 
Government decided to ‗upgrade‘ the Taiwan Jinja to the ‗Taiwan Jingū‘ (jingū is 
the highest-ranking Shinto shrine) [Figure 6.6]. This decision meant that the 
original area covered by the Jinja needed to be expanded. Consequently, the local 
temple that had given away part of its land for the sake of the Taiwan Jinja‘s 
construction was relocated (Ibid). In other words, colonial urban planning‘s 
forcefulness once again made the native spirits give way to the gods from Japan. 
The Taiwan Jinja‘s establishment also influenced the capital Taipei‘s 
holistic urban planning. With the erection of the Jinja, a road (combining present-
day Zhongshan South Road and part of Zhongshan North Road, see Figure 6.5, p. 
108) was constructed to allow worshippers to access the Jinja. The road then came 
to be known as the ‗Imperial Messenger Road‘ because, after the establishment of 
the Jinja, a Shinto ritual contingent, serving the Japanese Emperor only, came to 
 111 
colonial Taiwan and marched on the Road to the Jinja to practise its first rite 
(Wang, 2005; Wang, 2005a). Furthermore, as ‗the road to the gods‘ residence‘, 
the Road was designed to be colonial Taiwan‘s most modern boulevard—fifteen 
meters in width, paved by macadam slabs and planted with trees (Wang, 2005). In 
addition, it was deliberately designed to connect the Jinja and the Office of the 
Taiwan Governor-General to symbolise Shinto‘s significance to the Japanese 
Empire (Hsu, 2001a; Kang, 2002; Lin, 2005a). 
Apart from these symbolic functions, the Road was designed to lead tap-
water channels from the waterworks, located at the north Taipei Basin, to the 
urban area (Shen, 2005). Moreover, it also played an important role as a travel 
medium for people to visit not only the Jinja, but also the north Taipei Basin 
where the zoo, playing fields, hot springs, golf clubs, and several leisure centres 
were located. Under these circumstances, the Road eventually was packed with 
vehicles and people not only on traditional festivals, but also during weekends 
(Wang, 2005; Wang, 2005a). 
In consideration of its excessive use, the Road‘s condition was improved 
from 1936 to 1940. For instance, apart from planting more trees and flowers along 
it, the Road became asphalt-paved and forty-meters wide. Street lights were 
installed and electric cables were put underground. New pavements along the 
Road were paved by concrete bricks and planted with trees [see Figure 6.7, p. 
112]. Furthermore, high-quality residential quarters were set up along it. In view 
of these adjustments, it was not long before fine shops and restaurants appeared 
on the Road. The condition ultimately made the Imperial Messenger Road the 
pride of the Colonial Government as well as of the Japanese Empire (Wang, 2005). 
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Figure 6.7—The Imperial Messenger Road, the 1940s 
That is to say, the Road was a physical symbol of the Japanese colonisers‘ 
political, cultural, and economic achievements in Taiwan. 
 
The forgotten road for welcoming foreign guests 
After the KMT took over Taiwan at the end of the Second World War, the 
Imperial Messenger Road was renamed Zhongshan Road in honour of Sun Yat-
sen, the founder of the ROC and the KMT, who is also known as ‗Sun Zhong-
shan‘ amongst Taiwanese20. The Road was also divided into Zhongshan North 
Road and Zhongshan South Road by the Zhongxiao East Road [see Figure 6.5, p. 
                                                 
20
 Many Chinese historical figures had several first names by which people could refer to 
them in their lifetime. For instance, they could originally have a name ‗registered‘ within their 
clans‘ ancestries. After having begun to receive education, however, their mentors would give 
them another name. In addition, they could still give themselves other names to imply their higher 
educational status. The legacy of this culture may confuse the researcher when he/she deals with 
sources presented in different languages. For example, although English academic studies usually 
use ‗Sun Yat-sen‘ and ‗Chiang Kai-shek‘ to refer to the two KMT leaders, the Taiwanese usually 
call the former ‗Sun Zhong-shan‘ and the later ‗Chiang Zhong-zheng‘. 
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108]. Subsequently, several adjustments were made to the Road and its 
surroundings. The first one was at the damaged Taiwan Jingū. 
In 1944, the Taiwan Jingū was damaged by US air-strikes as well as a 
Japanese passenger aeroplane crash. At the time, Japan was still struggling in the 
end of the Second World War and was therefore unable to pay attention to the 
Jingū‘s restoration (Wang, 2005). After the KMT came to Taiwan, it used the 
Jingū‘s remains to build a guest house to serve foreign officials. Ultimately, the 
Grand Hotel was built in 1952 at the same location in order to make Taiwan have 
an internationally recognised top class hotel (The Grand Hotel, 2002). Clearly, the 
Hotel‘s main purpose was to accommodate the ROC‘s important foreign persons. 
Moreover, this arrangement enabled the foreign officials to witness the beautiful 
urban scenery of the Zhongshan North Road when coming into and out of the 
Hotel. Eventually, many foreign embassies were built along the Road (Kang, 
2002).  
In 1973, the expanded Grand Hotel, a fourteen-storey traditional Chinese 
palace building [see Figure 6.8, p. 114], held its opening ceremony on the ROC 
National Day (The Grand Hotel, 2002). Tay (1995) suggests that it was a distinct 
landmark with the state-imposed representation of Chinese antiquarianism. 
Nevertheless, after Taiwan‘s UN seat was replaced by that of the People‘s 
Republic of China in 1971 and lost international recognition, many embassies 
were closed and the number of important foreign visitors also decreased. 
Eventually, the Zhongshang North Road lost its function of serving foreign guests 
(Hsu, 2001a). Meanwhile, the Grand Hotel‘s significance was also diminished. Its 
extravagant Chinese palace styles and former political functions even became 
 114 
Figure 6.8—The Grand Hotel 
topics for satire in present-day Taiwan (Lei, 2001). Overall, although it still 
constitutes a landmark in the capital Taipei due to its architectural features, the 
Grand Hotel also awkwardly represents Chinese settler rule‘s one-time superiority 
and Taiwan‘s marginalisation within the international community.  
 
The forgotten road serving the Settler State leader 
Although the Zhongshan North Road stopped serving important foreign 
guests after Taiwan‘s 1970s diplomatic crisis, it still had to serve Chiang Kai-shek, 
the ROC as well as the KMT leader whose official residence was located along it. 
When the KMT was struggling in the Chinese Civil War in the late 1940s, Taiwan 
Provincial Governor Chen Cheng was already looking for a suitable place to be 
Chiang‘s official residence. The location was finally decided to be at present-day 
Section Five of the Zhongshan North Road [see Figure 6.5, p. 108]. The location 
had previously been used by the Japanese Colonial Government for the 
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development of gardening and agricultural cultivation techniques. Hence, it 
constituted an exquisite natural environment. Since the area was called ‗Shilin‘ by 
the locals, the residence was named the Shilin Residence. After its completion in 
1950, the Residence became Chiang Kai-shek‘s life-time residence in Taiwan 
(Department of Transportation, updated 08/06/2006; Parks and Street Lights 
Office, updated 02/06/2006; Wang, 2005). 
With Chiang‘s move into the Shilin Residence, the area simultaneously 
became a strategic point of armed forces (Parks and Street Lights Office, updated 
02/06/2006; Wang, 2005). Meanwhile, both the Zhongshan North Road and 
Zhongshan South Road would form Chiang Kai-shek‘s official route from the 
Residence to the Office of the President [see Figure 6.5, p. 108]. Therefore, the 
Roads also became a strategic point. As a result, thirty minutes before Chiang‘s 
departure, the military police, civil police, and plainclothes agents would 
collectively collaborate on the Roads‘ traffic control. Moreover, as a 
precautionary measure against air-attacks, buildings along the Roads were 
required to consist of more than four storeys in order to facilitate the use of 
ground-to-air weapons in an emergency (Wang, 2005). 
Despite such intense security operation, however, the railway line along 
the Zhongxiao East Road, crossing the Zhongshan North Road and Zhongshan 
South Road, occasionally hindered Chiang‘s fleet [see Figure 6.5, p. 108]. Fearing 
that this condition might ‗harm national security‘, Taiwan‘s first flyover—the 
Fuhsing Bridge—was constructed in 1954 to connect the Zhongshan North Road 
and Zhongshan South Road over the railway line. Thus, Chiang‘s fleet was able to 
travel between the Residence and the Office without the risk of being stopped 
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(Ibid). Incidentally, in Mandarin, ‗fuhsing‘ means ‗restoration‘ implying Chiang‘s 
ambition to restore the Mainland China. 
After Chiang Kai-shek‘s death, the Zhongshan North Road no longer 
needed to serve such an extremely cautious national leader. Moreover, with the 
tube lines‘ construction, the railway line that had once obstructed Chiang‘s way 
was demolished. Hence, the Fuhsing Bridge also lost its function and was 
demolished in 1996 (Ibid). Apart from those up-to-four-storey buildings along it, 
nowadays, one can no longer perceive how Chinese settler rule‘s superiority had 
dramatically affected the Zhongshan North Road. 
In terms of the Shilin Residence, although its landownership belonged to 
the Taipei City Government, it became a forbidden site following Chiang Kai-
shek‘s death and Madame Chiang‘s emigration to the US. Not until the DPP‘s 
Chen Shui-bian became the mayor and negotiated with Madame Chiang, did a 
large part of the Residence, functioning as a public park, began to open to the 
general public since 1996. Nonetheless, Chiang Kai-shek‘s and Madame Chiang‘s 
house [see Figure 6.9, p. 117] is still a forbidden area in the Residence (Shilin 
Residence, visited on 13/10/2007). Arguably, this arrangement shows respect for 
the late national leader. Nonetheless, it may also imply that the late Settler State 
leader‘s unshakable power has not been entirely weeded out. 
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Figure 6.9—The Shilin Residence 
Chiang Kai-shek‘s and Madame Chiang‘s house (behind the barred door) is still a 
‗forbidden area‘ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5 The Chiang Kai-shek (CKS) Memorial Hall 
One can acknowledge that the iconic sites examined in the previous three 
Sections are more or less related to the late Chinese Settler State leader—Chiang 
Kai-shek. As a matter of fact, Chiang still influenced capital Taipei‘s urban 
landscape after his death. This Section reveals his spatial legacies in the City: 
 
Chiang’s death and the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall 
Having been a state leader with virtually unshakable power, Chiang Kai-
shek‘s death in 1975 unsurprisingly resulted in the construction of an iconic site—
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Figure 6.10—The CKS Memorial Hall 
the CKS Memorial Hall [Figure 6.10]. But, before examining the CKS Memorial 
Hall‘s establishment and implications, I want to briefly introduce the Dr. Sun Yat-
sen Memorial Hall, erected to pay tribute to Sun Yat-sen, the KMT and ROC 
founder. In fact, the first person proposing its construction was Chiang Kai-shek 
himself in 1964. The main structure was completed in 1972. However, following 
extensive discussions between Chiang and the designers, the Hall was made to 
bear more Chinese architectural features (National Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial 
Hall, visited on 21/12/2006). A slight irony was that after Chiang died on 5th 
April 1975, only three years after the completion of Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial 
Hall, the building became his body‘s temporary resting place [see Figure 6.11, p. 
119] (Nan, 2001). One can suggest that it was another national-identification 
activity that made Chiang‘s death become the nation‘s imagined collective 
sorrowful memory, thereby reinforcing settler rule‘s legitimacy. 
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Figure 6.11—The Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall, 1975 
People queued up in front the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall to enter the building in 
order to pay their respects to Chiang Kai-shek‘s body 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The origin of the CKS Memorial Hall 
According to the claim made by Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Office, 
 
As an expression of their high esteem for the late President and as a way 
of eternally cherishing his memory, Chinese communities at home and 
abroad all generously donated funds to the government to build the 
Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall. In June the same year the Executive 
Yuan (Prime Minister‘s Office) accepted recommendations from the 
public and resolution of the official Funeral Committee to build the 
Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall [and it was accomplished and opened to 
the public in 1980]. 
(National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Management Office, 
visited on 19/12/2006) 
 
Clearly, it is difficult to investigate all the details within the above claim 
(e.g. whether ‗Chinese communities at home and abroad‘ indeed donated funds to 
the Hall‘s construction). Nonetheless, one may not be surprised that the KMT 
immediately dedicated itself to the project after Chiang Kai-shek‘s death. In fact, 
in comparison to the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall that took nine years to be 
accomplished, the more spectacular CKS Memorial Hall‘s construction took only 
five years. 
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Figure 6.12—Plan of CKS Memorial Park 
VIEW 
The Hall with its adjacent Square and Memorial Park [Figure 6.12] 
occupies an area of 250,000 square meters, and consists of many traditional 
Chinese architectural features. In view of its magnificent scale and architectural 
aesthetic value, the Hall has become one of Taiwan‘s famous tourist spots (Kang, 
2002; Lee, 2001a). 
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It is worth noting that although Sun Yat-sen was the founder of the ROC 
and the KMT, through documentation investigated in this study, the Dr. Sun Yat-
sen Memorial Hall seems less ‗iconic‘ than the CKS Memorial Hall in the 
Taiwanese‘ eyes, meaning that the latter is a more important landmark in Taiwan. 
Apart from the fact that the CKS Memorial Hall‘s grander appearance and scale 
made it frequently come under the media spotlight, one explanation can be that in 
comparison to Sun, Chiang‘s image of ‗great national leader‘ had been created 
through the large-scale propaganda prior to Taiwan‘s democratisation. For 
example, by consulting several archival sources (Taipei 2-28 Memorial Museum, 
visited on 19/12/2006) of the martial law period, the Taiwanese media and public 
education textbooks had portrayed Chiang as ‗the saviour of the human beings‘, 
‗the great man of the world‘, ‗the lighthouse of liberation‘, and ‗the Great Wall of 
the nation‘. 
As a large-scale project, the CKS Memorial Hall‘s construction directly 
affected Taipei City‘s urban planning. The land occupied by the Hall was a 
military base during the Japanese colonial era. Although the land remained in 
military use in the early settler-governing era, it was intended ultimately to be 
used for commercial purposes in order to accelerate the capital‘s economic 
development. However, Chiang‘s death immediately changed that plan (Lee, 
2002a). As a result, several new business districts, which are examined in Chapter 
9, were subsequently established in east Taipei City (the CKS Memorial Hall was 
located in the Zhongzheng Administrative District in west Taipei City; see the 
relative position on Figure A.1, p. 331) (Kang, 2002). One can suggest that this 
change and its implications demonstrates how Chiang Kai-shek‘s superior 
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leadership, despite his death, still had impacts on the capital Taipei‘s built 
environments. 
 
The demotion of CKS Memorial Hall 
The CKS Memorial Hall stored the collections and information in relation 
to Chiang Kai-shek. Meanwhile, the CKS Memorial Park served as an open 
recreational space for the general public. In particular, the CKS Square was 
frequently used by governmental and private institutions as a fair or exhibition 
venue. However, the KMT Government might not have expected that the Square 
would one day serve as the centre-stage for social movements against itself. 
Following the abolition of martial law in 1987, several large social 
movements were launched by the opposition party and the general public. One of 
the movements was organised to force the old National Assembly members to 
resign. The ROC National Assembly had been formed on the Mainland China in 
1947. Since Assembly members were intended to represent different regions of 
the Mainland, they became irreplaceable after the KMT‘s retreat to Taiwan in 
1949. Under these circumstances, if a member died, a Mainlander originally from 
the same region would be appointed to fill the vacancy. However, if no suitable 
person could be found, a new member would be selected from Chinese-
Mainlander communities in non-Communist countries (Roy, 2003). 
Although the newly-established DPP subsequently enabled several local 
politicians to become Assembly members representing Taiwan‘s regions, the 
Assembly was still dominated by elderly Mainlanders. For example, in 1988, a 
ninety-three-year-old Mainlander was elected as the session chairman. More 
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importantly, since one of the National Assembly‘s functions was to elect the ROC 
President and to revise the ROC Constitution, the elderly Mainland members‘ 
predominance would make the KMT always have the privilege of being the party 
in power (Ibid). 
In order to show their disapproval of such a political monopoly system, 
thousands of students occupied the CKS Square in March 1990 for several days to 
appeal to the KMT Government to urge these old Assembly members resign. As a 
result, in 1991, President Lee Teng-hui asked the long-term Assembly members to 
resign and launched the elections to select new members from Taiwanese 
constituencies only (Ibid). 
After the 1990 student movement, the CKS Square became a regular 
venure for anti-KMT social demonstrations to be held. In addition, the CKS 
Memorial Hall was then nicknamed as the ‗CKS Temple‘ to satirise the KMT‘s 
deification of Chiang Kai-shek (Lee, 2001a). 
The CKS Memorial Hall‘s iconic status has been continuously challenged 
with the coming of Taiwan‘s post-settler era. Taipei City‘s Sungshan Airport had 
been the location of the official welcoming ceremony for foreign leaders. In 1995, 
in consideration of the fact that the Airport was far from the Presidential Building 
where the ROC President would meet foreign leaders, the CKS Square began to 
host such ceremonies. However, in April 2006, the DPP Government announced 
that future ceremonies would be held on the Ketagalan Boulevard. Although the 
DPP Government emphasised that the change would enable foreign leaders to 
avoid extra traffic between the CKS Square and the Presidential Building, the 
opposition politicians claimed that the DPP intended to distance the ROC 
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Government from anything related to Chiang Kai-shek (Ko, 06/04/2006). 
Recalling the fact that, on 25th March of the same year, the building name of the 
Office of the President was just changed from ‗Chiehshou Hall‘ to ‗Presidential 
Building‘ [see Section 6.2, pp. 102-3], it may be understandable why the 
opposition politicians made such a claim. 
 
From the CKS Memorial Hall to the National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall 
Prior to exploring why the CKS Memorial Hall became the National 
Taiwan Democracy Hall, the DPP‘s strong attention to the 2-2-8 Incident needs to 
be recalled, since it was the trigger for the Hall‘s functional change. The literature 
review [see Section 4.3, pp. 57-8; Appendix 5] mentioned that, on 28th February 
1947, a conflict between the local people and the KMT Government broke out in 
Taipei City. Thereafter, a series of riots occurred throughout Taiwan. After violent 
suppression of the riots, the KMT began to use harsh methods, such as secret 
police, to control the public. Meanwhile, the Incident became a taboo subject until 
the coming of Taiwan‘s democratisation. Finally, in 1995, the DPP‘s Taipei 
Mayor Chen Shui-bian enabled the 2-28 Memorial to be erected at Taipei Park, 
which was also renamed 2-28 Peace Park, to symbolise ethnic harmony [see 
Figure 6.13, p. 125]. He also constructed the Taipei 2-28 Memorial Museum [see 
Figure 6.14, p. 125], originally a Japanese legacy located next to the Park, which 
was opened in 1997 (Taipei 2-28 Memorial Museum, visited on 19/12/2006). 
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Figure 6.13—The 2-28 Memorial in the 2-28 Peace Park 
Figure 6.14—The Taipei 2-28 Memorial Museum 
See more details of the Museum in Appendix 9 
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Figure 6.15—The National 228 Memorial Museum stamp 
See more details about National 228 Memorial Museum and the stamp in Appendix 
10 
The DPP‘s strong connection with the 2-2-8 Incident was continuously 
shown after it took state power. For instance, in 1998, President Lee Teng-hui, 
also the KMT‘s chairman at the time, already apologised for the massacre caused 
by the KMT military, and simultaneously designated 28th February as the ‗Peace 
Memorial Day‘ and a national holiday (Ibid). On 27th February 2006, the DPP 
Government even announced that national flags in government institutions and 
schools across Taiwan should be flown half-mast on the Day in order to mourn 
the victims. Such a policy was criticised by the opposition politicians claiming 
that the DPP was trying to attack the KMT and its allies by highlighting the KMT 
military‘s misbehaviour (Chuang, 28/02/2006; Chuang, 01/03/2006). Despite this 
criticism, on 28th February 2007, the 60th anniversary of the Incident, the DPP 
Government announced the construction of the National 228 Memorial Museum 
[Figure 6.15] in the capital Taipei (Hirsch, 28/02/2007). In addition, for the first 
time, new history textbooks including the illustration of the 2-2-8 Incident would 
be released in the same year (Gluck, 27/02/2007). 
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Among those ‗2-2-8 Incident compensation measures‘ made by the DPP 
Government, the one that directly impacted on the CKS Memorial Hall was 
triggered by a report released by the 228 Incident Memorial Foundation in 2006. 
The report was endorsed by the Central Government in 1992. It concluded that 
Chiang Kai-shek bore the greatest responsibility for the Incident since he ordered 
the troops sent from the Mainland China to Taiwan to brutally suppress the riots. 
On 26th February 2007, the DPP Government announced that the report was 
regarded as an ‗official‘ document (Chuang, 27/02/2007; Gluck, 27/02/2007). 
Thereafter, in his opening speech at the conference commemorating the 60th 
anniversary of the Incident, President Chen Shui-bian reemphasised the report‘s 
conclusion and vowed to tackle the legacy of authoritarian rule by renaming the 
CKS Memorial Hall (Ko and Shih, 27/02/2007). It is worth noting that, in early 
February, a similar proposal had been made by the DPP politicians (Wang, 
08/02/2007). Nonetheless, the name-change policy announced by President Chen 
was legitimised by the ‗new official report‘ of the 2-2-8 Incident. 
Subsequently, on 2nd March 2007, the Cabinet announced that the CKS 
Memorial Hall would be renamed as ‗National Taiwan Democracy Memorial 
Hall‘. It would be used to display information regarding the Taiwan‘s history of 
democratisation. The Square and Park around the Hall would be renamed too. 
Moreover, the white-washed walls surrounding the Hall‘s territory would be 
demolished (Mo and Wang, 04/03/2007; Wang, 05/03/2007). 
The Cabinet‘s plan immediately caused criticism form the opposition 
parties (Mo, 04/03/2007; Mo and Wang, 04/03/2007). On 4th March 2007, the 
KMT‘s Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin announced that due to its historical and 
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architectural features, the Hall was designated as a potential historic site under 
official review. According to the Cultural Property Preservation Law, examined 
further in Chapter 9, the Hall would therefore remain untouched during the review 
process, which could last from six months to one year. Predictably, Mayor Hau‘s 
strike-back strategy immediately caused disapproval from the DPP and its allies 
(Mo and Chuang, 07/03/2007; Wang, 05/03/2007). 
Despite the continuous disputes within politicians and the general public 
with different political stand points (see Chuang, 10/05/2007; Ko, 18/05/2007; 
Loa, 19/05/2007; Shih and Wang, 21/05/2007), on 19th May 2007, with protestors 
and supporters both gathered at the scene, the DPP Government invited the 2-2-8 
Incident victims‘ families to join the name-change ceremony held in the ‗new‘ 
National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall. In order to avoid any physical 
damage on the Hall already designated by the City Government as the potential 
historic site under official review, several new name signs were erected 
surrounding the site (Loa and Wang, 20/05/2007). Moreover, giant banners were 
hung to cover the old-name plate of the main hall. 
The dispute regarding the Hall‘s future continued after the name-change 
ceremony (see Ko, 29/05/2007; Loa, 16/07/2007; Mo, 26/05/2007). On 6th 
November 2007, the Council for Cultural Affairs approved the City Government‘s 
proposal for designating the Hall and its surrounding park as an historic site at the 
municipal level. Based on this decision made at the central government level, the 
City Government and the KMT assumed that the Hall would remain untouched 
(Hsu, 07/11/2007). 
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Nonetheless, the DPP Government said that although it would not affect 
the Hall‘s important physical structure due to the Council for Cultural Affairs‘ 
decision, the name-change would be continued to be put in practice. On 23rd 
November 2007, the relevant proposal made by the DPP Government was also 
approved by the Council for Cultural Affairs. Based on the proposal, the four 
Chinese characters ‗Da Zhong Zhi Zheng‘ (meaning ‗Great Centrality and Perfect 
Uprightness‘; ‗Zhong Zheng‘ implying Chiang Kai-shek‘s other name Chiang 
Zhing-zheng) would be changed to another four Chinese characters meaning 
‗Liberty Square‘. Moreover, the name tablet inscribed ‗Chiang Kai-shek 
Memorial Hall‘ above the main hall‘s entry would be changed to the one inscribed 
‗Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall‘. Unsurprisingly, the KMT-led City 
Government was unable to accept these changes. Moreover, it emphasised that the 
Central Government needed to obtain its permission to make the changes since the 
City was the government institution that was in charge of the Hall‘s historic 
heritage interests (Loa and Mo, 23/11/2007; Mo, 08/11/2007). 
However, the DPP Government just ignored the City Government‘s 
concerns and the City Government appealed to the Taipei High Administrative 
Court to overturn the Central Government‘s decision. On 30th November, 
although the Court indicated that the City Government had the right to prevent the 
site from being physically damaged, it rejected the request to stop the Central 
Government‘s future actions (Chang and Hsu, 01/12/2007). 
As a result, despite strong criticism made by the City Government and 
opposition politicians, the preparation of the re-construction work began on 5th 
December 2007. However, the work was unable to start since the site was packed 
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Figure 6.16—The last day of the Da Zhong Zhi Zheng arch 
On 6th December 2007, the extreme protest actions in front of the arch were already 
under control. Nevertheless, several people with different opinions on the Hall‘s change were 
still staying at the site to demonstrate their beliefs. Meanwhile, the media people (on the left 
side of the Figure) and their satellite news gathering cubs were stationing behind the barricades 
to wait for up-to-date news 
with protestors and supporters having different opinions about the change. 
Ultimately, with the assistances from the National Police Agency and the City 
Police Department, the work was able to take place on 7th December [Figure 
6.16]. The inscription on the arch was changed on the 8th and the new name tablet 
was hung on 9th December (Hsu, 08/12/2007; Wang and Lao, 06/12/2007). 
After changing these signs, the DPP Government began to change the 
main hall‘s interior. On 1st January 2008, the main hall was reopened to the 
public. Although the giant Chiang Kai-shek statue was not removed, its 
surrounding was decorated with kites representing a ‗democratic wind‘. Moreover, 
the names of all the recorded Incident victims were posted on the inside wall (Ko, 
02/01/2008). Meanwhile, the dispute between the Central and City Governments 
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was continuing. The City Government has been suing the Ministry of Education, 
which was in charge of the re-designing the main hall, for changing the municipal 
historic site‘s physical elements without its permission (Hsu, 09/12/2007; Hsu and 
Wang, 11/12/2007). 
From the above story of the CKS Memorial‘s change to the National 
Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall, it can be seen that conflict between the DPP-
led Central Government and the KMT-led Taipei City Government constitutes not 
only a party political competition, but also an identity contest. On the one hand, 
by using the 2-2-8 Incident as the justification, the DPP claimed that the Hall was 
a legacy of authoritarian rule and changing it would symbolise the 
accomplishment of transitional justice. On the other, the KMT claimed that the 
DPP just intended to apply the change to tarnish the KMT‘s image. 
Clearly, both sides‘ claims can be taken into account and I do not attempt 
to make any comment about them. However, one concern is that if the CKS 
Memorial Hall‘s change did symbolise the practice of transitional justice, why did 
it not occur in Taiwan‘s political transition era? Such ‗unaccomplished‘ 
transitional justice can imply that, despite its symbolic collapse, Chinese settler 
rule still has a strong influence on Taiwanese identity and its urban 
representations. In fact, although the DPP Government eventually changed the 
CKS Memorial Hall‘s name and function, the metro-station and bus-stop names of 
the site remain ‗CKS Memorial Hall‘, due to the insistence of the KMT-led Taipei 
City Government. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
This Chapter has examined how the changes of several iconic sites were 
associated with state power‘s transformation in Taiwan. From these stories, it can 
be concluded that the Japanese Colonial Government applied state power to 
efficiently build several iconic sites in the capital Taipei. Apart from representing 
colonial rule‘s superiority, it ought to be noted that these sites also had practical 
functions corresponding to the colonial capital‘s urban planning (e.g. the Imperial 
Messenger Road functioned not only as a state-religion symbol, but also as an 
important traffic route linking the city centre and the recreation spots in north 
Taipei City). 
In terms of the newly-arrived KMT Government, although it built its own 
iconic sites to represent/legitimise political control and Mainland China‘s culture, 
the new government also kept using some of these Japanese colonial iconic sites 
to practise similar national identification schemes (e.g. as in the Japanese era, the 
Chiehshou Road was still the site hosting national events organised by the state). 
However, a distinct difference between these two political entities‘ uses of the 
sites was that during the early years of the KMT Government‘s authoritarian rule, 
some iconic sites were almost inaccessible to the general public. One can suggest 
that this difference implied settler rule‘s further superiority. Not until the coming 
of Taiwan‘s democratisation did the transitional KMT‘s begin to abandon these 
identification schemes, and the relevant sites simultaneously became increasingly 
accessible. 
The reason why the KMT Government kept using these Japanese legacies, 
rather than deliberately destroying them, can be that when the KMT took over 
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Taiwan in 1945, it was still struggling in the Chinese Civil War with the CPC on 
the Mainland China. That is to say, although it was able to manipulate the home 
population‘s collective identity through education, media propaganda, and martial 
law, the preoccupation of the Civil War left KMT unable to pay any attention on 
these Japanese legacies‘ legitimacy. Hence, many noticeable physical 
representations of colonial memories still remain in the capital Taipei. In fact, one 
can even suggest that these Japanese legacies played an important role in making 
the KMT settle quickly in Taiwan. It not only meant that these Japanese legacies 
were able to accommodate the KMT while struggling in the war on the Mainland 
China. It also meant that these sites‘ symbolic functions were used by the KMT to 
swiftly legitimise state power. 
In contrast to the KMT Government, in Taipei City, the DPP Government 
did not really built new iconic sites representing state power. Nonetheless, since 
Taiwan‘s political transition era, the DPP, the opposition party at the time, has 
applied its political resources to enable several sites, representing sorrowful 
memories caused by the KMT Government‘s early dictatorial rule, to be 
constructed in the capital Taipei (e.g. the 2-28 Memorial was erected to 
commemorate the victims of the 2-2-8 Incident). Moreover, it also introduced 
several name- or functional-change policies to divest the iconic sites from serving 
the KMT‘s interests (e.g. the Chiehshou Road was renamed Ketagalan Boulevard 
to pay tribute the Taiwanese Indigenous People, rather than the late Settler State 
leader). 
In the light of this, it is unsurprising that the DPP, after it came to state 
power in 2000, would try to use the similar methods to affect the settler-rule 
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iconic sites in the capital Taipei (e.g. trying to transform the CKS Memorial Hall 
into the National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall). However, since the 
opposition parties, consisting of the KMT and its allies, were controlling the 
City‘s administration at the time, the plans of the DPP-led Central Government 
were hindered by the KMT-led City Government. This implies that settler rule, 
despite the coming of Taiwan‘s post-settler era, still has implications for the 
nation‘s imagined collective memory and its urban representations. 
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CHAPTER 7 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS (II): 
NATIONAL CULTURE, FAMILIARITY, AND TAIPEI CITY 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 7 introduces several national-cultural sites and subtle urban 
elements in Taipei City. Although they seem to be ordinary public places, their 
existence is originally associated with the state‘s deliberate arrangement to forge, 
maintain, and reinforce the nation‘s imagined collective memory concerned with 
national history, national culture, and the sense of ‗home‘. Specifically, Section 
7.2 examines how different political entities in Taiwanese history used the 
museums to legitimise state power and ‗national‘ history and culture. Moreover, 
Section 7.3 explores how sports and the relevant playgrounds also served the 
state‘s interests in forging the nation‘s collective identity. Finally, Section 7.4 
investigates other specific urban features that are also related to the state‘s 
identification schemes. 
     
7.2 Museums and National Identification 
The theoretical framework [p. 34] has suggested that a museum can 
constitute a national-cultural site since it can be used by the state to store and 
display collections relevant to ‗national‘ history or culture. This Section explores 
several museums that were state-legitimised as national-cultural sites in Taipei 
City: 
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Figure 7.1—The National Taiwan Museum 
The museum as the Japanese colonial legacy 
The National Taiwan Museum is a Japanese legacy. Like many Western 
colonisers inclined to demonstrate their superior power by erecting museums 
where the colony could be symbolically displayed within a limited space, the 
Japanese colonisers also had the same inclination. In 1915, Taiwan‘s first museum, 
the Taiwan Governor-General Museum, was built in the colonial capital Taipei. 
Like many other colonial landmarks (e.g. the Office of the Taiwan Governor-
General, see Section 6.2, pp. 98-9), the Museum‘s appearance combined various 
Western architectural features implying the Japanese colonisers‘ partiality to 
Westernisation [Figure 7.1] (Bee, 2005). 
The original purpose of the Museum was to display the information 
concerned with Taiwan‘s earth science, anthropology, zoology, and botany for 
both academic and industrial uses. However, it ultimately came to serve as the 
Kodama/Goto Memorial Hall in order to dedicate to colonial Taiwan‘s fourth 
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colonial Governor-General and third Chief Civil Administrator, who had 
successfully modernised the colony from 1898 to 1906. It is worth noting that the 
Museum‘s location was originally occupied by the Matzu Temple constructed in 
the Qing-ruling era. Although ‗Matzu‘ is a significant religious spirit for the locals, 
it was unable to prevent the Temple from being demolished for the sake of the 
Museum‘s construction (Ibid). 
During the Second World War, the Museum was used to store and display 
the war spoils to justify the Japanese Empire‘s role in the War. The similar tactic 
of such spatial propaganda was applied by the KMT Government. For example, 
the Museum was used to display materials related to the KMT‘s battles with the 
Qing Empire, Japan, or the CPC. The situation continued until the 1980s where 
Taiwan‘s democracy began to emerge (Bee, 2005). In short, although its original 
function was not to legitimise specific national history or culture, the Museum, as 
a public space, eventually served the state‘s identification schemes. Nowadays, 
the Museum only serves academic interests. 
Incidentally, after the KMT took over Taiwan, the Museum was renamed 
several times due to changes in the nation‘s domestic administrative system. 
Ultimately, in 1999, the name National Taiwan Museum was confirmed and is 
now the name by which the museum is known (National Taiwan Museum, visited 
on 09/01/2007). 
 
Remembering Chinese roots 
In view of the KMT‘s progressive defeat in the war with the CPC on the 
Mainland China, Chiang Kai-shek allowed many significant Chinese cultural 
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Figure 7.2—The National Museum of History 
assets to be transported to Taiwan since 1948. In 1956, some of the cultural relics 
were displayed in the Artifact‘s Museum in the capital Taipei. It was the first 
museum ever built by the KMT Government in Taiwan. After visiting the 
Museum on the ROC National Day in 1957, Chiang Kai-shek ordered it to be 
renamed ‗National Museum of History‘ (National Museum of History, visited on 
10/01/2007). One can suggest that this arrangement was intended to legitimise 
Taiwan‘s connection with Mainland China‘s history and culture. Incidentally, the 
Museum‘s appearance represented the traditional Chinese imperial-palace 
architectural style [Figure 7.2]. 
Nonetheless, the National Museum of History only displayed a small part 
of the valuable Chinese cultural items originally moved from the Mainland. The 
rest were not displayed publicly until the opening of the National Palace Museum 
in the capital Taipei in 1965. Ironically, the ‗original‘ National Palace Museum 
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Figure 7.3—The National Palace Museum 
 
was on the Mainland China. The story dates back to 1925, when the KMT allowed 
the Qing Empire‘s Forbidden City—the Emperor‘s home in Beijing—to become 
the ‗Palace Museum‘. The cultural assets transported by the KMT to Taiwan were 
collections from that Qing-Imperial legacy (Caltonhill and Asmus, 2006; National 
Palace Museum, visited on 15/01/2007). 
The National Palace Museum represents the typical Chinese imperial-
palace architectural styles [Figure 7.3]. In view of its abundant collections, the 
Museum is one of Taiwan‘s famous tourist spots. It can be suggested that the 
circumstances of its creation further reinforced Taiwan‘s connection with Chinese 
history and culture. 
In March 2007, when the National Palace Museum‘s Organic Status was 
being reviewed, the DPP Government proposed that the Museum should 
accommodate international cultural and historic relics rather than only those 
concerned with ‗Chinese‘. However, the proposal was blocked by the opposition 
parties claiming that the DPP was practising de-Sinicisation (Shih, 22/03/2007). 
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Remembering Taiwanese roots 
One may assert that, in terms of the three museums described in the 
previous two subsections that the one most closely linked to ‗Taiwan‘ actually is 
the Japanese colonial legacy, the National Taiwan Museum. After all, the 
Museum‘s existence was originally attributed to the colonisers‘ attempt to display 
colonial Taiwan within a limited space. Nonetheless, by visiting the present-day 
National Taiwan Museum, one can realise that it only displays items concerned 
with Taiwan‘s anthropology and natural science, rather than those associated with 
Taiwan‘s history and culture. Overall, it seems that the National Museum of 
History and the National Palace Museum still play the role of displaying items 
that are representing Taiwan‘s ‗national‘ history and culture. 
Nonetheless, by consulting the documentary sources, it is found that 
Taiwan‘s political transition has intended to plan a national-cultural site 
concerned with the region itself. The story dates back to 1992. After visiting the 
Provincial Taiwan Museum (the present-day National Taiwan Museum), 
President Lee Teng-hui proposed a project to construct the ‗Provincial History 
Museum‘ that was meant to store and display historic and cultural relics related to 
Taiwan. After the streamlining of the Taiwan Provincial Government [see 
Appendix 7, pp. 326-7], the planned museum was directly administered by the 
Central Government and was renamed as ‗National Museum of Taiwan History‘ 
in 1999. Incidentally, the planned Museum is located in Tainan City in south 
Taiwan, rather than the capital Taipei. This arrangement was due to the fact that it 
was Taiwan‘s earliest developed area. In other words, the location symbolises the 
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origin of Taiwanese history (National Museum of Taiwan History Planning 
Bureau, 2003). 
The Museum‘s construction began in 2003 and was planned to be 
accomplished in 2008. An article titled ‗History of the Land and the People‖ 
published in a DPP Government-published booklet introducing the planned 
Museum said that: 
 
History is an endless flow linking the past, the present and the future. It cannot 
be expounded upon in a uniform way, but it is open to public debate. History 
still awaits constant exploration and interpretation … The history we speak of is 
the history of this land known as Taiwan and its people. Viewing this land 
―Taiwan‖ as the stage and the early settlers and recent immigrants that are 
―Taiwan‘s people‖ as the lead actors, we construct Taiwan‘s history as the 
evolution of interaction between multiple ethnic groups and the natural 
environment over a great period of time. 
(National Museum of Taiwan History Planning Bureau, 2003, pp. 6-7) 
 
From the above article, it may be suggested that the DPP Government, 
claiming that it represented ‗local‘ power, regarded the planned Museum as a 
significant symbol highlighting Taiwan‘s history and culture, rather than those of 
the Mainland China. 
 
7.3 Stadiums and National Identification 
The theoretical framework [p. 32] has suggested that a specific sporting 
activity can constitute a nation‘s cultural feature, and it can be represented by a 
given city‘s sporting facilities. This Section unveils how national sports were 
associated with the state‘s identification schemes in Taiwan, and how they 
reflected certain sites‘ construction and demolition in Taipei City. 
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The state and the sport 
The Japanese learned baseball from the US educators teaching in Japan. In 
1898, the sport was introduced by the Japanese colonisers to Taiwan. However, 
the natives initially regarded baseball as ‗the colonisers‘ game‘. The condition had 
not changed until the 1920s where the Colonial Government intended to secure 
ethnic harmony by beginning to allow the natives to participate in the colony‘s 
political decision making [see Appendix 3]. At that point, the Government also 
assumed that ‗team‘ sports could provide a means of cooperation between the 
colonisers and the colonised, and therefore made physical education a compulsory 
course within colonial Taiwan‘s educational system. Unsurprisingly, baseball was 
included in the course. Eventually, the sport became the natives‘ main leisure 
activity (Chen, 1999; Lin, 2002; Slack et al., 2002). 
In comparison to baseball, basketball was not popular in colonial Taiwan. 
However, it had already become popular on the Mainland China after the US 
military officials introduced it to their KMT counterparts. After the KMT took 
over Taiwan in 1945, similar to the Japanese colonisers intending to use baseball 
to unify the colonisers and the colonised, the KMT Government began to apply 
basketball to forge a new identity among the local Taiwanese population. For 
instance, the well-trained basketball teams were formed by military and police 
units in order to enable the locals be identified with them. Moreover, many 
tournaments were held to celebrate Taiwan‘s ‗restoration‘ (the end of Japanese 
colonial rule), Chiang Kai-shek‘s birthday, and the KMT‘s claimed achievements. 
The situation continued until the 1960s, when the relationship between the KMT 
and the CPC began to become less intense (Shu, 2005). 
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In terms of the baseball‘s development in early settler-governing era, 
although the KMT was practising de-Japanisation at the time, it did not regard 
baseball as an inappropriate colonial legacy. Thus, the local people were able to 
play baseball continuously. However, although the KMT Government did not ban 
baseball, it did not promote the sport in comparison to its dedication to promoting 
basketball (Chen, 1999; Slack et al., 2002). 
In 1968, a significant event ultimately changed the KMT Government‘s 
stance on baseball: a Taiwanese elementary school baseball team defeated the 
visiting Japanese counterpart in a friendly game in Taipei City. Since the mass 
media were serving the KMT‘s interests at that time, the news reports distorted 
the game by reporting that the local team had defeated the Japanese national 
elementary schools ‗champion‘. Meanwhile, the general public were happy with 
this ‗news‘ implying a victory over the former colonisers. Under these 
circumstances, the KMT Government not only realised the Taiwanese youth 
baseball players‘ talent, but also the extent to which baseball could be used for 
propaganda alongside national identification. Thereafter, the Government began 
to send youth baseball teams to participate in international games, in which they 
won the titles frequently. When Taiwan was forced to leave the UN and 
experiencing a series of diplomatic blows in the 1970s [see Appendix 6, p. 323], 
these sports victories were used as state propaganda to reassure the public. 
Eventually, baseball‘s as Taiwan‘s national sport was confirmed (Chen, 1999; Lin, 
2002; Slack et al., 2000). 
Clearly, the national basketball teams‘ victories were also able to reassure 
the public when Taiwan encountered the diplomatic crisis in the 1970s (Hsu, 
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2001b). Nonetheless, after the PRC replaced the ROC‘s role as ‗China‘ in the UN 
in 1971, many international organisations began to marginalise Taiwan. 
Consequently, the International Basketball Federation cancelled ROC‘s 
membership for ten years from 1975. During this period, the only ‗international‘ 
games that the ROC Basketball Team could participate in were the invitation 
tournaments held by the KMT Government in Taiwan (Shu, 2005). In this light, it 
may be suggested that in comparison to basketball, Taiwanese baseball gained 
even more reputation at the ‗restricted‘ international level. 
 
The basketball stadium and national identification 
When basketball was the favourite game, the KMT constructed several 
basketball courts in the capital Taipei during the early post-Second-World-War 
period. One of the most famous indoor basketball stadiums was the Three Armed 
Stadium, administered by the ROC‘s Ministry of National Defense in 1951. It is 
worth noting that the Stadium also functioned as a theatre/gallery hosting 
significant artistic events. However, like the basketball game, the artistic events 
also served the KMT‘s identification scheme. For example, an ordinary art events‘ 
title had to include nationalist or anti-Communist slogans (Shu, 2005). 
Despite its association with the state‘s identification scheme, the Three 
Armed Stadium was once an important public entertainment venue for the citizens 
in the capital Taipei. However, it was demolished in 1960 and the location 
became the present-day Jieshou Park [see Figure 6.3, p. 104] (Kao, 2004; Shu, 
2005). Despite the demolition of such an important site being able to connect 
basketball, art, and national identification, the KMT Government had another plan. 
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Figure 7.4—The Chunghua Stadium 
After the ROC gained the right to host the Second Asian Championships 
Basketball Tournament, the KMT Government persuaded a wealthy overseas 
Chinese entrepreneur, who had already invested in Taiwan‘s hotel industry, to 
contribute to the construction of a large-scale basketball stadium in Taipei City. 
Therefore, the Chunghua (literally meaning ‗Chinese‘) Stadium [Figure 7.4] was 
erected in 1960, and used to host the Championships in 1963. When the ROC 
became marginalised within the world of international basketball [see the previous 
subsection, pp. 143-4], the Stadium became the most important site where the 
KMT Government could host its international tournaments (Hsu, 2001b; Lee, 
2002a; Shu, 2005). 
Like the Three Armed Stadium, the multi-use Chunghua Stadium became 
an important public entertainment venue in the capital. However, it was destroyed 
by fire in 1988. The impact was that the KMT Government had no other 
appropriate stadiums to host major basketball events. Hence, many state-
organised tournaments, constituting the only channel for Taiwanese basketball to 
have contact with foreign teams, were temporarily suspended. Meanwhile, 
although Taiwan‘s basketball standard had always been competitive in 
comparison to other Asian countries, it began lagging behind its Asian 
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counterparts following the Stadium fire (Hsu, 2001b; Shu, 2005). In other words, 
the site‘s abrupt collapse coincidentally reflected Taiwanese basketball‘s decay. 
One can suggest that the situation reinforced baseball‘s role as the nation‘s 
national sport. 
Incidentally, although the Taipei City Government made plans to build a 
new stadium on the ground where the burned Chunghua Stadium had stood, due 
to the incessant disputes between the land-owners and investors, the location had 
remained undeveloped within one of the City‘s important commercial districts 
(Hsu, 2001b; Lee, 2002a; Shu, 2005). By the time of my fieldwork, nonetheless, 
in 2006, however, the location was in use for the new metro‘s construction. 
 
The baseball stadium and national identification 
In view of the fact that baseball is Taiwan‘s national sport, it is 
unsurprising that one can encounter baseball parks within many Taiwanese cities. 
It ought to be noted that, according to the information provided by the Chinese 
Professional Baseball League (Taiwan‘s only professional baseball league), 
several present-day baseball stadiums in Taiwan are Japanese legacies (Chinese 
Professional Baseball League, 2007a-d). After all, the sport itself was introduced 
by the Japanese colonisers. However, in contrast to the aforementioned basketball 
stadiums that were deliberately built by the KMT Government, the construction of 
the Taipei City Baseball Stadium, which was once Taiwan‘s most famous baseball 
field, came about by chance. 
The basic construction of the Taipei City Baseball Stadium was 
accomplished in 1959. At the beginning, it was used as a multi-use sports field 
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Figure 7.5—The Taipei City Baseball Stadium 
(Chinese Professional Baseball League, 2007e; Lee, 2002a). The Stadium was 
used to host the game in which a Taiwanese elementary school baseball team 
defeated its Japanese counterpart in 1968 (Taipei Arena, Eastern Dome 
Management Co. Ltd., visited on 12/01/2007). As mentioned in the previous 
subsection [see p. 143], the event inspired the KMT Government to use baseball 
to produce nationalistic rhetoric. 
When it began to frequently sent youth baseball players to pursue national 
glory in international tournaments and simultaneously to forge the nation‘s 
collective memory, the KMT Government also planned to host similar events in 
Taiwan. Ultimately, it gained the right to host the 1971 Little League Baseball‘s 
Asian Tournaments. Therefore, the Government decided to extend the Taipei City 
Baseball Stadium to host the forthcoming Tournaments. Inevitably, the renovated 
Stadium featured traditional Chinese architectural elements—a Chinese imperial 
palace-style entrance [Figure 7.5]. Eventually, the Stadium became a significant 
spot representing the connection between baseball and the nation‘s reinforced 
collective identity due to the Taiwanese youth players‘ continued dominance in 
the games hosted in it (Lee, 2002a; Taipei Arena, Eastern Dome Management Co. 
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Ltd., visited on 12/01/2007). 
The beginning of Taiwan‘s professionalized/commercialised baseball in 
1990 reinforced the Taipei City Baseball Stadium‘s role as the capital‘s important 
entertainment venue. It was also used to host various other outdoor events. 
However, due to overuse, the Stadium was ultimately closed after hosting its final 
professional baseball game on 26th January 2000 (Lee, 2002a). 
In contrast to the burned Chunghua Stadium‘s impact on Taiwanese 
basketball [see the previous subsection, pp. 145-6], the Taipei City Baseball 
Stadium‘s demolition did not result in Taiwanese baseball‘s decay. As a matter of 
fact, in view of its other available baseball parks with decent facilities, Taiwan 
subsequently hosted the 34th Baseball World Cup in 2001 and won the bronze 
medal. The title ‗Asia number one‘ (Cuba won the gold and the US won the silver) 
once again cheered the Taiwanese (Lin, 2003). In other words, although the site 
representing good memories has gone, baseball‘s role as Taiwan‘s national sport 
remains unshakable. 
Incidentally, in 2005, the Taipei Arena [see Figure 7.6, p. 149] was erected 
at the original location where the Taipei City Baseball Stadium had stood. It was a 
BOT project
21
. Like the Taipei City Baseball Stadium, this new multi-use domed-
shaped stadium became a significant recreational site in the capital since it has 
hosted various sports and artistic activities (Lee, 2002a; Taipei Arena, Eastern 
Dome Management Co. Ltd., visited on 12/01/2007). However, the significant 
                                                 
21
 BOT (build-operate-transfer) is a project whereby the government allows specific 
public works to be constructed by the private sector that will be authorised to operate the site and 
obtain the profit in a limited contractual period. After the end of the period, the government takes 
over the site. 
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difference is that the Taipei Arena is unable to function as an indoor baseball 
stadium. 
 
7.4 Subtle Urban Elements and National Identification 
Section 4.3 [see pp. 58-9] mentioned that after the KMT Government took 
over Taiwan, new street and place names and statues were appearing to create a 
new national identity. This Section reveals more subtle urban elements in Taipei 
City that were linked to the state‘s identification schemes. 
 
Forgotten daily nationalistic propaganda 
The KMT Government‘s nationalistic propaganda had once formed part of 
everyday life until the coming of Taiwan‘s democratisation. For instance, state-
released lottery tickets were literally named ‗patriotic lottery ticket‘ and imprinted 
with figures of important official buildings and traditional Chinese allegories. 
Furthermore, Chiang Kai-shek‘s portraits as well as various anti-Communist and 
nationalistic slogans were frequently seen on postage stamps (Hsu, 2001c-d).  
Figure 7.6—The Taipei Arena 
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Figure 7.7—The North Gate, 1947 
The nationalist slogans and KMT figures‘ portraits were hung on the historic heritage 
built in the Qing-ruling era 
Likewise, these portraits of important KMT figures and anti-Communist 
and nationalistic slogans had dominated the capital Taipei‘s urban scene during 
Taiwan‘s martial-law period. They were painted on walls of schools and 
governmental institutions, posted on public transport billboards, or hung on 
bridges or facades of historic buildings [Figure 7.7] (Hsu, 2001e; Lee, 2001b; Nan, 
2001). 
Another relevant, yet odder, example is Taipei City‘s pavements. The 
ROC national flag [see Figure 7.8, p. 151] depicts the slogan that the most 
Taiwanese may be familiar with—‗Blue Sky, White Sun, Red-covered Ground‘. 
The official statement below explains the meaning of the flag: 
 
The 12 points of white in the emblem represent the 12 two-hour periods 
of the day, symbolizing unceasing progress. At one level, the three colors 
of blue, white, and crimson stand for the Three Principles of the people, 
nationalism, democracy, and social well-being [(proposed by Sun Yat-
sen, the ROC founder)]. At another level, the colors embody qualities 
that evoke other concepts enumerated in the Three Principles … a 
government that is of the people … a government that is by the people … 
a government that is for the people. 
                              (The Government Information Office, Republic of China 
(Taiwan), 2005: p. 3) 
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Figure 7.9—The remainder of the red paving bricks 
Figure 7.8—The ROC national flag 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1968, at the time the Taipei Mayor was still appointed by the KMT-led 
Central Government, the City Government decided to use red bricks to pave the 
City‘s pavements. As a result, the capital‘s urban scene would symbolise the 
‗Blue Sky, White Sun, Red-covered Ground‘. Incidentally, the bricks‘ pattern was 
deliberately designed to denoted ancient Chinese coins implying good luck 
[Figure 7.9] (Lee, 2001c). 
Although the DPP‘s Chen Shui-bian, the first direct elected Taipei Mayor, 
changed several subtle urban elements (e.g. street names and status) associated 
with the KMT Government‘s Chinese identification scheme, it seems that he did 
not notice that these pavements also collectively constituted a settler-state legacy 
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with the identification function. The person who later initiated the relevant 
changes was the KMT‘s Ma Ying-jeou, who defeated Chen in the 1998 mayoral 
election. Mayor Ma consulted with the basic-level local authorities and thereafter 
decided to allow local communities to choose their own patterns and colours for 
pavements in their living areas. Meanwhile, the City Government also allowed the 
private sector to adopt some pedestrian areas and decide their appearance (Ibid). 
The reason why the KMT Mayor did not intend to preserve these old pavements 
could be that after thirty years, and with their worn-out appearances, these 
pavements‘ original meaning may have already been forgotten. In addition, as 
mentioned in Section 4.3 [pp. 63-4], Taiwan‘s democratisation had already led the 
general public to become involved in the creation of their built environments; it 
was therefore unnecessary to cause potential conflict with the empowered citizens. 
 
Architectural styles and national identification 
Prior to exploring how the KMT Government applied urban elements‘ 
architectural design to practise its identification scheme, a brief examination is 
needed of the Western-style Japanese housing legacies. One can still encounter 
these physical representations of the Taiwanese‘s imagined collective colonial 
memory in present-day Taiwanese cities. 
Section 4.3 [see p. 56] mentioned that the Japanese Colonial Government 
built Western-style official buildings, parks, statues, and monuments in colonial 
Taipei City in order to create a Western-city image. Meanwhile, Lu (2005) 
indicates that the Colonial Government also encouraged the natives to build 
Western-style houses. Nonetheless, the Colonial Government did not force the 
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natives to follow the official guidelines when re-building their dwellings. Hence, 
although there were many Western-style official buildings and public places in the 
City, the natives still lived in traditional Chinese-style houses. 
In 1911, a typhoon caused severe damage to colonial Taipei City. Many 
traditional Chinese-style dwellings of the natives were therefore seriously 
damaged. The Colonial Government then took this ‗opportunity‘ to propose new 
guidelines for the natives to build new Western-style houses (Ibid). Meanwhile, 
the location of the present-day Hengyang Road, where many Japanese companies 
were located, became the starting point for the Colonial Government to 
experiment with the new guidelines. The project was generally completed in 1914 
and the area subsequently became one of the capital Taipei‘s most successful 
commercial spots [see Figure 7.10, p. 154] (Hsu, L. C., 2005; Lee, 2002a). 
Thereafter, many native businesspeople also began to renovate their shop fronts 
with Western architectural features in order to attract customers. Some natives 
even asked the public sector to help them build Western-style living quarters (Lu, 
2005). From this, it can be suggested that the Colonial Government successfully 
made the natives accept the new living environments. In other words, the natives 
were embracing the new sense of ‗home‘ as well as the new identity. 
It is worth noting that, according to the documentary sources (e.g. Kang, 
2002; Lee, 2005), although the Japanese Colonial Government encouraged the 
natives to build and live in Western-style houses, most houses in the colonisers‘ 
residential areas were traditional Japanese one-storey houses. The contradiction 
implies that the colonisers still tried to keep themselves ‗different‘ from the 
colonised and therefore highlighted their superiority. One can still encounter these 
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Figure 7.10—Changes of Hengyang Road 
The upper picture was taken in the late 1880s when the Qing Empire still occupied 
Taiwan. One can see shabby houses along the Road. The middle one, taken in the 1930s, 
shows the outcome of the Japanese Colonial Government‘s new housing guidelines. The final 
picture shows present-day Hengyang Road. One can still encounter several Western-style 
colonial housing legacies (e.g. the building on left side of the picture) 
old one-storey Japanese houses in present-day Taipei City. Reasons behind their 
existence to date are discussed in the next Chapter. 
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Figure 7.11—Taipei Station 
 
Following the KMT‘s occupation of Taiwan, according to the sources that 
I have investigated, it seems that the Settler State did not establish specific 
regulations requiring the general public to build Chinese-style houses. 
Nonetheless, the KMT Government still had Chinese architectural elements added 
to Taipei City‘s built environment. The Grand Hotel and the CKS Memorial Hall 
examined in Chapter 6 [see pp. 114 and 118] are the main examples. Furthermore, 
pavilions in parks, phone booths, and many of the capital‘s public buildings, such 
as Taipei Station [Figure 7.11], the National Theater, and the National Concert 
Hall [see Figure 7.12, p. 156], have Chinese architectural features. Although the 
nation‘s architectural features have become more diverse and hybridised with the 
coming of democratisation (Lee, 2005), these Chinese-style urban elements still 
remain familiar to the Taiwanese. After all, they have long been part of people‘s 
everyday life. 
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Figure 7.12—The National Theater (left) and the National Concert Hall (right) 
The buildings are located beside the National Taiwan Democracy Park (the former 
CKS Square; see Section 6.4, p. 120) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
Recalling the literature reviewed in Section 4.3 and considering the case 
study findings revealed in this Chapter, it can be seen that the Japanese colonisers 
introduced various previously unknown urban elements, including parks, statues, 
the museum, baseball grounds, and Western-style housing, to the capital Taipei. 
By having access to these new urban elements (e.g. visiting the park or the 
museum, playing in the baseball field, settling in the Western-style dwelling), the 
natives‘ everyday socio-cultural experiences were therefore changed 
unconsciously, implying shifts in the nation‘s collective memory. These subtle 
urban elements‘ permanent influence on Taiwanese identity is evidenced by the 
fact that some of them still exist in present-day Taipei City. 
Meanwhile, the KMT Government, like the Japanese colonisers, also 
applied similar urban elements (e.g. statues, museums, sports, etc.) to practise 
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their own national identification schemes. Hence, the home population‘s socio-
cultural experiences were affected once again. In comparison to the Japanese 
colonisers, however, the Chinese settler rulers were more active and ‗creative‘ in 
producing the identification messages via different mediums (e.g. sports events, 
artistic events, posters, pavements, architectural styles, etc.). In fact, one can 
suggest that the entire Taipei City‘s public spaces and facilities collectively 
constituted a national-identification machine serving the Chinese Settler State‘s 
interests. 
The coming of Taiwan‘s democratisation resulted in a disregard for or 
even physical demolition of certain urban elements that were associated with the 
KMT‘s identity manipulation. Moreover, new urban elements, such as the planned 
museum related to local culture or the buildings featuring mixed architectural 
styles, have been appearing. 
Nevertheless, some subtle settler-state legacies have become widely and 
deeply rooted within the Taiwanese everyday living environments (e.g. street- and 
place-names, the National Museum of History, the National Palace Museum, the 
National Theater, etc.). Even though Taiwan has entered the post-settler era, the 
DPP Government can only try to ‗change‘ some aspects of the past (e.g. the 
National Palace Museum‘s function), rather than eliminating them entirely. In 
other words, the existence of these subtle urban elements in post-settler Taipei 
City proves the Chinese Settler State‘s deep implications for the nation‘s 
imagined collective memory. 
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CHAPTER 8 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS (III): 
ETHNICITY AND TAIPEI CITY’S URBAN LANDSCAPE 
 
8.1 Introduction 
From the previous literature concerned with Taiwan‘s history, it can be 
seen that the region had become a multi-ethnic land by the seventeenth century, 
given the Han Peoples‘ emigration from the Mainland China and their coexistence 
with the Taiwanese Indigenous People. Moreover, the coming of Japanese 
colonisers, Chinese settlers, international capitalists, and economic immigrants 
also means new ethnic groups‘ participation in Taiwanese society as part of a 
process of cultural diversification and hybridisation [see Section 4.3; Appendices 
1 and 2]. 
Clearly, many simple examples can be used to show how developing 
multiculturalism can be observed in Taiwan‘s urban life. For instance, the café 
was introduced by the Japanese colonisers keen to pursue Westernisation (Shen, 
2005). Moreover, some snacks and dishes that can be seen in the local market 
constitute Chinese-settler legacies (Chen, 2001a; Yeh, 2005). This Chapter 
therefore aims to examine how different political entities in Taiwanese history 
gave rise to certain spatial outcomes concerned with particular ethnic groups‘ 
interests. Specifically, Sections 8.2 and 8.3 focus on the once politically 
predominant Chinese settlers‘ impacts on Taipei City. Meanwhile, Sections 8.4 
and 8.5 respectively investigate how the Hakka and the Taiwanese Indigenous 
Peoples, both Taiwan‘s ethnic minority groups, reclaimed their once suppressed 
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cultural identities, and how the circumstances reflected the capital Taipei‘s urban 
changes. Finally, Section 8.6 explores why and how the foreign capitalists, 
strategists, and economic immigrants contributed to the formation of Taipei City‘s 
multicultural urban scene. 
 
8.2 The Chinese Settlers’ Spatial Implications (I) 
Sections 4.3 [pp. 56-7] and 7.4 [pp. 153-4] indicated that although the 
Japanese Colonial Government did not make the Taiwanese natives live in the 
backwater, the underlying ‗difference‘ between the colonisers and the colonised 
could still be perceived from colonial Taipei‘s urban scene. For instance, public 
parks and transportation were concentrated in the area dominated by the 
colonisers. Moreover, although the Colonial Government encouraged the natives 
to build Western-style houses, the colonial officers still lived in traditional 
Japanese houses. Such arrangements implied the ultimate difference between the 
colonisers and the colonised, and simultaneously emphasised the colonisers‘ 
superiority. In fact, according to Chao (2005), during the Japanese colonial era, 
even churches could be built for the colonisers‘ use only. Very few native 
businesspeople could have opportunities to enter the colonisers‘ places. 
This Section explores how the Chinese Settler State applied Japanese 
urban legacies and several new tactics to mark the ultimate difference between the 
settlers and the locals living in the capital Taipei, and what implications emerged 
during Taiwan‘s political transition and post-settler eras. 
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The Chinese settlers’ spatial privilege 
Section 7.4 [pp. 153-4] briefly mentioned that one can still encounter one-
storey traditional Japanese houses, built during Taiwan‘s Japanese colonial era, in 
present-day Taipei City. Why they remain despite the coloniser‘s departure is 
because they have been used to accommodate the Chinese Mainlanders 
immigrating to Taiwan in the late 1940s. After the KMT occupied Taiwan, it also 
took over all state-owned properties and businesses. Hence, these former Japanese 
officials‘ living quarters, built in the traditional one-storey Japanese housing style, 
became the KMT Government‘s properties. According to documentary sources 
(Liu, 2005; Lee, 2002a) and the information given by a member of the City 
Government‘s Department of Cultural Affairs (personal interview, 23/01/2007), 
apart from accommodating the newly-arrived KMT officials, some of these 
Japanese houses were also designated to accommodate Mainland Chinese social 
elites, including high-ranking military men and senior educators. 
It is worth noting that one can easily encounter these Japanese housing 
legacies in the present-day Daan Administrative District of capital Taipei, since 
the colonisers erected most of their official-use living quarters in this area [see 
Figure 8.1, p. 161] (Lee, 2002a). 
The old Japanese houses in Taipei City are not the only colonial legacy 
applied by the KMT Government to benefit the newly-arrived Chinese 
Mainlanders. For instance, the Ji Nan Presbyterian Church [see Figure 8.2, p. 162] 
originally served the Japanese colonisers and the wealthy natives only. In the 
early post-colonial era, it became the Church for the Mainland Chinese social elite. 
Although the locals eventually were able to have access to the Church, its Sunday 
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Figure 8.1—The old traditional Japanese one-storey houses 
Picture taken in the Jinan Ward in the Daan Administrative District 
Mass is still attended by two groups of people, the Mandarin speakers (Chinese 
Mainlanders and their following generations) and the Minnan speakers (the ‗local‘ 
Taiwanese) (Chao, 2005). 
Similarly, the Nanmem Market [see Figure 8.3, p. 163], colonial Taipei 
City‘s most modern and famous indoor market constructed in 1910, was occupied 
by the Mainland Chinese retailers after the colonisers‘ departure (Kang, 2002; Lee, 
2001d). Although retailers in the present-day Market include locals, it still 
functions as the capital‘s most famous collection-and-distribution centre of 
traditional Chinese food. 
 
 
 
 
 162 
Figure 8.2—The contested Ji Nan Presbyterian Church 
The believers are divided into the Mainlanders and the ‗locals‘. Each group belongs to 
a specific Presbyterian society. Moreover, each society‘s name plaque is hung on each site of 
the Church‘s front door (see the upper picture). In addition, each society erected a notice of its 
religious service time beside the Church (see the lower picture) 
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Figure 8.3—The Nanmem Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Apart from taking advantage of these aforementioned Japanese urban 
legacies, the settler rulers also created the new urban elements in the capital 
Taipei to serve the newly-arrived Mainlanders‘ interests. For instance, since the 
1950s, many bus-ticket kiosks began to be erected on Taipei City‘s pavements 
[see Figure 8.4, p. 164]. They were originally built by the City Government to 
provide employment for retired KMT soldiers. By the late 1960s, when the private 
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Figure 8.4—Taipei City‘s bus ticket kiosks 
sector began to enter the market, these kiosks were monopolised by Mainlanders. 
But, since the beginning of the capital‘s pavement-reconstruction project in 2001, 
these ticket kiosks have been removed (Lee, 2001e). 
According to the relevant sources (Discovery Center of Taipei, visited on 
07/02/2007; Hsu, 2001f; Hsu, 2005a; Lee, 2001f), another example is the 
Zhonghua Market. In the Japanese colonial era, there was a railway line running 
along the present-day Zhonghua Road. After the KMT‘s retreat to Taiwan, some 
KMT soldiers began to illegally construct houses along the railway line and to sell 
goods and foods. Eventually, this linear illegal settlement became one of the 
capital‘s famous commercial spots due to its cheaper products and services. 
Despite the negative impact of these illegal shabby houses on the image of capital 
Taipei, the City Government took no actions against them. One can suggest that it 
is because, at the time, the KMT Government still believed it would one day re-
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Figure 8.5—The Zhonghua Market, 1960s 
conquer the Mainland China and therefore regarded such an inappropriate urban 
scene as a ‗temporary‘ problem. 
Interestingly enough, the City Government ultimately ‗legalised‘ houses 
along the railway line by constructing eight three-storey indoor markets at the 
location. The project was started in 1960 and accomplished in 1962. The markets 
were collectively named the Zhonghua (meaning ‗Chinese‘) Market [Figure 8.5]. 
Although the Market was not entirely monopolised by the Mainlanders, its various 
traditional Chinese food and military equipment stalls still implied its origin. 
Incidentally, as Taiwan‘s first big collective market, the Zhonghua Market 
enabled its surrounding areas to develop rapidly. 
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However, with increasing modern department stores opening in the capital 
Taipei, the Zhonghua Market eventually became outmoded. In 1992, the City 
Government demolished the railway line running along the Zhonghua Road to 
implement the mass transit underground project. The Market was also demolished 
for good. 
Similar to the case of the Zhonghua Market is the story of Parks No. 14 
and 15. In 1932, the Japanese Colonial Government proposed to construct sixteen 
parks linked by five boulevards in colonial Taipei City in order to present a 
modern/Western urban image. However, due to the Second Sino-Japan War 
alongside the Second World War, the Colonial Government was unable to 
accomplish the project. But, after the colonial era, Taipei City‘s main park 
construction projects have still followed the Japanese Colonial Government‘s 
initial plan (Wang, 2005b). 
Parks No. 14 and 15 were two parks the colonisers did not finish. After the 
KMT took over Taiwan, some Chinese soldiers began to build illegal houses on 
the land. Eventually, the capital‘s largest illegal residency was formed [see Figure 
8.6, p. 167] (Hu, 2002; The Department of Cultural Affairs, Taipei City, 2005). 
Again, it can be suggested that this resulted from the KMT Government‘s belief in 
re-conquering the Mainland and therefore its neglect of the capital Taipei‘s 
comprehensive urban development. 
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Figure 8.6—The illegal housing in the land of Parks No. 14 and 15, 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impacts of the settlers’ spatial privilege 
From the previous subsection, one can suggest that after the KMT 
occupied Taiwan, its urban polices were established to benefit the newly-arrived 
Mainland Chinese social elites. Meanwhile, its neglect of the illegal built houses‘ 
impacts on Taipei City was benefiting the newly-arrived KMT soldiers. 
The circumstances ultimately caused significant consequences. For 
instance, the KMT Government initially regarded the old Japanese houses as the 
settler elites‘ ‗temporary‘ residencies in Taiwan. However, since it never restored 
the ‗lost‘ Mainland China, these temporary residencies have become 
‗permanently‘ occupied by the first-generation Mainland Chinese residents and 
their offspring. With the coming of Taiwan‘s democratisation, although such 
unequal housing distribution has caused public outrage, both the transitional KMT 
Government and the DPP Government have had no appropriate measures to deal 
with this awkward situation. After all, as indicated by the community 
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representative (personal interview, 13/01/2007) living in the area consisting of 
many old Japanese houses accommodating the first-generation Mainlanders, it 
might be seen as cruel to force these old Mainlanders to move out. 
According to a member of City Government‘s Department of Cultural 
Affairs (personal interview, 23/01/2007), many of these old Japanese houses have 
become officially recognised historic buildings. The ideal situation is that after the 
residents move out or pass away, the houses will formally be revitalised for public 
use. However, if a resident passes away and his/her offspring still live in the house, 
no relevant laws are able to force them to leave. Meanwhile, the member also 
reveals that being able to live in the Japanese urban legacy does not always 
constitute an advantage to these old Mainlanders. Since many of these Japanese 
legacies have been designated by the City Government as historic buildings, based 
on the Cultural Property Preservation Law, which is examined further in Chapter 
9, if the resident decides to renovate the house, he/she will have to provide the 
City Government with feasible construction plans and then wait for its permission. 
It can result in a long time waiting due to bureaucracy. Of course, the resident can 
move out to avoid such inconvenience. However, according to the aforementioned 
community representative (personal interview, ibid), not all of these old-time 
Mainland Chinese elites are able to afford the purchase or renting of private 
residencies in present-day Taipei City. Hence, some of them can only be ‗stuck‘ 
in these old houses. 
In comparison to the Chinese social elites occupying old Japanese houses, 
the KMT soldiers‘ illegally built dwellings directly caused impacts on Taipei 
City‘s urban planning. The previous subsection [see p. 166] already revealed that 
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the location of unfinished Parks No. 14 and 15 was the City‘s largest illegal 
residential area formed by newly-arrived KMT soldiers under the KMT 
Government‘s neglect. It is worth noting that after the KMT came to Taiwan, 
building restrictions were practised in the capital Taipei until 1974 (Chiao, 2002). 
However, by 1963 it was estimated that there were approximately 52,000 illegal 
houses, including those settled on the land of Parks No 14 and 15, in Taipei City 
resulting from the late 1940s‘ great Chinese immigration trend. During the 1960s 
and the 1970s, although the City Government demolished some illegally built 
houses and simultaneously provided the residents with public housing constituting 
altogether 10,000 households, illegal residencies still occupied many suburbs or 
lands originally designated for public park use (Huang, 2005b). 
Ultimately, the relevant demolition projects aiming to tackle these illegal 
dwellings were successfully introduced in the 1990s. Nonetheless, since there 
were a large number of residents, the illegal houses on the land of Parks No. 14 
and 15 remained untouched (Ibid). In March 1997, finally, the DPP Mayor Chen 
Shui-bian made the controversial decision to demolish the illegal residencies 
occupying the land. Approximately 3,000 households, including 976 low-income 
families, were therefore forced to move (Chen, 2001b; Hu, 2002; The Department 
of Cultural Affairs, Taipei City, 2005). 
Parks No. 14 and 15 were eventually restored [see Figure 8.7, p. 170]. 
However, if the KMT Government had appropriately arranged for these newly-
arrived Chinese soldiers to settle in Taiwan, it is unlikely to have so many 
illegally built residences with their unpleasant impacts on the capital Taipei. 
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Figure 8.7—The present-day Parks No. 14 and 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.3 The Chinese Settlers’ Spatial Implications (II) 
In addition to the ordinary Mainlanders, from the above Section, one can 
see that the Mainland Chinese social elites (e.g. the intellectuals and the KMT 
officials) and the KMT soldiers were two distinct groups of the Chinese 
Mainlanders strongly affecting post-colonial Taipei City‘s urban scene. Given that 
the Chinese social elites could settle in old Japanese houses, and the KMT soldiers 
had to build their own settlements, it seems that the Chinese social elites enjoyed 
more privileges than the KMT soldiers. 
Nonetheless, the KMT Government had been supporting the KMT soldiers 
and dependents to form specific living quarters across Taiwanese cities. These 
quarters are known as ‗chuan tsun‘ in Mandarin, literally meaning the ‗family-
dependent village‘. The villages‘ formation dates back to 1949 when the KMT 
had just retreated from China to Taiwan. At the time, a greater wave of Chinese 
soldiers lived with their families in schools, temples, abandoned Japanese houses, 
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or self-built illegal houses. Eventually, various military-dependent villages were 
formed. In 1950, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) began to supervise 
these villages. Simultaneously, the term ‗chuan tsun‘ began to appear in official 
documentaries (Kuo, 2005). In this light, one can suggest that these originally 
illegal built military-dependent living quarters ultimately became the officially 
recognised Mainland Chinese diaspora spaces. 
Usually, soldiers of the same service and arms would settle in the same 
village. Accordingly, the name of each village denoted its residents‘ type of 
military service, its geographical location, its non-governmental institutional 
sponsor, the troop‘s original base on the Mainland, a specific individual, or, 
inevitably, a nationalist slogan (Ibid). 
Some military-dependent villages, like a military base, had restrictions on 
public access. However, some villages did not have such restrictions, and 
therefore benefited surrounding areas‘ development. For instance, some present-
day schools and hospitals were originally built for the use of soldiers and their 
dependents only. Also, the increasing number of residents might stimulate the 
growth of local transport networks and commercial activities. Incidentally, some 
villages even became officially recognised wards included in the city‘s 
administrative system (Ibid). 
Nevertheless, not all illegally built residences could become dependent 
villages recognised by the MND. Parks No. 14 and 15 mentioned in previous 
subsections [see p. 166] is a relevant example. Moreover, although the KMT 
Government did not ban the KMT soldiers from illegally building their living 
quarters, it did not support them either (Huang, 2005b; Kang, 2002). Therefore, in 
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contrast to the dependent quarters based within old Japanese residencies that 
offered better living conditions, most self-built military-dependent villages were 
run-down. For instance, the residents had to use public toilets; the building 
materials were often inferior; and the lanes separating individual houses were very 
narrow. In addition, the houses might be extended to accommodate more family 
members, thereby exacerbating the poor conditions. Even high-ranking military 
figures might live in these shabby settlements (Kuo, 2005). As before, it can be 
suggested this was because the KMT Government, with the hope that it would re-
conquer the Mainland China ultimately, regarded these military-dependent 
villages as the soldiers‘ temporary settlements, and therefore ignored their living 
conditions. 
Not until 1957, the KMT Government began to improve the military-
dependent villages‘ conditions by soliciting contributions from or directly taxing 
the private sector. This gave the MND sufficient financial support to search for 
private construction companies to build new villages on land that was MND-
owned, or bought or rented from the general public (Ibid). 
Nevertheless, although the soldiers‘ living conditions began to improve, 
many of these originally illegally built villages still affected Taiwan‘s urban 
development. As a result, in the 1960s and 1970s, the KMT Government launched 
several public housing projects to permanently settle the veterans of some villages, 
which would then be demolished (Lee, 2002a). Meanwhile, the MND itself also 
tried to solve the relevant problem. According to the MND staff (personal 
interview, 08/01/2007) in charge of the management of military-dependent village, 
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a plan that was proposed and commenced from 1980 onwards was based on the 
following three tactics: 
 
(1) The MND would subsidise the residents‘ renovation of their dwellings; 
 
(2) The MND would build new residences and would subsidise the soldiers to 
purchase them; 
 
(3) The MND would provide the Central or local governments with land to 
construct public housing. The households would be allocated to the 
institutions participating in the public housing project. Meanwhile, the MND 
would subsidise the veterans‘ purchase of their housing. 
 
It ought to be noted that although the above measures appeared to be 
successful in terms of improving the image of the old villages and of catering for 
Taiwan‘s urban development, they still had unexpected consequences. For 
instance, despite the MND‘s subsidy, some soldiers were still unable to afford the 
new residencies. Hence, some new public housing units ended up vacant. In 
addition, in comparison to the military-dependent villages, public housing offered 
a ‗multi-ethnic‘ living environment. Therefore, the old Mainlanders might be 
unable to adapt themselves to a new environment (Kuo, 2005). 
What is more, the crucial issue, according to the MND staff (personal 
interview, ibid), was that the above three tactics were not legislated by the Central 
Government, and the MND was therefore unable to execute them efficiently. The 
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‗Enforcement Rules of the Act for Rebuilding Old Quarters for Military 
Dependents‘ were not formally introduced until 1996. Apart from giving the 
MND more financial support, the new Act allows the land where the bigger 
dependent villages stand to be used as the site where the new flat complexes will 
be erected. The new construction can house people both from the original bigger 
village and from other surrounding smaller villages. Meanwhile, the land of the 
smaller villages can be sold and the proceeds used to build more apartment 
complexes. Of course, prior to the implementations of the construction project, the 
MND and the residents can negotiate the subsidy. 
According to the MND‘s online archive (National Defense Laws and 
Regulations Archive, updated 21/06/2007), there was an Article 6 in the original 
Act stating that if the resident passed away, his/her partner or offspring were able 
to inherit his/her unit. However, the Article was deleted on 16th September 1998. 
One can suggest that the Article‘s deletion implied that the transitional KMT 
Government began to regard military-dependent villages as unique spatial 
products that needed to be carefully considered, rather than allowing them to 
organically develop and be continuously occupied by those Mainland Chinese 
diasporas without the state‘s interference. After all, if the new flat complex still 
had been officially allocated to those veterans‘ partners or successor generations, 
this controversy could have kept emerging among the general public. 
Although the new Act aims to enable the MND to efficiently eliminate old 
military-dependent villages, several issues remain. For example, some residents 
are still unable to afford the new housing; the once close relationships formed in 
older neighbourhoods might disappear when residents are rehoused in separate 
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apartment dwellings; and many old veterans might be reluctant to spend time and 
energy moving to new places (Kuo, 2005). After all, given that they have lost 
their original homes on the Mainland China, these Chinese settlers may not want 
to lose their sense of home again. 
The above discussion shows that Taiwan‘s public housing projects were 
originally introduced to accommodate the residents whose dependent villages 
were affecting urban planning. An interesting implication is that, in Taiwan, the 
terms ‗military-dependent village (chuan tsun)‘ and ‗public housing‘ became 
characteristically overlapped. Nonetheless, as the MND staff (personal interview, 
ibid) suggests, with not only the departure of the soldiers and their families but 
also the participation of new residents, these ‗dependent villages/public housing‘ 
will become ‗real‘ public housing in the future. 
By visiting some of these ‗dependent villages/public housing‘ in present-
day Taipei City, one can still find clues indicating the sites‘ origins. The 
surrounding areas of Taipei City‘s Qingnia Park can serve as an example. One can 
see many dependent villages/public housing located there, standing since 1975 
when the City Government authorised their construction [see Figure 8.8, p. 176] 
(Lee, 2002a). During a visit, I discovered that although it was an ordinary day, 
ROC national flags were still hung out of some buildings. Furthermore, several 
restaurants declared their cooking of Chinese dishes originating from specific 
places on the Mainland China. Moreover, I found some old people sitting in the 
community centres to socialise with each other. Given their accents, they could be 
KMT veterans. Incidentally, the interiors of some of these community centres 
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Figure 8.8—Two public housing quarters near Qingnia Park 
The upper picture shows the Guoxing (nation-rise) Community; whereas the lower 
picture shows the Zili (self-strength) Community. They were originally built to solve the 
impacts on urban planning caused by the demolition of illegally built military-dependent 
villages located in the area 
were decorated with the ROC national flags, national symbols, and nationalist 
slogans. 
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Although the legislation of the ‗Enforcement Rules of the Act for 
Rebuilding Old Quarters for Military Dependents‘ accelerated the demolition of 
military-dependent villages across Taiwanese cities, the condition ultimately 
generated outcries amongst some scholars and politicians who believed that such 
unique urban products ought to be preserved. Eventually, many cities began to 
hold theme fairs and festivals to highlight the history of their military-dependent 
villages. Some cities even planned to transform the old villages into thematic 
museums (Kuo, 2005). Taipei City was the city with the most dependent villages. 
However, it was also the first city where the policies regarding the demolition and 
reconstruction of the old villages took place. Hence, as the MND staff (personal 
interview, ibid) indicates, in present-day Taipei City, there are now no real old 
military-dependent villages consisting of shabby houses and narrow alleys. 
Nonetheless, an old village in Taipei City, namely Si-Si Nan Cun (literally 
meaning ‗Forty Four South Village‘), has been revitalised as a public space to 
represent the classic image of the military-dependent village. According to the 
relevant sources (Lee, 2002a; Xinyi Public Assembly Hall, visited on 16/01/2007), 
the site was a military storage room during the Japanese Colonial era. After the 
KMT took over Taiwan, by 1948, the storage room became the base of the KMT 
Government‘s 44th Arsenal. Subsequently, the Arsenal‘s soldiers and their 
dependents formed the Si-Si Nan Cun beside the base. Even after the Arsenal was 
removed in 1978, these retired veterans and their families still lived in the Si-Si 
Nan Cun. 
In 1980, the MND proposed to demolish Si-Si Nan Cun and settle the 
residents in new public housing. Si-Si Nan Cun was located in Xinyi Planning 
 178 
Figure 8.9—The Si Si Nan Cun, 1990s 
The site‘s shabby appearance contrasts with the surrounding skyscrapers within one 
of the City‘s greatest commercial districts 
District [Figure 8.9], one of the capital Taipei‘s important business districts, 
which will be explored further in Chapter 9. Given this fact, the MND‘s proposal 
was justifiable. 
In 1988, the residents agreed to MND‘s subsidies for moving to the new 
public housing that would be ready by 1999. However, concerns over the 
demolition of their initial homeland in Taiwan did not take long to surface. With 
the time of their relocation approaching, petitions from the residents were 
presented to both the Central and City Governments in the late 1990s. 
Ultimately, the Si-Si Nan Cun‘s classic image of the old military-
dependent village, in comparison to its 247 counterparts within the capital Taipei, 
led to the City Government‘s decision to preserve it. After the residents moved 
out in 1999, the relevant land-use policies and restoration plans began to be 
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Figure 8.10—The Xinyi Public Assembly/Restored Si-Si Nan Cun 
implemented. In 2003, the completed project made the revitalised Si-Si Nan Cun 
become not only the model representation of the classic military-dependent 
village, but also provided the Xinyi Public Assembly Hall [Figure 8.10]. The 
surrounding area, including old bomb shelters, has been designed as a public park. 
As a result, the capital Taipei is able to retain the physical evidence representing 
the post-war Mainland Chinese immigrants‘ participation in Taiwanese society. 
 
8.4 The Hakka’s Ethnic Sites 
Section 4.3 [p. 51] mentioned that Han People constitute Taiwan‘s ethnic 
majority, and they can be further divided into three subgroups: the Chinese 
Mainlander (coming to Taiwan in the late 1940s), the Hokkien (Hoklo), and the 
Hakka. Given the Mainlanders‘ political privilege and the Hokkien‘s predominant 
population, the Hakka constitutes Taiwan‘s ethnic minority. This Section 
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investigates how the Hakka overcame their marginalisation within Taiwanese 
society, and how this change was reflected in Taipei City‘s changing urban 
landscape. 
 
The invisible Hakka 
The Hakka and the Hokkien have been part of the Han population 
emigrating from the Mainland China to Taiwan since the seventeenth century 
(Council for Cultural Affairs Executive Yuan, 2001). Despite their different 
cultural backgrounds and languages, in the early years of exploring ancient 
Taiwan, these two ethnic groups had co-operated to fight with the Taiwanese 
Indigenous People when competing for natural resources or territories. However, 
with the population‘s increase, conflict between these two groups also emerged. 
As a result, the more predominant Hokkiens forced some Hakkas to move to other 
unexplored areas (Hsu et al., 2002). In the case of ancient Taipei Basin, after 
being defeated by the Hokkiens, some Hakkas moved to the areas surrounding 
present-day Taoyuan, Xinzhu, and Miaoli. Nowadays, these three cities are still 
perceived as areas of Hakka concentration in north Taiwan (Tai and Wen, 1998). 
The Japanese Colonial Government was the first political entity to conduct 
a comprehensive census in Taiwan. In its census records, the Colonial 
Government clearly distinguished the Hokkien from the Hakka. However, after 
the KMT took control of Taiwan, in its first census conducted in 1956, the KMT 
Government divided the Han population into two categories based on ‗place-of-
origin‘. According to that system, the Hokkien populace was registered as coming 
from Fujian Province on the Mainland China, and the Hakkas were registered as 
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coming from the Guangdong Province. This arrangement was based on the idea 
that each Province had its own ethnic group as the relative majority (Ibid). Clearly, 
the local Han‘s ancestors did not just come from two Chinese Provinces alone. 
One can suggest that the system constituted an identity policy enabling the KMT 
Government to legitimise the connection between the Taiwanese Han population 
and that on the Mainland China. 
In 1992, the transitional KMT Government formally cancelled the ‗place-
of-origin‘ section in the citizens‘ residence registration records. However, due to 
that early inaccurate survey method, Taiwan‘s Hakka population could only be an 
estimate based on early Japanese accounts and KMT Government archives (Hsu 
et al., 2002; Tai and Wen, 1998). In 2004, a more accurate survey was conducted 
by the DPP Government‘s Council for Hakka Affairs (2004). This 2004 survey 
estimated that the number of Hakka population in Taiwan was approximately 
3,048,000, or 13.5 per cent of the region‘s entire population. Moreover, the survey 
also reported that the Hakka community accounted for 11.7 per cent of the capital 
Taipei‘s population. The approximate number was 307,70022.  
 
Reclaiming Hakka identity 
As already mentioned above, in the early Han emigration era, many 
Hakkas were forced to live in Taiwan‘s unexplored areas. When most explored 
areas began to experience urbanisation, many Hakka communities were therefore 
still engaged in the agricultural sector. In the 1950s, the KMT began to change its 
focus from developing the agriculture sector to light industry in order to boost 
                                                 
22
 In that 2004 survey, several criteria were set up to identify the Hakkas. They included 
‗self-identifying‘, ‗language‘, ‗ancestor‘, etc. In this thesis, I use the criterion of self-identifying.  
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Taiwan‘s economy. Under these circumstances, many Hakkas began to move into 
urban areas to seek job opportunities. Subsequently, many urban-based Hakka 
societies began to appear since the 1960s (Hsu et al., 2002). 
During the martial law period, these Hakka societies only functioned as 
platforms for the Hakkas living in the close urban areas to connect and socialise. 
However, with the coming of Taiwan‘s democratisation, these grassroots 
organisations became significant actors enabling the Taiwanese Hakka to reclaim 
their suppressed identity (Hsu et al., 2002; Hsiao and Huang, 2001). For instance, 
the Righteous People Ceremony, a significant Hakka religious festival only held 
in the cities where the Hakka population was in the majority, was held for the first 
time in the capital Taipei on 19th August 1988, due to the coordination of several 
Taipei-based Hakka societies (Hsu et al., 2002; Tai and Wen, 1998). Since then, 
the Ceremony has been held in Taipei City every year. In 2000, the City 
Government replaced those grassroots Hakka societies‘ role as the main actor to 
organise the event (Hakka Culture Center, visited on 21/01/2007). 
More importantly, on 28th December 1988, in Taipei City, the first Hakka 
social movement, namely ‗Reclaiming Our Mother Tongue Movement‘, was held 
in order to appeal to the KMT Government to promote Hakka culture and 
language, which were strongly suppressed in the martial law era (Hsu et al., 2002). 
The Movement made the DPP become more active to improve the Taiwanese 
Hakka‘s cultural rights (Tai and Wen, 1998). Subsequently, the KMT lost several 
regional elections due to the Hakka communities‘ votes for the DPP (Hsiao and 
Huang, 2001). This result made the KMT Government acknowledge the 
Taiwanese Hakka‘s political influence. Therefore, along with several grassroots 
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Hakka social movements taking place in Taipei City, the KMT Government began 
to make new policies serving the Taiwanese Hakkas‘ interests. For instance, in 
November 1989, at which time the mass media had not been totally freed, the 
television stations began to broadcast thirty-minute Hakka-speaking programmes 
(Tai and Wen, 1998). Moreover, in 1997, many public transportation services 
were required to use the Hakka language when they broadcast information to 
passengers (Hsu et al., 2002). 
In short, due to the coming of Taiwan‘s democratisation and the grassroots 
Hakka nationalists‘ efforts, the Taiwanese Hakka began to use the capital Taipei 
as the stage to demonstrate their capability to influence political decision making, 
and therefore began the process of reclaiming their self-identification.  
 
Remembering the Hakka in Taipei City 
After elaborating on how Taiwan‘s changing political landscape enabled 
the Taiwanese Hakka to reclaim their identity, one may question how Taiwan‘s 
urban landscape could reflect this change.  
In the case of the capital Taipei, by tracing back to ancient Taipei Basin‘s 
exploration history, it can be pointed out that the temples were the centres of the 
Han People‘s enclaves when they began to explore the region. In this light, one 
can associate relevant temples in Taipei City with the presence of the ancient 
Hakkas (Tai and Wen, 1998). 
Moreover, according to the Colonial and KMT Governments‘ records and 
several contemporary small-scale surveys, since the Japanese colonial era, the 
majority of the capital Taipei‘s Hakka population has been concentrated around 
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present-day Zhongzheng District, with the Daan and Songshan Districts being the 
second and the third Hakka populace concentrations respectively [see the relative 
positions on Figure A.1, p. 331]. More specifically, they are situated on Nanchang 
Road, Tongan Street, Wolong Street, Tonghua Street, and Shipai Road. The story 
behind the formation of these Hakka enclaves began with the Japanese colonisers‘ 
departure from Taiwan. Some of the colonisers‘ abandoned houses in these areas 
were eventually occupied by the local Hakka communities. From the 1950s 
onwards, in order to live with neighbours bearing the same ethnic roots, many 
Hakkas from other Taiwanese regions also chose these spots as their first 
settlements in Taipei City (Hakka Culture Center, visited on 21/01/2007). 
Although I did not have many chances to hear the residents speaking the 
Hakka language when I visited these Hakka enclaves, I did encounter temples and 
restaurants related to Hakka culture. Moreover, I found that the areas were packed 
with furniture shops, shoemaking stores, and traditional Chinese pharmacies. 
These industries are believed to have been set up by the first-generation Hakkas 
settling in the capital Taipei (Tai and Wen, 1998). 
It seems that if one lacks basic knowledge on the Hakka‘s religions and 
the migration history in Taipei City, it can be difficult to notice these Hakka 
enclaves since one of the Hakka‘s most distinct characteristics—Hakka 
language—cannot be ‗seen‘. Nonetheless, there are three venues in Taipei City, 
namely, the Hakka Culture Hall, the Hakka Art and Culture Center, and the Taipei 
Northern Hakka Culture Hall, where one is able to see the Hakkas freely 
demonstrate their cultural roots. 
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Figure 8.11—The Taipei Hakka Culture Hall 
The Hall‘s appearance deliberately combines the architectural factors, such as bricks 
and rough stones, of traditional Hakka dwellings 
The Hakka citizens‘ interests have been incorporated within the City 
Government‘s policy-making since the DPP‘s Chen Shui-bian acted upon this 
initiative in the 1994 Taipei mayoral election (Hsu et al., 2002; Tai and Wen, 
1998). However, like the stories concerned with how the Hakkas were able to 
reclaim identity, the formation of these three Hakka-cultural sites was also due to 
the efforts of the grassroots Hakka figures. According to the staff of the City 
Government‘s Hakka Affairs Commission (personal interview, 24/01/2007), the 
projects of the Hakka Culture Hall [Figure 8.11] and the Hakka Art and Culture 
Center [see Figure 8.12, p. 186] were initially proposed by grassroots Hakka 
organisations. Although the City Government has subsidised the sites‘ 
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Figure 8.12—The Taipei Hakka Art and Culture Center 
The Hakka gather in front of the Center. The monument at the lower right-hand 
corner of the picture is a Hakka religious symbol 
construction since 1998, it was not until 1999 that the City Government formally 
established a specialist team under the Department of Civil Affairs to promote 
these two sites by organising several cultural events. In 2001, the project of Taipei 
Northern Hakka Culture Hall was also implemented. In the following year, the 
City Government formally set up the Hakka Affairs Commission to take over 
these three sites‘ management. Incidentally, all of the sites are built on land 
formerly occupied by government buildings or offices. 
When I visited these Hakka-cultural sites, I encountered many collections 
related to Hakka culture. Moreover, I discovered that the sites would regularly 
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host events, such as Hakka music concerts, language tutorials, and traditional 
operas. More specifically, inside the sites, I heard people speaking the Hakka 
language; in contrast to my experience when visiting the places supposed to 
constitute the capital Taipei‘s Hakka enclaves. It can be suggested that due to the 
grassroots Hakka nationalists‘ efforts, the capital Taipei can own these three 
Hakka-cultural sites that represent not only the Hakka‘s recognition within 
Taiwanese society, but also an improved tolerance of different cultures and ethnic 
groups in Taiwan. 
 
8.5 The Taiwanese Indigenous People’s Ethnic Sites 
The Hokkien, the Hakka, and the Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples 
collectively constitute the ‗home population‘ having been governed by two 
‗outside‘ regimes, including the Japanese Colonial Government and the KMT 
Government. But it can be argued that the Taiwanese Indigenous People represent 
the ‗real natives‘, given that their ancestors were already living in Taiwan prior to 
the Hokkien‘s and Hakka‘s arrival in the seventeenth century. In present-day 
Taiwan, there are thirteen official recognised Taiwanese Indigenous tribes 
(Council of Indigenous Peoples, 2007a). Moreover, due to their distinct living 
environments, the Taiwanese Indigenous People can generally be divided into two 
categories, namely, the ‗Plains Tribes‘ and the ‗High Mountains Tribes‘. At the 
end of 2007, a government survey reported that there were 484,174 Indigenous 
population in Taiwan (Council of Indigenous Peoples, 28/01/008), occupying 
approximately 2 per cent of the region‘s total population. This Section aims to 
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examine how these real natives could contribute to the formation of capital 
Taipei‘s multicultural urban scene. 
 
The suppressed Taiwanese Indigenous People 
Despite being the ‗real natives‘, the Indigenous People‘s imagined 
collective memories were consistently affected by different political entities 
featured in Taiwan‘s history. For instance, the Dutch colonisers had introduced 
Western religion to the Taiwanese Indigenous People. Afterwards, when Cheng 
Cheng-kung and the Qing Empire were ruling Taiwan, the Indigenous Peoples 
witnessed mass waves of Han immigrants and therefore adopted a new culture. 
Moreover, the Japanese Colonial Government had tried to culturally assimilate the 
Indigenous population in order to exploit the natural resources within tribal 
territories; the relevant story is revealed later. The KMT‘s Chinese identification 
schemes strongly suppressed Indigenous identity (e.g. the Indigenous People were 
forced to have Chinese names). The Plains Tribes were affected more than the 
High Mountains Tribes since the former‘s living areas were more accessible 
(Hsieh, 1987). In January 2007, the Sakizaya was just officially recognised as the 
thirteenth Indigenous tribe (BBC NEWS, 17/01/2007). This suggests that there 
may be more Indigenous tribes ‗hiding‘ within Taiwan, since their self-identity 
has been suppressed over the years. 
Shifts in the Taiwanese Indigenous People‘s collective identity and the 
changes of their living environments are interrelated. Given that many useful 
natural resources were located in the Indigenous People‘s living territories, the 
Japanese Colonial Government had been planning to control the Indigenous 
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population, especially the High Mountains Tribes. At first, the colonisers tried to 
understand the Indigenous‘ cultures and languages. Eventually, the colonisers 
were able to socialise with the tribes and therefore were able to have access to 
tribal lands to gain the relevant information, for example, on the presence and 
extent of natural resources. Subsequently, colonial regulations were introduced 
declaring that the lands were state-owned. The circumstances generated great 
dissatisfaction amongst the Indigenous People who regarded the lands as their 
livelihood. Ultimately, in 1902, a severe battle between the colonisers and the 
Indigenous People broke out. After oppressing the rebellion, the Colonial 
Government began to use armed force to threaten the Indigenous People. With its 
efficient control, since 1915, the Government began to train and force the 
Indigenous People to help it exploit natural resources. Such a tactic led to another 
serious riot in 1930. Finally, the Colonial Government decided to use compulsory 
education to change the Indigenous People‘s customs; and therefore made them 
obey the colonisers (Fujii, 2001). One can argue that this last measure, 
constituting a cultural assimilation policy, was able to fundamentally affect 
Indigenous identity. 
After the end of the Second World War, the newly-arrived KMT 
Government‘s relevant land policies once again caused an identity conflict for the 
Indigenous People. Although the colonisers distinguished Indigenous tribes‘ 
territories from those of the Hokkien and the Hakka, the KMT Government did 
not recognise individual tribes within administrative districts where the authorities 
were usually Han Peoples. Consequently, tribe leaders lost their power. 
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Meanwhile, the younger Indigenous generations also lost their sense of tribal 
territory (Ibid). 
Moreover, by consulting the Japanese colonisers‘ natural resources survey 
record, the KMT Government claimed that certain Indigenous‘ territories were 
state-owned and called them ‗preserved lands‘ (Hsieh, 1987). In other words, like 
the colonisers, the newly-arrived settler rulers also intended to take advantage of 
these lands‘ economic value. According to Fujii (2001), in 1951, when the KMT 
Government began to promote Taiwan‘s agriculture sector, many preserved lands 
were transformed into agricultural land. In the mid-1950s, the KMT Government 
thought that Indigenous culture could be a tourist attraction; and therefore 
transformed many preserved lands into private ownership in its attempts to 
develop Taiwan‘s tourist industry. These land use changes were intended to 
promote the nation‘s economy. However, without appropriate support measures, 
many Indigenous landowners sold these transformed lands to the Han 
entrepreneurs. As a result, once again, many Indigenous People lost their sense of 
tribal territory and identity. 
 
Moving from tribes to cities 
In the late 1950s, when the KMT Government began to promote light 
industry, Taiwan‘s agricultural sector started to decline. Under this condition, 
increasingly more Indigenous People moved to Taiwan‘s urban areas in pursuit of 
job opportunities since their mountainous homelands were eventually sold to the 
Han entrepreneurs. However, due to their distinct cultures and languages different 
from those of the Han majority, most of Indigenous People could only engage in 
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unskilled or physical work, and settled in suburbs (Ibid). What is more, the mass 
media and state-edited textbooks even portrayed them as the ethnic group with 
limited or no education and economic means. The circumstances not only affected 
the Indigenous People‘s chances of finding jobs but also their self-esteem (Hsieh, 
1987). Overall, it can be suggested that in comparison to the nation‘s other ethnic 
groups, the Taiwanese Indigenous People‘s self-identity was strongly suppressed; 
and their living territories within urban areas were relatively further marginalised. 
 
Resurgent Indigenous’ identity 
With the Indigenous People living increasingly in urban areas, came 
opportunities for consolidation amongst these long-time suppressed ethnic 
minorities. For instance, several Indigenous societies founded by students or 
cultural and religious elites began to appear in the capital Taipei from the early 
1980s. Moreover, prior to the DPP‘s formal establishment, many Indigenous 
nationalists had got involved in the anti-KMT social movements organised by 
people who later became DPP figures in order to demonstrate their dissatisfaction 
with their communities‘ marginalisation (Ibid). 
With the coming of Taiwan‘s democratisation, the Indigenous People 
strove more actively. For instance, two ‗Giving My Lands Back Movements‘ 
were held in 1987 and 1988 in Taipei City. As a result, although some ‗preserved 
lands‘ were still controlled by the Han businesspeople, the KMT Government 
stopped proclaiming that the lands were state-owned (Fujii, 2001). Moreover, in 
1991, the term ‗Mountain Compatriots‘, referring to the Taiwanese Indigenous 
People, first appeared in the ROC Constitution. However, such term caused 
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dissatisfaction amongst the Indigenous Peoples. With the relevant social 
movements and changes taking place, ultimately, in 1997, the new term 
‗Indigenous Peoples‘ was adopted by the Constitution to emphasise that the 
Indigenous were composed of many tribes that collectively constituted an distinct 
ethnic group within Taiwanese society (Council of Indigenous Peoples, 2007b). 
Overall, one can indicate that the Indigenous communities further realised 
their marginalisation within Taiwanese society through interactions with other 
ethnic groups in the context of urban life. Democratisation then provided them 
with opportunities to use the capital Taipei as the stage to widely demonstrate 
their resentment, and eventually to reclaim their dignity. This process, to a certain 
point, echoes how the Taiwanese Hakkas reclaimed their cultural rights as well as 
self-identification mentioned in the previous Section [see pp. 181-3]. 
Apart from these grassroots social movements, the Indigenous politicians 
also directly influenced the transitional KMT Government‘s decision-making. For 
example, the Council of Aboriginal Affairs was established under the Executive 
Yuan in 1996 (Fujii, 2001). After several changes of the Central Government‘s 
administrative system, the organisation was renamed as the Council of Indigenous 
Peoples (CIP) in 2002 (Council of Indigenous Peoples, 2007c). 
The DPP Government also made several policies serving the Indigenous 
People‘s interests. For instance, in 2005, the Government declared the 1st August 
to be the ‗Indigenous Peoples Day‘ given that the term ‗Indigenous Peoples‘ was 
initially adopted by the Constitution on that day of 1997 (Council of Indigenous 
Peoples, 2007b). Furthermore, in the same year, the curriculum materials covering 
different Indigenous tribes‘ languages were published by the Ministry of 
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Education and the CIP (Mo, 16/01/2005). In addition, the Indigenous Television 
Network began to operate in 2005 (Gluck, 01/07/2005). 
Interestingly enough, one year before the KMT Government announced 
the setting up of the Council of Aboriginal Affairs, Taipei City Government had 
already been requested by both governmental and non-governmental Indigenous 
figures to establish the Indigenous Peoples Commission. In 1996, the Commission 
became Taiwan‘s first government institution serving the Indigenous People‘s 
interests (Indigenous Peoples Commission, Taipei City Government, 2004), 
although it could only take care of the capital Taipei‘s Indigenous citizens. The 
Commission has made policies concerned with vocational advice, education 
subsidy, and cultural preservation. By the end of 2007, there were 12,544 
Indigenous People living in Taipei City (Council of Indigenous Peoples, 
28/01/2008), less than 0.5 per cent of the capital‘s whole population. 
It seems likely that the City Government established the Indigenous 
Peoples Commission ahead of the Central Government because the capital Taipei 
had become the stage for the Indigenous nationalists to reclaim their interests 
since the late 1980s. This made the politicians aware of the Indigenous citizens‘ 
political influence. Actually, as the first Mayor openly supporting the Hakka 
citizens‘ interests [see the previous Section, p. 185], the DPP‘s Chen Shui-bian 
was also the Mayor who allowed the Indigenous Peoples Commission to be 
established. One may question whether Mayor Chen‘s motivation was for getting 
votes from the Hakka and Indigenous citizens, but whatever the reason, his 
policies have benefited these two minority groups living in the capital Taipei. 
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Figure 8.13—The Aborigine Culture Theme Park 
The National Palace Museum can be seen at the background of the picture 
Remembering the Indigenous People in Taipei City and emerging issues 
At a spatial level, the Indigenous Peoples Commission also contributed to 
the construction of several Indigenous-cultural sites in the capital Taipei. For 
instance, the Aborigine Culture Theme Park was built in 2000 [Figure 8.13]. It 
was deliberately constructed next to the National Palace Museum [see Section 7.2, 
pp. 138-9]. Given that the Museum is famous for its Chinese cultural relics, this 
arrangement symbolises the significance of Indigenous culture to Taiwan. 
Incidentally, the Park‘s design caused several disputes between non-Indigenous 
designers, Indigenous artists, and government institutions. These took time to 
resolve and reconstruction continued until 2002 (Indigenous Peoples Commission, 
Taipei City Government, 2006). 
Another Indigenous-cultural site is the Ketagalan Culture Center [see 
Figure 8.14, p. 195] built in 2002. The Center is located in Beitou Administrative 
District [see Figure A.1, p. 331], where an Indigenous tribe—Ketagalan—had 
lived in ancient Taipei Basin (Ketagalan Culture Center of the Indigenous 
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Figure 8.14—The Ketagalan Culture Center 
Peoples Commission, Taipei City Government, 2008a-b). The Center functions as 
a museum featuring the Taiwanese Indigenous People‘s culture and arts. It is also 
used for Indigenous education and training. The Shop inside the Center is the one 
of four Indigenous Shops set up by the Commission since 2001 to promote 
Indigenous culture and help the Indigenous citizens earn more income (Alin, 
2007). 
As noted previously, with Taiwan‘s economic development, many 
Indigenous People began to move to urban areas to seek for job opportunities, 
usually accompanied by their families. Waves of urban immigration occurred in 
the 1950s and 1970s (Liao and Li, 2000). Given that most of these new urban 
residents could only engage in low-paid labour work at the time, many Indigenous 
communities were formed in the suburbs in the late 1970s (Liao and Li, 2000; 
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Figure 8.15—The Donghu Indigenous Public Housing 
The picture at the upper-right corner shows the typical inner image of public housing 
in Taiwan. The picture at the lower-right corner shows the community‘s billboard decorated 
with Indigenous artistic pattern 
Yen and Yang, 2000). In the case of Taipei City, present-day Neihu and Nankang 
Administrative Districts [see Figure A.1, p. 331] are areas where the capital‘s 
Indigenous population is concentrated since they were the capital Taipei‘s suburbs 
(Yen and Yang, 2000; Fu, 2001). 
Some of this suburban Indigenous housing was built illegally and therefore 
affected urban planning (Yen and Yang, 2000). It also gave rise to the capital 
Taipei‘s first Indigenous-People public housing project [Figure 8.15]. According 
to a senior staff member of the City Government‘s Indigenous Peoples 
Commission (personal interview, 20/11/2007a), the story dates back to the early 
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1990s. At the time, an Indigenous dwelling, including approximate twenty 
households, was illegally built in the Neihu Administrative District. The residents 
called the site ‗Happy Village‘. The Village‘s inadequate living condition was 
revealed by the mass media. In response to the public opinion, the City 
Government designated the Building C of the nearby Donghu Public Housing as a 
rental house serving not only the Villagers but also other Indigenous citizens. 
Thereafter, neighbouring Building E was also designated to serve the same 
purpose. 
These two Indigenous People housing blocks, accommodating 74 
households, are managed by the City Government‘s Indigenous People 
Commission. They are also used to hold events organised by the Commission and 
the Indigenous citizens. The two blocks are called ‗Upper Tribe‘ and ‗Lower 
Tribe‘ respectively and have elected tribe chiefs. Currently, the female Indigenous 
citizens with specific conditions (e.g. the domestic violence victim) have priority 
to rent these units. Low-income Indigenous citizens also can make application. 
Incidentally, in 2001, the capital Taipei became the pilot city where 10-per-cent of 
some public housing will be rented to the low-income Indigenous citizens only. 
However, the other Indigenous Peoples Commission staff member 
(personal interview, 20/11/2007b) reveals that the Commission has encountered 
some residents being unable to pay rent. In view of this problem, the Commission 
may need to give the residents guidance in financial management or even force 
them to move out. Meanwhile, a real task for the Commission in managing the 
houses is that some tenants may be unable to get used to urban life. According to 
the Commission staff (personal interview, ibid) and the community representative 
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(personal interview, 22/11/2007) of the area where the Donghu Public Housing is 
located, there are sometimes instances of anti-social behaviour and tension 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous residents, resulting in complaints to the 
Commission. As a result, the Commission has responded by trying to work with 
the tenants to improve living conditions in the area.  
 
8.6 The Spatial Implications of the ‘New Immigrants’ 
The previous three Sections examine the urban policies and sites 
associated with Taiwan‘s three ethnic minorities, including the (politically 
predominant) Chinese Mainlanders, the Hakka, and the Taiwanese Indigenous 
Peoples. However, there are still other ‗new immigrants‘ who have shaped the 
capital Taipei‘s multicultural urban scene and simultaneously contributed to the 
formation of part of Taiwanese identity concerned with the nation‘s developing 
multiculturalism. The Section reveals those stories. 
 
Western influential power and its spatial implications 
Due to its defeat with Western countries‘ coalition in the war, the Qing 
Empire was forced to open several harbours to the Western countries in the 1860s. 
Hence, increasing Western businesspeople were able to come to west Taipei City 
where the locals already formed commercial spots around the ports. Against this 
background, Dadaocheng began to develop [see Appendix 2]. 
In view of Dadaocheng‘s development, in 1885, Governor Liu Ming-chun 
designated the region as the capital Taipei‘s central business district. Meanwhile, 
the area of the present-day Gueide Street, located next to the Dadaocheng Wharf, 
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Figure 8.16—Western-style historic building on Gueide Street 
was designated as the foreign nationals‘ residential quarter. Therefore, several 
local entrepreneurs helped their foreign business partners build churches and 
Western-style houses along the Street (Chih, 2003). Nowadays, one can still see 
some of these Western-style buildings on Gueide Street [Figure 8.16]. 
According to the sources investigated in this study, it seems that the 
Westernised Japanese colonisers did not set up specific areas in the capital Taipei 
to accommodate foreign nationals. On the other hand, the KMT Government built 
several sites to serve this purpose, though for US soldiers, rather than foreign 
businesspeople. One of the sites was located at present-day Tienmou in the Shilin 
Administrative District [see Figure A.1, p. 331]. It is worth noting that ‗Tienmou‘ 
is not an officially recognised region but a name used by the locals to refer the 
area including the present-day Sixth and Seventh Sections of the Zhongshan 
North Road, and Tienmou West and East Roads. The origin of the name is from 
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the construction of a Japanese Shinto shrine named Tienmou Jinja in the area in 
1933; and the locals therefore began to use ‗Tienmou‘ as a geographical indicator 
(Lee, 2002b). In other words, the name is a Japanese colonial legacy. 
The story of the site‘s formation dates back to 1951. At the time, in view 
of the rapid spread of Communist power over the Mainland China and North 
Korea, the US sent its Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to Taiwan, 
the region bearing great strategic value in the west Pacific [see Figure 4.1, p. 51]. 
In consideration of the CPC‘s threat, clearly, the KMT Government accepted the 
MAAG‘s coming. In order to accommodate these US military figures and their 
families, the KMT Government built a living quarter in Tienmou. The area 
constituted one of the capital‘s suburbs at the time. However, the area began to 
develop and many shops, pubs, and restaurants were opened to sell Western 
products or food that these newcomers were familiar with. Although the MAAG 
departed in 1978 due to the termination of ROC-US diplomatic relations [see 
Appendix 6], Tienmou‘s infrastructures and atmosphere still attract many foreign 
countries‘ representatives and the ROC‘s foreign nationals to settle there. The 
American School and the Japanese School are also located in the area. With its 
high-income residents, Tienmou has become an up-market cosmopolitan place in 
the capital Taipei [see Figure 8.17, p. 201] (Ibid). 
Another place in Taipei City associated with the US military‘s urban 
legacy is the Third Section of Zhongshan North Road. The lands around the 
Fourth Section of the Road, in which the present-day Taipei Fine Arts Museum 
and the Taipei Artistic Park stand, were the MAAG‘s command base [near the 
present-day Grand Hotel, see the relative location on Figure 6.5, p. 108]. Hence, 
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Figure 8.17—Sights of Tienmou 
Foreign schools, luxury residential complexes, international bank brunches, pubs and 
fine shopping malls are the US military‘s and foreign residents‘ collective legacies in Tienmou 
several Western entertainment venues and US military living quarters were 
erected at the Third Section of the Road. Meanwhile, the locals also started to 
provide these newcomers with relevant commercial services. For example, foreign 
book-stores, cafés, restaurants, music shops, markets, and pubs were opened along 
the Road. These services not only catered for the MAAG personnel stationed in 
Taiwan, but also for US soldiers who participated in the Korean and Vietnam 
Wars, who used Taiwan as their holiday base (Cheng, 2005; Hsu, 2005b; Hu, 
2002). 
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Figure 8.18—Pubs on the lanes around the Third Section of the Zhongshan N. Road 
After the MAAG‘s departure, the lands of its command base were taken 
over by the ROC‘s MND and were finally used for the establishment of the 
aforementioned Museum and Park (Hu, 2002). Meanwhile, according to the 
former community representative living in the area (personal interview, 
19/01/2007), the pubs‘ business declined dramatically due to the US soldiers‘ 
departure. Therefore, most of the tenants moved to the low-rent houses on the 
Third Section‘s lanes. Eventually, a special night life spot was formed [Figure 
8.18]. Nowadays, these US legacies‘ main customers are the locals, rather than 
foreign nationals. 
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Remembering the immigrant spouses 
 
In today‘s society, issues of identity and ethnicity are a serious matter 
that cannot be denied or deliberately overlooked. My colleagues and I, in 
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as the governing party, will lead 
the way in addressing such issues … It was several hundred years ago 
that the generations before us traversed the ―Black-water Channel‖ 
(Taiwan Strait) or crossed the great ocean to find a safe haven in Taiwan. 
No matter what year they arrived, regardless of their ancestral origins 
and their mother tongues, even in spite of their different hopes and 
dreams, all are our forefathers; all have settled down here and together 
faced a common destiny. Whether indigenous peoples or new settlers, 
expatriates living abroad, foreign spouses or immigrant workers who 
labor under Taiwan‘s blazing sun—all have made a unique contribution 
to this land and each has become an indispensable member of our ―New 
Taiwan‖ family. 
(Office of the President, 2005e: lines 173-81) 
 
The above quotation is part of President Chen Shui-bian‘s speech in his 
Inauguration Ceremony as the 11th-term ROC President. Despite the specific 
political discourse that one may interpret from the speech, it is clearly that in 
illustrating Taiwan‘s multi-ethnic society, Chen mentioned two specific groups—
the ‗foreign spouses‘ and ‗immigrant workers‘. 
At the end of 2007, there were 372,741 immigrant spouses in Taiwan [see 
Table 8.1, p. 204] (National Immigration Agency, updated 31/01/2008). 
Meanwhile, there were 357,937 immigrant workers from Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Mongolia engaged in various industries in 
Taiwan; 37,211 of them located in Taipei City (Council of Labor Affairs, updated 
12/2007). It is worth noting that these two groups‘ combined number (730,678) is 
greater than that of the Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples (484,174). 
 
 
 204 
 
 
In terms of the immigrant spouses, Tai‘s study (2005) indicates that 
Taiwan‘s economic development caused social polarisation, and some low-
income male Taiwanese therefore began to find their partners via the private 
matchmaker company‘s arrangements. Most of these immigrant spouses are 
coming from China or Southeast Asian countries where the gross domestic 
income is less than that of Taiwan. Due to their husbands‘ social-economic 
backgrounds, it is usual to find these new immigrants in suburbs. 
However, given my personal experience, the circumstances are more 
complicated than suggestion by Tai. In January 2007, I met two Chinese females 
by chance in a hospital located in Taipei County. At the time, they were the 
personal nurses of my sister‘s father-in-law. They told me that via a specific 
private organisation‘s arrangement, they came to Taiwan by using marriage as an 
excuse whereas their true purpose was to work there. 
Clearly, various stories behind the increasing number of immigrant 
spouses are not the focal point of this study. What ought to be highlighted is that 
Table 8.1—The population of immigrant spouse in Taiwan and Taipei City at the end of 2007 
Region Total 
Nationality of immigrant spouse 
Vietnam Indonesia Thailand Philippines Cambodia 
Taiwan 372,741 77,856 25,773 6,214 5,763 4,498 
Taipei City  2,002 398 273 195 55 
 
 Japan Korea China 
Hong Kong 
and Macau 
Other 
Taiwan 
 
1,428 635 240,176 6,001 4,428 
Taipei City 321 109 Data unavailable 587 
Source: National Immigration Agency (updated on 31/01/2008) 
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Figure 8.19—The Taipei City New Immigrants‘ Hall 
their number has already become a significant element in Taiwan‘s population. In 
2003, the DPP Government set up several policies concerned with the immigrant 
spouses‘ interests. For example, the local governments have to organise relevant 
activities, such as language classes, to help these new citizens fit in new 
environments (National Immigration Agency, updated 05/2007). In 2005, the 
Taipei City Government erected the Taipei City New Immigrants‘ Hall [Figure 
8.19] to host these activities (Taipei City New Immigrants’ Hall, 2005). 
According to the Hall‘s staff (personal interview, 24/10/2007), the 
building was formerly the City Government‘s publication office. The official 
statement said that the term ‗New Immigrants‘ is used for the purpose of political 
correctness, given that ‗foreign spouses‘ may imply discrimination (La, 2005). 
Some might argue that this special ethnic site within the capital Taipei symbolises 
the immigrant spouses‘ important role in Taiwan‘s developing multicultural 
society. 
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Remembering the immigrant workers 
In terms of the immigrant workers, Section 4.3 [p. 60] already mentioned 
that since the late 1980s, the KMT Government began to allow immigrant 
workers to come to Taiwan. In 1992, in consideration of the nation‘s acute labour 
shortage, the relevant laws were amended to allow more industries, including 
public construction and nursing, to employ immigrant workers (Government 
Information Office, 2006). 
In comparison to the immigrant spouses, the immigrant workers have 
more obvious effects on Taiwan‘s urban landscape. The Third Section of the 
Zhongshan North Road in the capital Taipei serves as the example. As mentioned 
in the previous subsection [pp. 200-2], the area‘s ‗pub lanes‘ also the US 
military‘s spatial legacies. However, regardless of these pubs located in the lanes 
behind the Road, by visiting the area, one can describe it as Taiwan‘s Little 
Philippines. For example, some shops and restaurants use both English and the 
Filipino language on their signs and sell Filipino products. 
Nonetheless, it may be difficult for one to encounter Filipinos in the area 
from Monday to Saturday, since they only appear on Sunday mornings. On that 
day, restaurants will play Filipino pop music. Moreover, the local hawkers will 
come to settle on the pavements and use English, Filipino, or pure body language 
to sell cheap accessories, clothes, or toys. Furthermore, in several overseas post 
offices in the area, one can see many Filipinos sending the items they just bought 
to their hometown. In addition, there is a bank (which also opens on Sunday) 
where the staff can use English and Filipino to serve these foreign customers [see 
Figure 8.20, p. 207]. 
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Figure 8.20—Sunday morning on the Third Section of Zhongshan N. Road 
On Sunday morning, the Filipino immigrant workers and the local hawkers make 
their appearance on the Third Section of Zhongshan N. Road 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to members of the Taiwan International Workers‘ Association 
(TIWA) (personal interview, 25/01/2007), the reason behind the former US 
military enclave‘s transformation into the Little Philippines is due to St. 
Christopher‘s Church [see Figure 8.21, p. 208], a Catholic church originally 
erected at the area to serve the MAAG personnel. In view of the increasing 
number of Filipino workers settling in Taipei City, in 1996, an international 
religious group, accustomed to helping immigrant workers in different countries, 
sent a Filipino priest to St. Christopher‘s Church. Eventually, the Church became 
the spot where the Filipino workers can not only attend mass, but also socialise 
with each other on Sundays. It ought to be noted that most immigrant workers in 
Taiwan only have a break on Sunday. 
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Figure 8.21—St. Christopher‘s Church 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meanwhile, according to a former community representative (personal 
interview, 19/01/2007) of the area, many shops along the Third Section of 
Zhongshan North Road were initially set up to sell antiques or fine wooden 
furniture to the target consumers—the US soldiers. As expected, the MAAG‘s 
departure deeply impacted their business. Nonetheless, the presence of the 
Filipino workers then reversed the condition. The local retailers rapidly changed 
their products to serve these new potential customers. Eventually, the Little 
Philippines was formed. Incidentally, the area even attracts Filipino workers 
working in neighbouring cities. 
With the increasing number of immigrant workers, the Church staff 
realised that the workers have been encountering various problems, such as being 
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exploited by the employers. Hence, in 1997, the Church required help from a 
Catholic-based organisation, originally located in Taoyuan County and having 
experiences in dealing with the relevant issues. Since the newly-arrived volunteers 
served not just immigrant workers from the Philippines, workers of other 
nationalities also began to visit the Church on Sundays. Unsurprisingly, the local 
retailers also began to provide these new potential consumers with food and 
products that they are familiar with. A similar situation also happened around 
some Taiwanese cities‘ rail stations and churches (TIWA members, personal 
interview, ibid). 
Apart from helping immigrant workers avoid employers‘ exploitation, the 
major task of these volunteers was to build bridges between the workers and the 
local communities since the latter frequently claimed that the former caused mess 
and noise. For example, the volunteers have organised cultural festivals as a 
means of enabling the locals to understand the new immigrants‘ cultures (Ibid). 
On gaining more experience in dealing with immigrant worker issues, the 
volunteers decided to set up a specific organisation in Taipei City to help 
immigrant workers across Taiwan since many relevant central government 
institutions were located in the City. As a result, the TIWA was established in 
1999. Meanwhile, in view of the area‘s cosmopolitan urban scene, the TIWA‘s 
headquarters were located at the Third Section of the Zhongshang North Road 
(Ibid). 
Concurrently, some volunteers were employed by the Taipei City 
Government‘s Foreign Workers Counseling Center, also founded in 1999. Hence, 
the TIWA was able to gain the City Government‘s financial support. The most 
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Figure 8.22—HOME, 2002 
important achievement of this public-private link was the establishment of the 
House of Migrants Empowerment (HOME) in 2002 [Figure 8.22]. It was an 
ordinary rented building located amidst the lanes of the Third Section of 
Zhongshan North Road. It provided the immigrant workers with a private place 
where they could have a break and socialise (Ibid). 
Although the idea of the HOME was proposed by the TIWA, the whole 
project was supervised and sponsored by City Government. In other words, the 
Government trusted the TIWA to manage the site. Later on, the staff with TIWA 
backgrounds left the Foreign Workers Counseling Center due to changes of the 
institution‘s personnel. Since the new officials thought that the HOME only 
opening on Sundays was a waste, financial support towards the HOME was 
eventually withdrawn and the HOME was closed in 2004 (Ibid). 
Although the officials believed that the closure of HOME would release 
funds to be spent on other pro-immigrant-worker activities, they did not consider 
that the immigrant workers‘ attention might be focused more on having a private 
place to rest on Sundays, rather than joining government-organised activities that 
would consume their spare time (Ibid). 
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Figure 8.23—The building where the FWCC is located 
In fact, after the closure of the HOME, in the same year the Foreign 
Workers Counseling Center used a one-floor office, with cheaper rent, to set up 
the Foreign Worker Culture Center (FWCC) which was supposed to function in 
the same way as HOME (Ibid). However, the FWCC located inside a traditional 
market in Dadaocheng [Figure 8.23]. In this area, the immigrant workers are 
unable to find the religious or commercial services they can relate to. Furthermore, 
the location is not as good as the Third Section of Zhongshan North Road where 
bus and metro stations are nearby. 
More importantly, according to the TIWA members (personal interview, 
ibid), in comparison to HOME where different ‗nationality zones‘ were arranged 
for the immigrant workers to have a rest or socialise, the one-floor FWCC does 
not have such large space, while TIWA‘s new office is also limited in space. This 
had made it less attractive for immigrant workers of different nationalities to visit 
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the FWCC or the TIWA. As a result, although the Filipinos are still the majority 
visiting the Third Section of Zhongshan North Road, immigrant workers from 
other countries began to gather at other places on Sundays. For example, the 
Indonesians usually meet at the Taipei Rail Station. The dispersal of immigrant 
workers‘ social and other activities made it difficult for the TIWA and the City 
Government to have access to them as a group. In addition, in the Third Section of 
Zhongshan North Road, according to a former community representative 
(personal interview, 19/01/2007), some local people originally against the 
HOME‘s existence in the area now also realised that it provided a good focal 
point for immigrant people. Through the interviews, it was found that both TIWA 
and the local communities have suggested the City Government should re-
establish the HOME as well as designate the Third Section of Zhongshan North 
Road as the immigrant workers‘ ‗holiday‘ base. However, the proposals have not 
met the City Government‘s approval yet. 
The above information suggests that grassroots organisations (St. 
Christopher‘s Church and the TIWA) and the local businesspeople were the main 
reason for the popularity of the Third Section of Zhongshan North Road and the 
subsequently built HOME become a meeting space and a sign of the immigrant 
workers‘ contribution to Taiwan‘s developing multiculturalism in a global context. 
Ironically, the government institutions‘ later intervention eventually broke the 
balance within this space and caused unexpected, implications. 
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8.7 Conclusion 
From the evidence presented above, it can be concluded that different 
ethnic groups (including the Hokkien, the Hakka, and the Indigenous Peoples) in 
Taiwan had been forming their territories without much interference from the state 
until the coming of the Japanese colonisers. The Colonial Government not only 
distinguished the living territories of the colonisers and the colonised in the urban 
areas, but also forcefully took the tribal territories in remote areas into state 
ownership in order to exploit the natural resources within them. 
The KMT Government took advantage of these Japanese urban legacies 
and land policies. For instance, in the capital Taipei, the settler social elites were 
assigned to live in former Japanese colonial officers‘ residencies. Moreover, some 
tribal territories were still claimed to be state-owned lands. In other words, these 
Japanese colonial legacies enabled the Chinese Settler State to keep its superiority 
and the settlers‘ privileges. 
What is more, since the KMT Government initially regarded Taiwan as a 
temporary settlement in its preparation for re-conquering the Mainland China, it 
did not prevent the newly-arrived settlers (most of them were KMT soldiers) from 
randomly erecting dwellings in urban areas. These illegally built houses 
eventually affected Taiwan‘s urban planning and development. 
With the coming of Taiwan‘s democratisation, the issues caused by these 
housing settlements and land use policies began to be discussed openly. Both the 
transition KMT Government and the DPP Government have tried to deal with the 
issues. However, they have encountered difficulties since every change could 
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affect different interest groups, such as residents, developers, and urban 
conservationists. 
Like the Chinese Mainlanders, the Taiwanese Hakka and Indigenous 
Peoples are both minority groups in terms of their relatively small population in 
Taiwan. However, unlike the Mainlanders who were backed by the Chinese 
Settler State, the Hakkas and Indigenous Peoples formed small ethnic enclaves in 
the capital Taipei by themselves. In fact, their cultural identities were strongly 
suppressed by the KMT Government‘s policy, which aimed to forge hegemonic 
Chinese identity. The Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples were portrayed as a group 
with lower socio-economic status. Hence, they usually lived in poor quality 
suburban areas. 
Ultimately, the nation‘s democratisation enabled these two groups to 
organise a series of grassroots social movements in the capital Taipei to promote 
their self-identification. The movements eventually made the transitional KMT 
Government to begin to support the Taiwanese Hakka and Indigenous People‘s 
self-identification alongside social welfare (e.g. setting up Hakka language 
television programmes; stopping claiming that tribal lands were state-owned). 
Meanwhile, the movements also enabled several ethnic-cultural sites to be 
constructed in Taipei City to promote Hakka and Indigenous cultural development. 
It is suggested that the sites‘ establishment symbolises the recognition within 
Taiwanese society of these two former suppressed ethnic groups. 
Apart from the local Taiwanese and the 1940s Chinese immigrants, 
Taiwan‘s natural resources, geographical features, and economic development 
have been attracting international traders, strategists, and economic migrants to 
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come to the region and simultaneously reinforce its multicultural living 
environment. For instance, after it lost the war with Western countries, the Qing 
Empire was forced to open Taiwanese ports to Western traders. As a result, many 
international traders began to settle in west Taipei City where two ports were 
located. Meanwhile, churches and Western-style buildings were built in the area. 
Moreover, due to the region‘s strategic importance, the KMT Government 
allowed the US military to station in Taiwan. The US military living quarters and 
their surrounding areas quickly became a confluence of Western cultural flows. 
Despite the US military‘s departure due to the ending of diplomatic relations 
between the ROC and the US, these US military‘s spatial legacies (e.g. foreign 
schools and entertainment venues) still remain in present-day Taipei City. 
In addition, the KMT Government‘s dedication to Taiwan‘s economic 
development, as a way to secure its political legitimacy, eventually caused social 
polarisation and labour shortage, and led to immigrant spouses‘ and workers‘ 
participation in Taiwanese society. Several ethnic-cultural sites or disapora spaces 
related to these new immigrants have appeared in Taipei City. Some of these 
developments were the result of the general public and grassroots organisations 
dedicating themselves to helping the new immigrants. 
From the stories revealed in this Chapter, it can be seen that, under 
different political entities‘ control, different ethnic groups in Taiwan were being 
privileged or suppressed. Clearly, the impact of those who were privileged could 
have spatial implications for Taipei City, although not all implications and 
legacies were approved (e.g. the illegally-built dwellings erected by the Chinese 
settlers). Meanwhile, owing to Taiwan‘s democratisation, those who had been 
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suppressed were able to break through and change the situation. Their ultimate 
success is evidenced by the new urban elements and policies implemented in 
Taipei City to serve their interests. In other words, they have become symbolically 
remembered in the form of the capital Taipei‘s urban landscape. These trends also 
show the development of Taiwan‘s multiculturalism, which has become a part of 
the nation‘s changing imagined collective memory. 
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CHAPTER 9 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS (IV): 
TAIPEI CITY’S GLOBALISATION AND LOCALISM 
 
9.1 Introduction 
Chapter 9 aims to examine the connection between Taiwan‘s economic 
globalisation and Taipei City‘s urban changes. More specifically, it investigates 
the state‘s role in trying to achieve a balance between urban globalisation and 
urban conservation. The former implies the formation of a new identity within the 
nation and the latter means maintaining the original imagined collective memory. 
Section 4.3 [pp. 53, 56, 60, 64-5] briefly mentioned how several business 
districts were formed in the capital Taipei due to the deliberate operations of 
different political entities. Based on second-hand materials and the additional 
documentary sources found in the fieldwork, Section 9.2 uses a historical 
approach to reveal how the formation of these districts reflects the process 
whereby Taiwan was getting involved in globalisation. Section 9.3 then 
exemplifies how Taipei City‘s globalisation caused issues related to urban decline 
and urban conservation. From Sections 9.4 to 9.6, several cases are introduced to 
show how the state, during the nation‘s different political periods, dealt with these 
issues, and what implications have emerged. 
 
9.2 Taipei City on the Way to Globalisation 
Section 2.5 [pp. 23-4] indicated that the nation‘s involvement in 
globalisation resulted from the state‘s intention to boost economy by attracting 
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international capitalists‘ investment. Meanwhile, Section 3.2 [pp. 40-1] revealed 
how such an economic globalisation process can give rise to urban changes. For 
instance, the city‘s central business district, packed with global retailers, 
international entertainment venues, and skyscrapers, is physical evidence of 
globalisation‘s implications for not only the nation‘s economic activities but also 
cultural diversification and hybridisation. What is more, in a globalising city, the 
appearance of these new urban elements can cause the old urban elements‘ 
demolition. The circumstances imply a contest between the new imagined 
collective memory and the old one. 
Built upon the viewpoint derived from the theoretical framework, this 
Section investigates how Taipei City‘s globalisation enabled specific ‗new‘ urban 
elements to appear in it. Chou (2005) argues that due to the operation of different 
political entities, Taipei City has several central business districts reflecting the 
history of Taiwan‘s economic globalisation. Figure 9.1 [see p. 219] shows the 
locations of the sites mentioned in this Section. 
 
Dadaocheng 
Section 8.6 [pp. 198-9] and Appendix 2 have mentioned that due to its 
defeat in the war with the Western coalition, the Qing Empire began to open its 
ports to foreign businesspeople since the 1860s. These international traders then 
began to settle in Dadaocheng, a port area located at west Taipei City. 
Dadaocheng therefore developed rapidly. Meanwhile, many Western-style 
buildings were erected in the area. 
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Figure 9.1—Locations of different central business districts in Taipei City 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dadaocheng‘s initial development was due to British camphor trader John 
Dodd. After visiting Taipei and encountering the region‘s tea tree farms in 1865, 
far-sighted Dodd decided to invest in Taiwan‘s tea farming. He worked with local 
entrepreneurs to introduce new seeds and to train local farmers. Following Dodd‘s 
success, many foreign and local businesspeople began to invest in the same 
industry. Eventually, ‗Formosa tea‘ became Taiwan‘s significant export (Tseng, 
2005a). Overall, one can suggest that Dadaocheng‘s development and 
Westernisation implied Taiwan‘s first-time deep involvement in global economic 
movements. 
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Figure 9.2—Dadaocheng Wharf, 1908 
Dadaocheng was still an important business district in the early Japanese colonial era, 
evidenced by its busy wharf 
During the Japanese colonial era, Taiwan‘s tea export business was 
affected by the emergence of Indian tea and the Second World War (Ibid). 
Meanwhile, fabric, traditional Chinese medicine, and groceries gradually replaced 
Formosa Tea as Taiwan‘s main export products [Figure 9.2] (Lee, 2002a). 
From the above information, it can be argued that Dadaocheng‘s 
development was initially contributed by the Western and local entrepreneurs, 
rather than the Qing Empire. In fact, one can assume that if the Qing Empire had 
not lost the war against the Western coalition, it would have kept foreign 
businesspeople from entering its territory, and Dadaocheng therefore would not 
have experienced the early consequences of economic globalisation. 
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Ximending 
‗Ximending‘ (meaning ‗west gate town‘ and pronounced as ‗sai-mon-cho‘ 
in Japanese
23
), built by the Japanese Colonial Government, constitutes the first 
state-planned central business district in Taiwan. The project of Ximending was 
carried out in 1914 in order to form a commercial district next to colonial Taipei 
City‘s railway station (Chou, 2005). 
Before the project was formally proposed, the Japanese Colonial 
Government had been implementing some infrastructures in the region. For 
example, Taiwan‘s first government-built public market, with mixed Western 
architectural features, was erected in 1908 (Tseng, 2005b); the relevant story is 
presented in Section 9.4. Incidentally, the area originally was a cemetery outside 
the west gate of stone-walled Taipei City. That is the reason why it was named 
‗west gate town‘. In 1922, with the project‘s accomplishment, the name was 
formally legitimised by the Colonial Government (Lee, 2002a). 
Ximending‘s construction is part of the Japanese Colonial Government‘s 
aim of building a Westernised/modern colonial capital. In other words, it was built 
to be a ‗modern‘ central business district. Apart from the aforementioned public 
market [see Figure 9.3, p. 222], for example, theatres, ballrooms, cafés, and 
department stores were also introduced to the district. In fact, even in the post-
colonial era, Ximending remained the capital Taipei‘s most famous business 
district (Ibid). It shows that Ximending‘s ‗modernity‘ was also recognised by the 
KMT Government. 
 
                                                 
23
 The knowledge of Ximending‘s meaning and pronunciation in Japanese is contributed 
by my Japanese colleague Kazuko Kakegawa. 
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Figure 9.4—The Zhonghua Market (left) and Ximending, 1970s 
Figure 9.3—Taiwan‘s first government-built public market, 1930s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the early 1960s, the Zhonghua Market [see Section 8.2, pp. 164-5] was 
established next to Ximending. These two sites collectively then became capital 
Taipei‘s most popular commercial as well as entertainment spot [Figure 9.4] (Lee, 
2002a). 
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East District and high-tech parks 
Section 4.3 [pp. 59-61] indicated that the KMT dedicated itself to 
Taiwan‘s economic development to reinforce its political legitimacy. The KMT 
Government‘s economic development strategies alongside its achievements can 
be described in the form of a brief timeline. In the 1950s, the Government 
implemented a series of land reforms to develop the agricultural sector. In the 
1960s, light industries alongside the export-oriented industries became the focal 
points. In the 1970s, in view of a series of diplomatic blows, the KMT 
Government set out to develop Taiwan‘s economy by promoting heavy industries. 
In the 1980s, recognising that cheaper costs of labour and materials in China and 
many Southeast Asian countries began to threaten Taiwan‘s export-oriented 
industries, the KMT Government successfully set up the high-tech industries, 
including computer chip production and software development, to make the 
nation become competitive in the global economic system. 
Such an economic restructuring process simultaneously affected the 
capital Taipei‘s urban landscape. Chou (2005) indicates that in the 1960s, the 
City‘s ‗East District‘ (a non-official term roughly referring to a region located 
across present-day Zhongzheng, Zhongshan, Daan and Songshan Administrative 
Districts) began to develop, since many export-based manufacturing headquarters 
and factories were located in the area. 
After the ROC was replaced by the PRC in the UN in 1971, the KMT 
became more eager to secure its legitimacy by strengthening Taiwan‘s economy. 
As a result, service industries began developing. Reflecting this change, financial 
services, insurance, and real estate firms, hotels, and department stores began to 
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Figure 9.5—East District packed with people during the weekend 
appear in the East District (Ibid). Nowadays, the East District still constitutes an 
important modern business district in the capital Taipei [Figure 9.5]. 
Since the early 1980s, the KMT Government began to promote high-tech 
industries. The Neihu Science Park and Nankang Software Industrial Park were 
therefore built in Taipei City during the late 1990s. What is more, the project of 
Beitou Knowledge Park has also been carried out in order to promote bio-industry 
(Ibid). The expectation was that these modern-looking high-tech industrial parks 
[see Figure 9.6, p. 225] would stimulate their surrounding areas‘ development. 
 
Xinyi Planning District 
From the previous subsection, one may suggest that the East District‘s 
formation to a certain extent was owing to the private sector‘s participation, rather 
than the KMT Government‘s comprehensive urban planning and design. In fact, 
Chou (2005) also suggests that the East District‘s efficient development was 
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Figure 9.6—Neihu Science Park and Nankang Software Industrial Park 
owing to the grid street pattern designed by the Japanese Colonial Government. 
Based on the colonisers‘ design, main roads and nodes in the region became 
appropriate locations for shops and office buildings to be erected. Meanwhile, 
lanes behind these roads and nodes formed residential areas accommodating urban 
residents as well as small businesses. The overall combination served both 
investors‘ and consumers‘ interests. 
Nonetheless, Xinyi Planning District‘s construction derives from the KMT 
Government‘s urban planning. In his study of the Xinyi Planning District‘s 
formation, Jou (2005) argues that the District is regarded by the general public 
and international tourists as the capital Taipei‘s most significant and international-
oriented area since it consists of business headquarters, first-class hotels, shopping 
malls, entertainment avenues, and luxurious residential complexes. Reflecting the 
theoretical framework of this thesis [see pp. 40-1], one can suggest that the Xinyi 
Planning District constitutes a global-standardised business district. 
The story of the District‘s establishment dates back to 1975. At the time, 
the area was occupied by the 44th Arsenal [see Section 8.2, p. 177]. In order to 
deal with the capital Taipei‘s over-population, President Chiang Kai-shek ordered 
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the removal of the Arsenal. The City Government was then responsible for 
building residential complexes in the area. However, the project was reviewed 
several times. Ultimately, in 1980, the City Government announced the project of 
the Xinyi Planning District, which aimed to make the area become the capital 
Taipei‘s administrative, cultural, and economic centre, rather than just a 
residential district. Based on the new proposal, the planned new City Hall would 
be located in the District. Moreover, the Dr Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall [see 
Section 6.5, pp. 117-9], already standing within the boundary and functioning as a 
place of exhibition and performance, would play the role of representing the 
District‘s cultural function. Finally, a commercial district would be created. It 
ought to be noted that although the City Government was putting forward the 
District‘s future image, the entire project was also supervised and modified by the 
Central Government (Ibid). 
However, the newly-built Xinyi Planning District‘s economic activities 
developed slowly because with Taiwan‘s democratisation, the private sector was 
allowed subsequently to participate in the project‘s implementation, and the 
District‘s land prices were therefore manipulated by the real estate investors. Until 
the early 1990s, only a few commercial department stores and luxury apartments 
were erected in the District (Ibid). 
In 1991, in consideration of frequent global economic interactions, the 
KMT Government intended to make Taiwan the ‗Asia Pacific Operation Center‘ 
playing the role of Asia Pacific region‘s economic as well as financial 
headquarters. In view of this ambition, it was necessary to build an international 
financial, business, and entertainment centre in the capital Taipei. It was felt that 
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the Xinyi Planning District was an appropriate base for such a scheme to be put 
into practice (Ibid). 
However, the scheme was not carried out until Chen Shui-bian became 
Taipei Mayor in 1994. Chen coordinated with the Central Government to release 
more city-owned lands to the private sector and therefore accelerated the area‘s 
development. Meanwhile, the City Government deliberately organised many 
large-scale outdoor activities in the District to make it become a well known 
public place. In addition, in order to create a ‗modern‘ urban image, the City 
Government set up specific building-coverage- and floor-area-ratio regulations to 
increase the District‘s building height and pedestrian areas. These policies were 
all applied to make the District become what Mayor Chen coined the ‗Manhattan 
of Taipei‘. Ultimately, through coordination between the Central and City 
Governments and the private sector, the Xinyi Planning District began to develop 
rapidly in the late 1990s (Ibid). 
As the ‗Asia Pacific Operation Center‘, it was considered necessary to 
have a distinct landmark in the District. Taipei Financial Center, nicknamed 
Taipei 101 due to its 101 storeys, was therefore constructed [see Figure 9.7, p. 
228]. The skyscraper was the first BOT (build-operate-transfer) project ever 
carried out in Taipei City
24
 (Ibid). As the tallest office building (508 meters) in the 
world at the time, it can be argued that the Taipei 101 constitutes Taiwan‘s iconic 
site. Incidentally, although it seems to look like just a typical glass-steel office 
building, as the ‗Asia Pacific Operation Center‘, the building contains many 
                                                 
24
 Meaning that the government allowed the project to be executed by the private sector, 
which was authorised also to operate the site and obtain the profit in a limited contractual period. 
After the end of the period, the government takes over the site [like the Taipei Arena, see Section 
7.3, pp, 148-9] 
 228 
Figure 9.7—Taipei 101 stands high above the Xinyi Planning District 
oriental symbols. For instance, the structure of the building itself represents 
bamboo poles, while symbols of ‗copper coins‘, ‗propitious clouds‘, and ‗dragon 
heads‘ are integrated into the detail of the building‘s design. All these features 
symbolise good fortune and luck (Taipei 101, visited on 18/12/2006). 
When the Taipei 101 project was started in 1997, Chen Shui-bian was 
Taipei Mayor. When the basic construction was accomplished in 2003, Chen had 
become the ROC President. In his attendance at the ceremony of the basic 
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construction‘s accomplishment, unsurprisingly perhaps, President Chen made the 
skyscraper a nationalist symbol by indicating that: 
 
[The Taipei 101] is a monument to the nation‘s can-do spirit amid an 
economic slowdown, a SARS epidemic and persistent friction with 
China … This building will lead Taiwan to the top of the world, giving 
Taiwan the drive to fulfil its dreams. 
(Bloomberg, 02/07/2003: lines 2-8) 
 
Meanwhile, Jou (2005) indicates that although Ma Ying-jeou, becoming 
Mayor of Taipei in 1998, had paid more attention to restoring and promoting the 
City‘s historic places, the image of Taipei 101 as well as the Xinyi Planning 
District had already become the main features of the capital Taipei‘s city 
promotion. 
 
9.3 Forgetfulness in Globalising Taipei City 
Section 4.3 [p. 65] indicated that despite Taiwan‘s involvement in 
globalisation, some traditional commercial activities alongside old places remain 
significant for the locals (e.g. the traditional markets). Night markets, initially 
formed by hawkers gathering in front of temples in the past (Kang, 2002), have 
been the locals‘ important commercial and entertainment venues. Meanwhile, for 
foreign travellers, night markets also constitute a distinct tourist attraction. 
Nowadays, many local governments in different cities have commodified their 
night markets as ‗tourist night markets‘ [see Figure 9.8, p. 230] (Chung, 2005a; 
Lin, 2005b; Su, 2002). 
However, not all old memories can remain in globalising Taipei City. For 
instance, during the late Qing-ruling era, Dadaocheng‘s harbour was filled with 
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Figure 9.8—Shilin Night Market 
One of most famous tourist night markets in the capital Taipei 
silt. Meanwhile, the new harbour and the railway gradually became important 
means of goods transportation and overtime, Dadaocheng lost its function. 
Although the City Government has designated Dadaocheng Wharf as a tourist 
spot, the site‘s historic past has gone [see Figure 9.9, p. 231] (Yu, 2005a; Lee, 
2002a). 
Moreover, Chou (2005) has indicated that when the East District became a 
new-born central business district in the 1960s, its western counterparts, 
Dadaocheng and Ximending, began to decline. Although increasing land prices, 
traffic jams, and pollution were slowing the East District‘s development during 
the late 1980s, the relevant infrastructure construction projects (e.g. the metro) 
were subsequently introduced to solve the problems. By contrast, it is difficult to 
renew west Taipei City due to the area‘s complicated and fragmented property 
ownership resulting from the 1950s‘ land reform. That is to say, the land reform 
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Figure 9.9—Dadaocheng Wharf 
allowed more people to own their lands, and therefore improved the nation‘s 
agriculture sector and light industries. However, when the government attempted 
to regenerate the area, it had to negotiate with many landowners with different 
interests. 
In fact, land ownership still constitutes an issue affecting contemporary 
west Taipei City‘s urban regeneration (Lee, 2005a). Ironically, in order to 
regenerate the area, the underground railway and the metro projects introduced in 
the 1980s caused Zhonghua Market‘s demolition [see Section 8.2, pp. 165-6] and 
traffic problems around Ximending, thereby affecting the area‘s commercial 
activities (Kang, 2002; Tseng, 2005c; Yu, 2005b). On the other hand, since the 
population density in east Taipei City was lower compared to that in the early-
developed west area, the public sector was able to implement policies for east 
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Figure 9.10—Shin Kong Mitsukoshi Taipei Station Store 
Taipei City‘s development without much worry of affecting the residents‘ 
interests. Hence, the East District was able to develop swiftly (Huang, 2005). 
The old places‘ decline and the new places‘ emergence in globalising 
Taipei City also implied shifts in people‘s sense of their capital city. Prior to the 
late 1980s, Taipei City‘s distinct landmarks were the Grand Hotel [see Section 6.4, 
p. 114] and the CKS Memorial Hall [see Section 6.5, p. 118]. However, the new 
skyscrapers in East District gradually became new landmarks (Huang, 2005b). For 
example, in 1994, the Japanese department-store chain, Shin Kong Mitsukoshi, 
erected a 51-storey skyscraper next to new Taipei Station. As the capital‘s tallest 
building at the time, Shin Kong Mitsukoshi Taipei Station Store became the 
City‘s new landmark as well as an important meeting place [Figure 9.10] (Lee, 
2002a). 
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Figure 9.11—A lane in Taipei City, 1980 
At the time, lanes between neighbourhoods were important spaces for people to 
socialise. The picture shows the children sitting along the lane to read comics or books they 
had borrowed 
It is worth noting that some ‗ordinary‘ places in Taipei City functioning as 
the general public‘s daily assembly places were also affected by the nation‘s rapid 
economic growth. For example, with their increasing incomes, many Taiwanese 
began to buy motorcycles. Wider roads therefore became necessary public 
constructions (Lei, 2001). Yet more road widening was needed as Taiwan‘s 
flourishing stock market made people increasingly able to purchase cars during 
the late 1980s (Hsu, 2001g). As a result, many old narrow lanes and streets, where 
neighbours socialised and children played games [Figure 9.11] were demolished 
(Huang, 2005b; Lee, 2001g). 
 
9.4 Localism and Discontent (I) 
From the previous Section, it can be suggested that Taiwan‘s 
economic/urban globalisation has had two interrelated impacts on Taipei City. 
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Firstly, in view of the development of east Taipei City, the City‘s early-developed 
west area eventually declined. Secondly, since many new places with assembly 
and entertainment functions were built, the old places with similar functions were 
neglected or even demolished. Overall, these impacts imply a process in which the 
urban elements representing local roots are gradually forgotten. Nonetheless, 
Sections 9.4 and 9.5 reveal how certain old places were re-remembered within 
Taipei City. 
In 1977, Taipei City Government set up the Urban Regeneration Section in 
order to achieve the comprehensive development of the entire City. However, the 
process did not function well, given that the City Government still focused on east 
Taipei City‘s development (Lee, 2005b). From the early 1990s, the local 
authorities of west Taipei City began to demand that the City Government should 
regenerate their living environment, too. In the late 1990s, the City Government 
began to improve Ximending‘s infrastructure, for example, by creating pedestrian 
areas. As a result, Ximending became popular with and a major consumption node 
for young people (Chou, 2005). 
Regenerated Ximending can attract the younger generation because there 
are many retailers selling cheaper fashion products or providing cheaper 
entertainment. Meanwhile, since it was a popular entertainment venue in the post-
war period, regenerated Ximending also re-attracts the older generation due to 
these traditional tailor shops, barber‘s, and old cafés still standing in the area [see 
Figure 9.12, p. 235] (Chung, 2005b; Lee, 2002a). In other words, the site‘s 
physical improvement not only creates its new image, but also partially restores 
its past glory. 
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Figure 9.12—Ximending 
The old restaurant (right) and the international fast food chain (left) coexist in 
present-day Ximending 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When I visited present-day Ximending during the fieldwork, I found that 
the younger generation might call the region ‗Ximen‘ instead of ‗Ximending‘. In 
fact, according to names appearing on various public guideposts, ‗Ximen‘ (west 
gate) is the official name of the site, referring to the area where stone-walled 
Taipei City‘s west gate was located. Why many Taiwanese call the area 
Ximending is because Japanese characters ‗west-gate-town‘ looks similar to 
Chinese characters ‗xi-men-ding‘. In other words, the name ‗Ximending‘ is a 
Japanese legacy. Meanwhile, the present-day younger generation seem to have 
adapted to the region‘s official name ‗Ximen‘, rather than ‗Ximending‘. 
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Apart from Ximending‘s regeneration, the City Government also began to 
regenerate early-developed west Taipei City by building parks, widening roads, 
paving sidewalks, renovating traditional markets, and restoring historic buildings 
(Lee, 2005b). Despite the improvement of these civic infrastructures, however, 
most local residents are still living in old dwellings. It is because, under 
contemporary regulations concerned with floor-area and building-coverage ratios, 
the new built house tends to be smaller than the existing one, and the locals are 
therefore not willing to build new houses. As a result, the City Government is 
planning to change the relevant regulations (Tseng, 2005b). 
It ought to be noted that in addition to the improvement of west Taipei 
City‘s infrastructures, the City Government‘s eventual goal is to use the area‘s 
cultural assets, such as historic buildings and traditional-goods retailing, to attract 
consumers and therefore boost the entire area‘s economic activities (Chen, 2002). 
However, the locals may not approve of such a strategy. The story of ‗Red 
Playhouse‘ illustrates why. 
The original Red House was Taiwan‘s first government-built public 
market erected by the Japanese colonisers in 1908 [see Section 9.2, pp. 221-2]. 
Due to its distinct red-brick architectural features, the locals called it ‗Red 
Building‘ (Tseng, 2005b). 
After keeping its operation for many years, the market ultimately closed in 
1991. In 1997, the City Government designated the building as a historic site. In 
1998, since it also functioned as a theatre during the Japanese colonial era, the 
City Government attempted to make the building a theatre providing local artists 
with chances of performance. However, this idea was criticised by some of the 
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Figure 9.13—The Red Playhouse 
local communities which claimed that since the building was located next to 
regenerated Ximending constituting the younger generation‘s assembly place, 
such a plan would be unable to attract this group of consumers (Ibid). In other 
words, in the local communities‘ view, neither historic importance nor cultural 
functions can cater for their economic interests. 
Despite this criticism, in 2002, the City Government began to trust the 
Paper Windmill Cultural and Educational Foundation to manage the building. 
Meanwhile, The Red Building was named ‗Red Playhouse‘ and started to function 
as a theatre [Figure 9.13] (Lee, 2002a). By visiting the site, to some extent, I could 
understand the locals‘ concern about the Red Building‘s new identity. It is 
because in comparison to neighbouring Ximending, the Playhouse was not able to 
act as an entertainment venue that could generate lively commercial activities. 
The case of Red Playhouse demonstrates how the City Government and 
the locals can have disagreements about public-owned historic sites‘ potential. In 
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Figure 9.14—Historic buildings along Dihua Street 
fact, disagreement can also occur over private-owned historic site. A relevant 
example is Dadaocheng‘s Dihua Street. The houses along the Street are classic 
Western-style facades built in the Qing-ruling era [Figure 9.14]. In 1977, the City 
Government attempted to widen the Street for the sake of urban development. 
Such an intention caused the locals‘ and scholars‘ disapproval. Ultimately, 
through a series of debates, the Dihua Street and its old buildings were designated 
as an historic site in 1988 (Hsu, 2005c; Huang, 2005b). Given that the area was 
packed with retailers selling traditional medicine and dry food that the locals used 
to purchase before the coming of Chinese New Year, since 1996, the City 
Government has designated the Street as the ‗Spring Festival Shopping Street‘ 
during that specific time period every year (Lee, 2002a). However, if not visiting 
the site during that period, one may find that the Dihua Street‘s commercial 
activities are not very lively. 
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Clearly, the cases of the Red Playhouse and the Dihua Street may not be 
comparable to each other. In the case of the Red Playhouse, the local communities 
ignored the site‘s historic meaning, whereas in Dihua Street, the local 
communities embraced the site‘s historic significance. Nonetheless, both cases 
show how Taipei City‘s economic/urban globalisation eventually gave rise to the 
issue of urban conservation; and how the issue would involve different interest 
groups‘ debates. Based on a chronological approach, Sections 9.5 and 9.6 further 
examine different political entities‘ policies on the conservation of those physical 
representations of Taiwan‘s old collective memory. 
 
9.5 Localism and Discontent (II) 
In practice, the Japanese Colonial Government was the first political entity 
to introduce regulations for the conservation of Taiwan‘s historic urban elements. 
For instance, in 1896 when it was still using armed forces to suppress the natives‘ 
resistance, the Colonial Government ordered the troops not to damage temples or 
Qing Empire‘s official buildings. Furthermore, in 1922, the Colonial Government 
passed the relevant laws to conserve the colony‘s historic and cultural assets (Lu, 
2005). In fact, from the stories of colonial Taipei City‘s formation revealed in 
previous Chapters, it can be acknowledged that prior to the laws‘ establishment, 
although the Colonial Government demolished some native religious institutions 
and Qing Empire‘s legacies for the sake of urban planning (e.g. the Matzu Temple 
was demolished due to the construction of the Taiwan Governor-General Museum, 
see Section 7.2, pp. 136-7), it also conserved some of them (e.g. the Qing 
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Empire‘s Office of Logistics and Defence Bureau was moved and able to be 
conversed, see Section 6.2, pp. 98-9). 
The KMT Government, when it was on the Mainland China, established 
laws regarding the conservation of historic heritage as early as 1920. However, 
since the KMT was struggling with warlords and the CPC at the time, the laws did 
not really function (Tu, 2007). 
After its retreat to Taiwan, the KMT Government initially did not pay 
attention on the conservation of Taiwan‘s historic and cultural assets. In 1981, 
however, the Government formally established the Council for Cultural Affairs. 
The Cultural Property Preservation Law was then legislated in the next year (Ibid). 
The reason why the relevant institution and laws did not exist in Taiwan prior to 
1982 can be that during the early settler-governing era, the KMT Government was 
keen to re-conquer the Mainland China, and to secure its political legitimacy by 
rapidly forging state-imposed identity and accelerating economic development, 
thereby neglecting the conservation of historic and cultural relics. Eventually, 
since the dream of re-conquering the Mainland faded away and the nation‘s 
economy developed stably, the Government, by the late 1970s, finally could begin 
to pay attention to the nation‘s cultural development. As a result, the Council was 
established and the Law implemented in the early 1980s. 
However, perhaps due to the KMT Government‘s lack of experiences in 
dealing with historic urban elements, the 1982 Cultural Property Preservation Law 
did not function efficiently in reality. For instance, although the Law indicated 
that the construction work had to be stopped when historic heritage was found at a 
site, it did not lay down how to deal with the situation further. Moreover, it only 
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indicated that when the public construction project was planned, the authorities 
had to investigate the site in advance to confirm that there were no historic 
heritages. However, it did not mention whether the private sector also had to take 
such procedures (Ibid). 
It is worth noting that Taiwan‘s real estate model and its impacts also 
exposed the 1982 Law‘s inadequacy. That is to say, although new buildings have 
constantly been erected, how to improve old buildings to modern standards or 
purposes was ignored in Taiwan. In the light of this, it is unsurprising that a 
public-owned historic site might be neglected and eventually ruined, affecting the 
city‘s image or even causing a public safety problem. Meanwhile, a private-
owned historic site might be demolished without warning (Tsai, 2004). To some 
extent, one can suggest that such an urban development pattern also resulted from 
the KMT Government‘s initial attempts to re-conquer the Mainland China and its 
simultaneous neglect of Taiwan‘s comprehensive urban development. Taipei 
City‘s lack of housing construction control in the 1950s, mentioned in Section 8.2 
[pp. 164-9], is a relevant example. 
What stimulated the 1982 Law‘s amendment was an event that happened 
in the summer of 1997. At the time, a group of artists were searching for an 
exhibition space in Taipei City. Finally, they came across the Taipei Winery, a 
Japanese colonial legacy that had been unused since 1987. Since the Winery was 
located in the area called ‗Huashan‘ by the locals, the artists named the site 
‗Huashan Arts District‘ and began to use it for artistic purposes. However, when a 
play was performed in the Winery, police officers charged the director with 
illegally occupying public-owned property. The news aroused public opinion 
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Figure 9.15—Huashan Arts District 
about not only the lack of performing spaces for Taiwanese artists, but also the 
governmental institutions‘ neglect of public-owned old places (Ibid). Under these 
circumstances, the Council for Cultural Affairs came to be in charge of the issue. 
The Council took the site from the Taiwan Tobacco and Liquor Commission (now 
Taiwan Tobacco and Liquor Corporation) and trusted the private artists and 
cultural associations to manage it [Figure 9.15] (Council of Cultural Affairs, 
2005). 
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The story of the Huashan Arts District made some political decision 
makers realise the potential of public-owned historic sites. In the past, 
‗conservation‘ in Taiwan referred to ‗rescuing the site that would be damaged‘ or 
‗preventing the site from being accessed in order to protect it from potential 
damage‘. However, in 1998, the amended Cultural Property Preservation Law 
indicated that historic sites need to be restored and reused, rather than being 
passively conserved. Moreover, in 2000, the Council for Cultural Affairs, under 
the newly-established DPP Government, announced that the reuse of neglected 
public-owned historic sites was one of its significant policies (Tsai, 2004). 
Thereafter, many local governments began to dedicate themselves to the neglected 
old places‘ revitalisation (Fu, 2001a). In the case of Taipei City, according to the 
member of the City Government‘s Department of Cultural Affairs (personal 
interview, 23/01/2007), apart from the aforementioned Red Playhouse and 
Haushan Arts District, several public-owned Qing or Japanese legacies have 
already become museums, galleries, or theatres. Many of them are operated by the 
non-profit organisations trusted by the City Government. Most historic buildings 
in Taipei City are those colonial civil servants‘ traditional Japanese houses. Apart 
from the Japanese housing legacies, Fu (2001b) indicates that due to the nation‘s 
industrial restructuring history [see Section 4.3, pp. 59-60]; many neglected 
public-owned factories and storehouses also constitute historic sites. 
Clearly, the neglected public-owned historic sites‘ reuse can involve the 
participation of many interest groups, including government institutions, interior 
designers, scholars, and local communities, thereby giving rise to disagreement. 
One of key issues, like the story of Red Playhouse mentioned in the previous 
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Section [pp. 236-7], is that the local community may claim that the government 
institutions just intend to make the site become a cultural venue, instead of a 
commercial spot. In some cases, furthermore, the local community may want the 
site to become an ordinary public space, such as a park, rather than a cultural 
venue that they cannot frequently use (Fu, 2001b; Tsai, 2004). 
Overall, from the above discussion concerned with how the Taiwanese 
Government began to approach the issue of neglected public-owned historic 
places, it can be seen that it is difficult for the Government to find the balance 
between economic development, practical functions, and local identity, especially 
in a context where the nation has been experiencing economic/urban globalisation. 
 
9.6 Localism and Discontent (III) 
As shown in the previous Section, the 1998 Cultural Property Preservation 
Law seemed to be able to revitalise Taiwan‘s public-owned historic sites and 
therefore make them become re-remembered within people‘s everyday living 
experience, despite conflict over the sites‘ new functions. However, in 2002, in 
order to increase the revenue of the national treasury, the National Property 
Bureau announced that it would take over neglected public-owned buildings in 
Taipei and Kaohsiung Cities, the only two Taiwanese cities partially 
administrated and financed by the Central Government, if their owners could not 
propose appropriate plans to reuse the sites. To avoid the new policy before it was 
introduced, many government institutions in these two Cities immediately 
destroyed some neglected public-owned buildings, including many Japanese 
housing legacies, in order to retain ownership of the land. This shows that conflict 
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over the conservation and reuse of historic places can occur between government 
institutions at different levels, rather than just between the public sector and the 
general public (Tsai, 2004). 
In 2005, the Cultural Property Preservation Law was amended to define 
different types of cultural asset as well as to indicate different government 
organisations‘ responsibility over the issue (Tu, 2007). The 2005 Law clearly 
regulates how government organisations at different levels must deal with the 
recognition, conservation, and revitalisation of different public-owned historic 
urban elements. 
In the case of the conservation and revitalisation of private-owned historic 
sites, according to the 2005 Law, non-governmental organisations or the property 
owner need to ask the local government to investigate the site to judge whether it 
has historic and cultural importance. The local government then has to employ 
experts to investigate the site. Thereafter, public meetings need to be held to allow 
the property owner, government institutions, scholars, and other interest groups to 
discuss the site‘s future. 
Assuming that the owner is willing to allow his/her property to be 
designated as a historic site, the 2005 Law states that the owner then has 
responsibility for the site‘s conservation. Meanwhile, the local government has to 
compensate for the owner‘s ‗losses‘. For instance, if the owner attempts to erect a 
new building on the land, the new building‘s bulk ratio can avoid the 
contemporary regulation and be increased by that of the historic building [see 
Figure 9.16, p. 246]. Furthermore, the owner can have a cut in taxes relative to 
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Figure 9.16—A restored historic building in Dadaocheng 
The rewarded extra building bulk ratio enabled the original historic façade to be 
integrated with the modern skyscraper (the information is provided by an architect having 
participated in several historic building restoration projects in Taipei City, personal interview, 
11/12/2007) 
land, house, and inheritance, thus making the site have commercial and tourist 
functions. 
If a private-owned historic site needs to be restored, the 2005 Law 
stipulates that the owner can acquire support from the local government. The local 
government then needs to make a contract with the private sector through public 
bidding for the site‘s restoration. Nonetheless, according to an architect (personal 
interview, 11/12/2007) who has participated in several historic building 
restoration projects in Taipei City, the result of restoration can be unsatisfactory 
due to the limited funds the local government can provide to contractors. It means 
that despite more financial cost, if the property owner arranged the site‘s 
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restoration by himself/herself, the result could be better than relying on the local 
government‘s ‗support‘. What is more, the property owner can also avoid time-
consuming to deal with bureaucracy. 
Nonetheless, ‗assuming that the owner agrees to allow his/her property to 
become the historic site‘ is just an ideal situation. That is to say, from the very 
beginning, the Cultural Property Preservation Law has not clearly indicated how 
to deal with the situation where the owner refuses the government‘s attempt to 
designate his/her property as the historic site. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the 
process of recognising a private-owned historic site can cause disputes between 
different interest groups. For example, if the owner dislikes the strict regulations 
regarding the historic site‘s future conservation, he/she may demolish it prior to 
the government‘s formal affirmation of its historic importance. These kinds of 
cases have occurred many times in Taipei City (Hsu, 2005c; Huang, 2005b; Lee, 
2001g). In other cases, the owner can take administrative proceedings against the 
government‘s decision in order to maintain his/her property‘s status quo (A 
member of City Government‘s Department of Cultural Affairs, personal interview, 
23/01/2007). 
A current case demonstrating the difficulty of conserving and restoring 
private-owned historic sites is a Presbyterian church located in Dadaocheng. The 
church was built during the Qing-ruling era. In 2002, the City Government 
attempted to designate the church as a historic site. However, the church staff 
disagreed with the proposal and subsequently destroyed the building‘s façade to 
‗devalue‘ its historic value. In order to prevent the church staff from further 
damaging the building, the City Government immediately affirmed that the 
 248 
partially demolished church was a tentative historic site. Thereafter, the church 
staff took administrative proceedings against the City Government‘s action. In 
2004, the Taipei High Administrative Court pronounced that the City 
Government‘s decision was invalid because it did not hold any public conference 
to legitimise the church‘s tentative historic site status (Ibid). 
Despite the Court‘s judgement, the City Government continued to 
negotiate with the church staff. Ultimately, both sides agreed to allow the church 
to become a historic site. The conditions were that a new building integrating the 
restored façade would be constructed [Figure 9.17]. Meanwhile, the church staff 
had to employ the architect by themselves to plan the whole design and 
construction projects, following the Cultural Property Preservation Law‘s relevant 
regulations. In addition, in order to ‗compensate for the property owners‘ loss‘, 
Figure 9.17—Dadaocheng Presbyterian Church 
Above: During the Japanese colonial era; Lower: After demolition of the façade; 
Right: The future image 
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the church staff were able to sell the surplus building bulk ratio (e.g. based on the 
official regulation, the height of the new building can reach eight floors. However, 
the owner decided to construct a six-storey building. Under these circumstances, 
the owner can sell the two-storey building bulk ratio of the site to a buyer. In the 
future, that buyer can apply this surplus ratio to increase the height of his/her 
building). It ought to be noted that such conditions have become a general 
measure applied by different local governments to encourage private-owned 
historic sites‘ restoration in contemporary Taiwan (The architect participating in 
the church‘s restoration, personal interview, 11/12/2007). 
However, the next stage revealed more of the difficulties involved in the 
conservation and restoration of historic sites in contemporary Taiwan. At the 
beginning, the church staff were unable to find architectural design companies 
that wanted to do the work. It was because the companies realised that the project 
would involve the government bureaucracy that would delay the working process. 
In fact, since 2002, the company that took over the project found that it had to 
spend much time dealing with bureaucracy. Ultimately, all the interest groups, 
including the City Government, scholars hired by the City Government, the 
designers, and the church staff, reached a conclusion on the projects; and 
construction work started in 2007 (Ibid). 
The future of many other Japanese urban legacies in Taipei City also 
shows the difficulties of conserving and restoring historic sites when they are 
privately owned. Many one-time Japanese sites in Taipei City are owned by 
‗former‘ state-run companies (e.g. a bank) and institutions (e.g. a university). 
With the coming of Taiwan‘s democratisation, these public institutions gradually 
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became privatised or autonomous. Gradually, these Japanese legacies became 
private-owned, and this made it difficult for contemporary government institutions 
to confirm their historic significance. Incidents similar to that of the Dadaocheng 
church have occurred, meaning that owners have partially damaged or even 
demolished the historic sites (The member of City Government‘s Department of 
Cultural Affairs, personal interview, 23/01/2007). Also, the local governments 
may not have enough resources to support a ‗new‘ private sector owner to 
conserve the sites. Therefore, sometimes the local government only selects the 
sites in better condition to be conserved and restored (The architect participating 
in several restoration projects in Taipei City, personal interview, 11/12/2007). 
These examples show how commercial pressure caused by Taiwan‘s 
economic/urban globalisation made the state take urban conservation more 
necessary. However, democratisation has weakened the state‘s influence on the 
creation of built environments, and empowered the general public, the private 
sector, and sometimes even the public sector to pursue interests that can be 
detrimental to historic urban elements. 
 
9.7 Conclusion 
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that since the 1860s, 
Western capitalists began to bring commodified Western cultures to Qing-ruling 
Taiwan. During the Japanese colonial era, the colonisers, favouring 
Westernisation, reinforced that condition further. After the Japanese colonial era, 
in order to secure its political legitimacy, the KMT Government also welcomed 
international capitalists to explore the nation‘s market and therefore made Taiwan 
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become involved in globalisation. The capital Taipei‘s changing urban landscape, 
especially its several business districts, represents a process in which cultural 
diversification and hybridisation emerged due to the nation‘s globalising 
economic activities. For instance, during the Qing-ruling era, many Western-style 
buildings were erected in Dadaocheng where international traders‘ living quarters 
were located. Moreover, the Japanese Colonial Government constructed 
Ximending that hosted many Western-style entertainment venues. In addition, 
international retailers and skyscrapers appeared in east Taipei City due to the 
KMT Government‘s economic restructuring plan. 
However, with its devotion to economic development alongside modern 
urban image making, the KMT Government neglected the capital Taipei‘s 
comprehensive urban development. Hence, as the new business districts were 
developed, the old business districts and their surroundings began to decline. Not 
until Taiwan‘s democratisation, were the newly-empowered local communities 
and authorities able to influence political decisions and therefore bring about the 
improvement of these old places. 
The other outcome of the KMT Government‘s economic-development-
oriented policy making resulted from their lack of interest in urban conservation, 
so that public-owned historic sites were neglected, and private-owned ones 
demolished. Although Taiwan‘s stable economic development ultimately made 
the KMT Government start to pay attention to this issue from the early 1980s, it 
was just the beginning of an experimental process in which inexperienced 
government institutions kept amending the relevant laws to approach the issue. 
Meanwhile, democratisation empowered the private sector, citizens, and even the 
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public sector to control their properties, including those potential historic sites, 
thereby causing more difficulties for the relevant government institutions to 
achieve urban conservation when the property owners perceive their interests (in 
most cases, economic interests) will be affected. 
Overall, as the globalising urban scene alongside the modern urban life has 
become part of the nation‘s imagined collective memory, the KMT Government 
to a certain extent also lost its power to strongly control what can be remembered 
or forgotten within the capital Taipei. Consequently, the urban elements, which 
constitute historic and cultural relics as well as physical representations of the 
nation‘s old imagined collective memory, can be easily demolished. The situation 
today remains the same as in Taiwan‘s post-settler era, meaning that the DPP 
Government has encountered similar problems when dealing with urban 
conservation. This settler-rule legacy implies not only a setback in Taiwan‘s urban 
conservation, but also an identity contest between the new and the old. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 253 
CHAPTER 10 
REFLECTIONS ON RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
10.1 Introduction 
The previous four Chapters have revealed abundant information from the 
fieldwork. This Chapter examines how the information relates to the research 
questions. As explained in Section 4.5, the core research question is: How has 
shifting state power in Taiwan, until the early beginning of the post-settler 
era, shaped the nation’s urban landscape in the form of (re-)remembered/(re-
)forgotten spaces? This core question gives rise to three further questions, each 
of which is discussed, in turn, in Sections 10.2, 10.3 and 10.4. The aim is to make 
connections between the case study findings and the reviewed literature, and to 
use the theoretical framework to examine issues that have not been explored in 
existing academic work concerned with Taiwan‘s shifting national identity 
alongside its changing urban landscape. Based on discussions of these three 
Sections, Section 10.5 returns to the core question and further highlights 
connections between the case study findings and the theoretical framework. 
 
10.2 Question 1 
 
How did the Chinese Settler State use iconic sites, national-
cultural sites, and other urban elements, to practise its national 
identification scheme in Taiwan, and what implications for 
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these urban elements have emerged after the coming of 
Taiwan’s post-settler era? 
 
The Chinese Settler State/Post-colonial State 
In order to answer Question 1, I started my empirical work by looking 
back to Taipei City‘s Japanese colonial era. It is because the KMT represented not 
only the settler state but also the post-colonial state to Taiwan. The previous 
studies concerned with Taipei City‘s urban history do not clearly indicate how the 
KMT Government dealt with these Japanese colonial urban legacies that were 
supposed to be against its Chinese identification schemes. 
The relevant studies investigating post-colonial cities (e.g. Alsayyad, 1992; 
McClintock, 1994; Vale, 1992) have suggested that the post-colonial government 
cannot entirely eliminate colonial memories emanating from the post-colonial city 
due to the fact that the city was fundamentally created by the colonisers. Likewise, 
the case study shows that the KMT Government encountered the same issue. That 
is to say, the early 20th century Taipei City was constructed to represent the 
image of ‗Oriental Paris‘ corresponding to the Japanese Empire‘s aim of pursuing 
Westernisation. Meanwhile, when the KMT first occupied Taiwan in 1945, it was 
also struggling with the CPC in the Chinese Civil War on the Mainland China and 
therefore unable to pay attention on eliminating Japanese colonial urban legacies. 
In fact, one can suggest that these well-built colonial official buildings, public 
facilities, and infrastructures enabled the KMT to settle in Taiwan immediately. 
As a result, the Japanese colonial memory can still be remembered within the 
capital Taipei under Chinese settler rule. 
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The KMT Government even applied some colonial urban legacies‘ 
identification functions to swiftly legitimise state power. For instance, the main 
government building remained the place where the extravagant military parade 
took place. Furthermore, the museum was used to exhibit items related to the 
KMT‘s claimed achievement. In addition, the baseball stadium was used to forge 
nationalism derived from the nation‘s sporting victory. With the coming of 
Taiwan‘s democratisation, these identification implements were eventually 
abandoned. 
 
Creating new identity 
Although the KMT chose not to destroy the relevant Japanese colonial 
urban legacies in the capital Taipei, previous academic studies (e.g. Hou, 2000; 
Leitner and Kang, 1999; Tay, 1995) showed that the KMT Government created 
new iconic sites, street and place names, and statues to legitimise its political 
control as well as to forge a new identity among the local population. Meanwhile, 
the case study findings also show that the KMT built the relevant national-cultural 
sites in Taipei City to serve the same purpose. For instance, the museums were 
erected to legitimise Chinese culture and history as ‗national‘ culture and history. 
Moreover, the basketball stadiums were erected to host ‗domestic‘ matches of 
‗China‘. 
In comparison to the existing literature concerned with post-colonial cities 
in Asia and Africa (e.g. Vale, 2006) suggesting that the new government may 
build new landmarks hybridising Western and native architectural features to 
symbolise the nation‘s independence and capability to pursue modernisation 
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without the former colonisers‘ ‗help‘, the case study shows that the KMT 
Government made these self-built new urban elements simply represent Chinese-
palace styles without hybridising other architectural references. One can suggest it 
is because the KMT Government did not have strong connections with Japanese 
colonial Taiwan. Instead, it was a newly-arrived political entity claiming that 
Taiwan should have been part of China‘s territory. Thus, those new iconic sites, 
national-cultural sites, and relevant public facilities were built purely to legitimise 
Taiwan‘s ‗Chinese roots‘, and were not necessary to denote the end of Japanese 
colonial rule. Apart from directly conveying images related to ‗being Chinese‘, 
the KMT Government legitimised its political control by setting up many subtle 
urban elements, such as banners, fliers, and slogans, displaying in the Taiwanese‘s 
everyday built environments. 
For the local Taiwanese, however, these new urban elements created by 
the KMT, to a certain extent, might symbolise the beginning of a new colonial 
history. With the coming of Taiwan‘s democratisation, the symbolic meanings 
and functions of these urban elements began to be questioned publicly. As a result, 
some of them were physically demolished or functionally changed. Nonetheless, 
others are still intact in post-settler Taipei City. It is not just because there will be 
a lot of work to make the changes happen (e.g. renaming all of those streets and 
places) or that the changes will be costly (e.g. removing a giant monument). It is 
also because the opposition parties (the KMT and its allies controlling not only 
Taipei City‘s administration, but also the National Assembly‘s operation) can 
obstruct the DPP Government‘s plans aiming to affect these settler-state legacies. 
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From the case study findings [see Chapters 6 and 7] and relevant 
information from the existing literature, Table 10.1 [see pp. 258-60] summarises 
the information presented in this Section. The Table shows how the KMT 
Government used the Japanese colonial legacies, especially those iconic sites, to 
practise its identification scheme. Moreover, the Table also lists the iconic sites, 
national-cultural sites, and those urban elements created by the KMT Government 
to legitimise its power as well as to create collective memory among the 
Taiwanese. Furthermore, it shows how these urban elements‘ identification 
functions faded away during Taiwan‘s political transition period, and how that 
transition also enabled the DPP, which administered Taipei City at the time, to 
represent the nation‘s sorrowful memory—the 2-2-8 Incident—in the form of the 
memorial and the museum. It can be seen also that when the DPP was in 
government and tried to further affect some settler-state legacies‘ symbolic 
meanings, its actions were criticised or even stopped by the KMT and its allies. 
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10.3 Question 2 
 
How did the Chinese Settler State affect Taiwan’s developing 
multicultural society as well as multicultural urban 
environments, and what implications for these environments 
have emerged after the coming of Taiwan’s post-settler era? 
 
Reluctant Chinese diasporas 
Question 2 is set to explore the development of Taipei City‘s 
multiculturalism throughout Taiwan‘s different political contexts. From the 
fieldwork, five groups are identified. They are: (1) Chinese Mainlanders coming 
to Taiwan in the late 1940s; (2) the Hakka; (3) the Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples; 
(4) the US military people stationing in Taiwan from the early 1950s to the late 
1970s; and (5) the new global immigrants including immigrant spouses and 
workers. 
For the Mainlanders coming to Taiwan at the end of the 1940s due to the 
Civil War on the Mainland China, it can be assumed that some of them might 
initially believe that Taiwan was just a temporary settlement. However, since the 
KMT never re-conquered the ‗lost‘ Mainland, all of these new immigrants 
ultimately became a reluctant diaspora. Meanwhile, some of them formed their 
diaspora spaces in Taipei City. 
In contrast to the literature (e.g. Gensheimer, 2001; Mazrui, 2001) 
suggesting that diaspora spaces tend to form in the suburbs due to the diasporas‘ 
marginalisation from the locals, the formation of these Chinese diaspora spaces in 
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the capital Taipei present a different story since the Chinese Mainlanders were the 
‗politically-predominant minority‘ and able to have privileges concerned with 
their settlements in Taiwanese cities. The relevant academic studies (e.g. Chen, 
2005) have indicated that the KMT Government‘s housing policies, to a large 
extent, only benefited civil servants, educators, and military figures, in which 
Chinese Mainlanders were the majority. However, the studies do not clearly 
explore this condition‘s origins and implications. In the case of Mainlanders who 
were officials or educators, the case study findings indicate that the newly-arrived 
KMT Government arranged for them to settle in the former Japanese colonisers‘ 
living quarters. Unsurprisingly, in comparison to the local peoples‘ residential 
areas, people living in these quarters would have easy access to public facilities 
with better conditions. This condition can be related to discussion in Section 10.2 
[p. 254] indicating that the ‗ready-made‘ colonial urban legacies enabled the 
newly-arrived KMT Government to settle in Taiwan quickly. Meanwhile, it also 
somewhat reflects Hall‘s viewpoint (2002) that unbalanced spatial distributions 
originally stemming from colonial urban planning can still exist in the post-
colonial city. 
Since ‗restoring the Mainland‘ has become just a slogan, these ‗temporary‘ 
living quarters ultimately became the ‗homes‘ of these first-generation Chinese 
settlers and their offspring. As a result, these places can be regarded as the 
Chinese diaspora spaces to a certain extent, although they were originally built by 
the Japanese colonisers. By interviewing the key authorities, it was found that 
although such unequal arrangements have been discussed publicly with the 
coming of Taiwan‘s democratisation, both the transitional KMT Government and 
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the succeeding DPP Government have been unable to provide appropriate 
solutions to deal with this awkward situation. After all, it can cause controversy if 
the government force these old Mainlanders to move out. 
Apart from civil servants and educators, the majority among the Chinese 
Mainlanders immigrating to Taiwan during the late 1940s were KMT soldiers and 
their dependents. By consulting the official documents, interviewing the 
authorities, and visiting the relevant places, it was found that since the KMT 
Government initially regarded Taiwan as a temporary settlement, it did not 
prevent these soldiers from illegally constructing their dwellings in Taiwanese 
cities. In Taipei City, the City Government even built the public market or stalls to 
accommodate these newcomers‘ illegal settlements. 
It cannot be denied that some of these illegally built Chinese diaspora 
spaces strengthened economic activities or improved the infrastructure of the 
surrounding areas. Some of them even became officially-recognised ‗military-
dependent villages‘. However, their existence implied the KMT Government‘s 
ignorance of Taiwanese cities‘ comprehensive planning during the early 1950s. 
Furthermore, many of these roughly built villages‘ living conditions were 
inadequate, as was their appearance. These factors eventually affected Taiwan‘s 
urban development in the long run. Therefore, both the KMT and the DPP 
Governments have made relevant laws to deal with the issues. In fact, Taiwan‘s 
contemporary public housing scheme was originally launched to resettle these 
veterans living in military-dependent villages. 
A slightly surprising finding, which somewhat reflects Hayden‘s study 
(1995) investigating how diasporas can become symbolically recognised in their 
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settled land, is that although these military-dependent villages can be regarded as 
the physical evidence of the KMT Government‘s unequal urban policies and as an 
obstacle to Taiwan‘s urban development, their historic meaning eventually 
attracted the attention of some conservationists and government institutions. In the 
case of Taipei City, its role as the nation‘s capital makes it the first Taiwanese city 
experiencing many experimental military-dependent-village-demolition projects. 
Nevertheless, owing to the efforts of some politicians, scholars, and former 
residents, the last old military-dependent quarter in the capital Taipei was restored 
and functioned as a theme museum as well as a public hall. 
From the above discussion, it can be suggested that despite the residents 
being either Chinese social elites or KMT military figures, the reason why these 
Chinese diaspora spaces have caused many controversies and problems is due to 
the KMT‘s early political priority for re-conquering the Mainland China. The 
priority made the KMT Government once regard Taiwan as a temporary 
settlement and thus it did not formulate comprehensive plans to accommodate 
these newly-arrived Chinese Mainlanders, who ultimately became the reluctant 
diasporas. Consequently, thorny issues have occurred and still exist in Taiwan‘s 
political transition and post-settler eras. 
 
The locals’ rights of self-identification 
Apart from the Chinese Mainlanders, the case study also explores how the 
local minority groups had spatial implications for Taipei City. The local 
Taiwanese can be classified into two groups, namely the Han People and the 
Taiwanese Indigenous People. The Han People are composed of two subgroups, 
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namely the Hokkien (Hoklo) and the Hakka. Like the Taiwanese Indigenous 
People, the Hakka is the minority because of their smaller population. According 
to the relevant government publications, the Japanese Colonial Government 
clearly respected Taiwanese ethnic groups by studying and recording their 
customs, demographics, and living territories, etc. Nevertheless, for the 
succeeding KMT Government, the local Taiwanese were identified as Chinese. 
The condition immediately affected the Hakka‘s and the Taiwanese Indigenous 
People‘s self-identification. For instance, the language restriction forced the 
Hakkas to become ‗invisible‘ in Taiwanese society since they could not speak 
their mother tongue on most public occasions. Meanwhile, the Indigenous People 
were forced to learn Chinese culture. 
With Taiwan‘s economic development alongside accelerating urbanisation, 
increasing numbers of Hakka and Indigenous Peoples began to settle in 
Taiwanese cities to search for job opportunities. In Taipei City, several Hakka and 
Indigenous enclaves were therefore formed. Meanwhile, many societies were 
established by these minority residents. With the coming of Taiwan‘s 
democratisation, these grassroots organisations began to play an important role in 
making the transitional KMT Government eliminate those irrational identity 
policies. Consequently, as seen in Hayden‘s study (1995) which investigated how 
a given city can represent maturing multiculturalism, several museums, 
community centres, monuments, and public housing were erected in the capital 
Taipei in tribute to, or for the benefit of the Taiwanese Hakka and Indigenous 
People. 
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The US urban legacies 
Previous literature (e.g. Brown, 2004; Su, 2005) has suggested that due to 
its multicultural environments, Taiwan‘s cultural diversification and hybridisation 
have already been organically generated from interactions between the Indigenous 
People and the Han People prior to any political entity‘s occupation of the region. 
Apart from that ‗organic‘ cultural diversification and hybridisation, the literature 
also indicated that the state‘s policies were able to initiate the integration of 
Western culture with Taiwanese culture. For instance, the Qing Empire was 
defeated by the Western countries‘ coalition, and was thereby forced to allow 
Western traders and missionaries to enter Taiwan. Moreover, the Japanese 
Colonial Government regarded Westernisation as modernisation. All these factors 
influenced the flow of Western culture to Taiwan alongside subsequent cultural 
diversification and hybridisation. 
Similarly, the case study findings reveal how the state‘s policies enabled 
the US troops to bring Western culture to Taiwan. After the KMT retreated to 
Taiwan, the party was worrying about the threat from the CPC. Meanwhile, the 
US was worrying about the extension of Communist power in East Asia. Under 
these circumstances, the KMT Government allowed the US Government to station 
troops in Taiwan. Thereafter, similar to other cases (e.g. Gensheimer, 2001; 
Mazrui, 2001) concerned with relationships between non-Western locals and 
Western strategists, the Taiwanese locals began to provide the American 
newcomers with services such as food and entertainment that they could relate to. 
The newly built shops, restaurants, and entertainment places collectively implied 
emerging cultural diversification and hybridisation. 
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In Taipei City, although the US troops departed after the US Government 
cut diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979, one can still encounter their urban 
legacies in the areas where they were located. For instance, a nightlife spot was 
formed at the Third Section of the Zhongshan North Road owing to those pubs 
originally opened to serve the US troops. Moreover, the area around the Seventh 
Section of the Zhongshan North Road became a high-quality cosmopolitan place 
where one can easily encounter foreign nationals, international schools, pubs, 
cafés, and exotic restaurants. 
 
The new global immigrants 
In the age of globalisation, people can easily travel around the world for 
tourism, business, study, marriage, or work opportunities. The condition 
accelerates and reinforces the formation of a multicultural society (McGrew, 1992; 
Thompson, 1992). In Taiwan, Tai‘s study (2005) has shown that the region‘s two 
distinct global immigrant groups are immigrant spouses and immigrant workers. 
The participation of both groups in Taiwanese society is due to Taiwan‘s 
economic restructuring. More particularly, in order to secure its political 
legitimacy, the KMT Government dedicated itself to Taiwan‘s economic 
development. Capitalism eventually gave rise to an increasing middle class 
alongside social polarisation. Under this condition, the low-income Taiwanese 
males began to try to find their partners in Southeast Asian countries through 
match-maker companies. Meanwhile, the labour shortage began to emerge, as 
increasingly highly-educated generations tended to engage in white-collar jobs, 
and eventually drove the KMT Government to allow immigrant workers, the 
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majority from Southeast Asian countries, to participate in the nation‘s relevant 
industries. 
Although not all of these two groups of new immigrants are permanently 
living in Taiwan, the case study findings show that they had permanent 
implications for the capital Taipei‘s urban scene. For instance, a community 
centre was erected in Taipei City to host relevant courses and events to help 
immigrant spouses adapt to their new environment. Since the immigrant workers 
only settle in Taiwan for a certain period depending on their contracts, they have 
not so far formed specific residential areas in Taiwanese cities. Nonetheless, the 
local religious institutions, businesspeople, and grassroots human-rights 
organisations began to provide immigrant workers with relevant services and gave 
rise to the organic formation of Taipei City‘s Little Philippines, an assembly place 
for the Filipino immigrant workers on every Sunday, the only day off they have in 
a week. It can be suggested that these places symbolise the evolution of Taiwan‘s 
multiculturalism. 
 
The findings of the case study [see Chapter 8] and literature review related 
to Question 2 are summarised in Tables 10.2 [see p. 270] and 10.3 [see p. 271]. 
Table 10.2 demonstrates how different groups‘ self-identification and living 
territories were affected under different political periods. From the Table, it can be 
seen that the Hakkas‘ and the Indigenous People‘s identity suppression and 
reclamation corresponded to their marginalisation and eventual inclusion in the 
capital Taipei. Table 10.3 shows how original ‗outside‘ cultures have been 
integrated into Taiwanese culture and are reflected in Taipei City‘s changing 
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urban landscape. In short, from these two Tables, one can see that some groups 
were been privileged and some were being disadvantaged, even suppressed in 
different periods of Taiwanese history. The nation‘s democratisation made the 
state begin to revise certain groups‘ privileges. More importantly, these 
suppressed groups were able to strive to be treated equally. Those new urban 
elements and policies serving their interests represent not only the former 
suppressed groups‘ achievements, but also Taiwan‘s developing multiculturalism: 
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10.4 Question 3 
 
How did the Chinese Settler State deal with the impacts of 
economic/urban globalisation in shaping Taiwan’s urban 
landscape, and what implications related to this globalised 
urban scene have emerged after the coming of Taiwan’s post-
settler era? 
 
Globalisation 
To answer Question 3, we need to know how global culture was formed in 
Taiwan. Previous studies (e.g. Hall, 1992; Scholte, 1996; Stevenson, 1999) have 
suggested that global culture‘s formation, to a large extent, resulted from the 
spread of Western culture, driven by global capitalism. Based on this viewpoint, I 
traced back to the early 1860s when the Qing Empire was defeated by the Western 
coalition, and was therefore forced to open Taiwan‘s ports to Western capitalists. 
It was the first time Taiwan became involved in world trade due to the state‘s 
policy. The documentary sources show that these newly-arrived Western 
entrepreneurs cooperated with local businesspeople to enable a port area, namely 
Dadaocheng, to become the capital Taipei‘s central business district. Many 
Western-style buildings were erected in Dadaocheng and some still remain in the 
area. 
Technically, it can be argued that Westernised Dadaocheng was a spatial 
product contributed by both foreign and local capitalists, rather than the Qing 
Empire. However, unlike the Qing Empire, the successive Japanese Colonial 
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Government actively constructed a central business district, namely Ximending, 
in the capital Taipei. Ximending consisted of mixed Western-style buildings 
reflecting the Japanese colonisers‘ aim of pursuing Westernisation. Meanwhile, 
various Western entertainment venues, such as cinemas and cafés, were also 
located in the district. 
Clearly, although Dadaocheng, formed in the late 1860s, and Ximending, 
completed in the early 1920s, are physical representations of how Taiwan began 
to get involved in global capitalism, neither of them is able to match the 
contemporary globally-standardised urban scene that has been described (e.g. 
Clark, 2003; Wong, 1997) as a place, usually the city‘s central business district, 
packed with skyscrapers and global-brand retailers, representing a ‗sameness‘ 
derived from global culture. Such a globally-standardised central business district 
did not emerge in the capital Taipei until the KMT‘s coming. Other writers (e.g. 
Chou, 2005; Hsu, 2005; Jou, 2005) have emphasised that ‗economic 
development‘ was one of the instruments used by the KMT Government to 
legitimise/secure state power. This eventually enabled global capitalism to take 
root in Taiwan. As a result, several globally-standardised commercial districts 
were formed in Taipei City. For example, the East District began to develop in the 
1960s since many export-oriented manufacturing factories were located at the area. 
In the 1970s, owing to the nation‘s developing service sector, many financial 
institutions, department stores, official buildings and luxury hotels were erected in 
the East District. The subsequent process of democratisation enabled the private 
sector to create many consumption spaces. For example, before the early 1990s, 
the Xinyi Planning District developed slowly due to its high land prices 
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manipulated by the private sector. Later, through coordination with the Central 
and City Governments, substantial investment by the private sector then 
accelerated the Xinyi District‘s development from the mid-1990s. 
 
From globalisation to localisation 
The formation of globally-standardised central business districts in Taipei 
City was driven by the KMT Government‘s desire for economic achievement as 
well as power legitimacy. However, as Huang (2005a) has shown, the 
construction of civic facilities related to people‘s welfare, such as community 
centres and parks, was ignored for many years by the KMT Government. 
Meanwhile, the general public were not successful in their appeals to higher 
government institutions to improve their living environments. Eventually, with the 
coming of democratisation, the transitional KMT Government began to allow the 
general public to participate in policy-making concerned with urban planning and 
therefore improved their living conditions. 
Nonetheless, some thorny issues caused by the lengthy economic/urban 
globalisation process still cannot be easily solved. For instance, Chou (2005) has 
shown that, to develop the nation‘s light industry, the KMT Government 
converted much agricultural land for industrial use in the 1950s. Although such a 
forceful land policy indeed enabled Taiwan‘s light industry to develop rapidly. 
The complicated ownership due to land reform further hindered west Taipei 
City‘s urban regeneration launched in the 1980s, since the City Government had 
to negotiate with a large number of landowners. The case study findings show that 
the consequences are still affecting contemporary west Taipei City. 
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What is more, in consideration of the literature (e.g. Harvey, 1993; Sklair, 
2006) examining urban issues caused by globalisation, the case study investigates 
whether Taipei City‘s globalisation has resulted in the demolition of historic 
urban elements representing the old collective memory. The findings show that, as 
the first Taiwanese city to experience urban globalisation, the capital Taipei is 
also the one frequently suffering from losing historic urban elements. And since 
modern Taipei City was founded by the Japanese colonisers, most of the 
demolished historic buildings were housing legacies from the Japanese era. 
It has been suggested that the reason behind the demolition of these old 
urban elements was that when the KMT Government retreated from the Chinese 
Mainland to Taiwan in 1949, it regarded Taiwan as merely a temporary settlement, 
thereby not paying attention to urban conservation. Yet even the Japanese 
Colonial Government had made regulations to conserve urban legacies from the 
Qing Empire. 
In terms of when the KMT Government began to deal with the issue, it 
might be assumed that Taiwan‘s democratisation would be the point at which non-
governmental organisations, academics, and the general public would begin to 
appeal to the authorities to conserve historic assets. However, the documentary 
sources show that these views had already emerged in the late 1970s, and that, in 
the early 1980s, the KMT Government established laws to protect historic sites. 
The reason why the issue began to attract the public sector‘s and the general 
public‘s attention earlier than the coming of Taiwan‘s democratisation can be that 
the nation‘s economic development became stable and successful in the late 1970s, 
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and this enabled the authorities and the general public to begin to consider 
Taiwan‘s cultural development. 
Due to the lack of experience, the KMT Government‘s urban conservation 
policies had several shortcomings. For example, the early policies focused on 
‗conservation‘ by keeping historic sites inaccessible, without considering their 
potential for revitalisation. The policies even did not clearly indicate the 
responsibility of government institutions at different levels when dealing with 
urban conservation affairs. Meanwhile, echoing the literature (e.g. Boyer, 1996, 
Hannigan, 1998; Harvey, 1993; Sklair, 2006) investigating how different interest 
groups, including government institutions, real estate agents, developers, and 
property owners, can have conflict over the balance between urban development 
and urban conservation in different nations, the case study findings show a similar 
situation in Taiwan. 
The irony is that the situation seems to become more complicated with the 
coming of Taiwan‘s democratisation. Many financial, business and educational 
institutions initially controlled by the state became privatised or autonomous after 
the abolition of martial law. Often, they occupied government properties that the 
KMT Government took over from the Japanese Colonial Government, and some 
own historic Japanese housing legacies. As a result, in addition to resistance from 
the private sector and ordinary citizens owning historic buildings, the government 
institutions also have to restrain privatised former public sector organisations from 
demolishing historic sites for the sake of their own commercial and other interests. 
Even local governments, which also became more independent due to 
democratisation, in some cases demolished their historic properties to prevent the 
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central government from taking them over. Given this experience, the relevant 
laws have continuously been revised and strengthened throughout Taiwan‘s 
transitional and post-settler eras. 
 
Drawing on the information from the case study findings [see Chapter 9] 
and previous academic literature, Tables 10.4 [see p. 279] and 10.5 [see p. 280] 
summarise the answer to Question 3. Table 10.4, inspired by Chou‘s study (2005), 
indicates the formation of different central business districts in the capital Taipei 
in the context of Taiwan‘s experience of economic/urban globalisation. Table 10.5 
shows how this economic/urban globalisation process impacted on the residents‘ 
living environments in the capital Taipei and on Taiwan‘s urban regeneration and 
conservation policies, and how the Taiwanese government, in different political 
periods, dealt with the impacts. The key point is that since it initially regarded 
Taiwan as a temporary settlement, the KMT Government had ignored the issue of 
comprehensive urban development, both in Taipei City and in other Taiwanese 
cities. Consequently, although several important business districts were formed in 
Taipei City by the Chinese Settler State to represent the nation‘s economic 
achievements and simultaneously to secure its legitimacy, the City was still short 
of civic facilities, and some historic sites were damaged or even demolished. The 
nation‘s stable economic development and following democratisation eventually 
made the KMT Government begin to pay attention to the issues. However, 
democratisation also empowered the public sector, the private sector and the 
general public to manage their own properties and change/demolish some historic 
urban elements, without the state‘s strong control. Hence, how to conserve those 
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physical representations of the nation‘s old imagined collective memory, in a 
globalising built environment where new memories are being consistently forged, 
is still a crucial issue in post-settler Taiwan. 
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10.5 Conclusion 
After explaining the connections between the existing literature, case study 
findings, and each of the sub-research questions, this concluding Section gives a 
stronger summary of how the research as a whole relates to theoretical framework 
of the study. This is followed by an explanation of the outcome of the study in 
relation to the core research question: 
 
How has shifting state power in Taiwan, until the early 
beginning of the post-settler era, shaped the nation’s urban 
landscape in the form of (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces? 
 
From the theoretical framework to the case study 
The case study is concerned mainly with three topics derived from the 
theoretical framework. The first topic, set out in Chapter 2, is about the nature of 
national identity, based on viewpoints of Anderson (1991) and other 
commentators (e.g. Cohen, 1997; Billig, 1995; Hall, 1999; Scholte, 1996; Smith, 
1991; Thompson, 1992), the term an ‗imagined collective memory‘ is used to 
represent the effects of the nation‘s changing political, cultural, and economic 
conditions. 
The second topic, set out in Chapter 3, is concerned with how shifting 
national identity is represented within urban landscapes. By examining the work 
of Edensor (2002) and others (e.g. Cohen, 1997; Hall, 2000; Hall, 2002; Harvey, 
1993; Hayden, 1995), I suggest that the nation‘s changing urban landscape 
constitutes what I term ‗(re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces‘ where new and 
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old imagined collective memories consistently compete for representation due to 
national government changes, developing multiculturalism, and globalisation. 
The final topic, set out in Chapter 4, is concerned with Weitzer‘s study 
(1990) of settler countries. He suggests that the settler state may use authoritarian 
ways to maintain its political control in the settled land. However, democratisation 
can enable the suppressed home population to begin to participate in political 
decision-making. This political transition can eventually make the nation evolve 
into a post-settler country, meaning that the home population formally gains (or 
regains) state power. Such a viewpoint inspires one to consider how national 
identity and its urban representations can be affected in the context of the settler 
country‘s transition and transformation. 
The existing academic works (e.g. Chen, 2005; Chou, 2005; Hsu, 2005; 
Huang, 2005a; Jou, 2005; Leitner and Kang, 1999; Simon, 2003; Su, 2005; Tai, 
2005; Tay, 1995) investigating the KMT Government‘s implications for Taipei 
City‘s urban landscapes have reflected these three topics to a certain extent. That 
is to say, the KMT Government/Chinese Settler State used language restrictions, 
control of educational materials, mass-media censorship and economic 
achievements to create the imagined collective memory of ‗being Chinese‘ and 
simultaneously to legitimise its political control in Taiwan. The built environment 
of the capital city, Taipei, was also used to a certain extent by the KMT to express 
the sense of ‗being a Chinese city‘. For example, Chinese imperial-palace style 
public buildings were erected by the KMT Government. But with the beginning of 
Taiwan‘s democratisation in the late 1980s, many of the Settler State‘s explicit 
identification schemes have been abandoned. Meanwhile, Taipei City‘s urban 
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changes also reflected the nation‘s political transition. For example, some urban 
elements associated with the KMT Government‘s early authoritarian rule were 
demolished. 
Taiwan entered the post-settler era with the DPP Government coming to 
power in 2000, yet urban changes in post-settler Taipei City have received 
relatively little attention in the academic literature. But from studies concerned 
with urban post-settler South Africa (Beall et al., 2002; Bollens, 1999; Saff, 1998), 
it can be asked whether post-settler Taipei City would be ‗stuck in transition‘ due 
to the Chinese Settler State‘s profound influence? Moreover, in consideration of 
the theoretical framework of this study, one can also indicate unexplored issues 
concerned with Taipei City‘s various characters, including its roles as post-
colonial city, multicultural city, and globalising city in Taiwan‘s changing socio-
political contexts. Hence, I set out to investigate these issues to generate a 
comprehensive perspective on what has been (re-)remembered and (re-)forgotten 
in contemporary Taipei City, in relation to shifting Taiwanese identity. The 
following subsection presents the conclusion to the entire study as well as the 
answer to the main research question of the thesis. 
 
(Re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten Taipei City 
Through a historical approach, one can argue that, in comparison to the 
Dutch colonisers, Cheng‘s regime, and the Qing Empire ‗ruling‘ part of Taiwan, 
the Japanese Colonial Government was the first political entity that began to 
‗govern‘ the entire region. Therefore, in consideration of Anderson‘s perspective 
(1991) on the formation of a nation/an imagined political community, the 
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beginning of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan means the beginning of the 
formation of the Taiwanese‘s imagined collective memory. Meanwhile, by 
examining the existing literature (e.g. Su, 2005) concerned with colonial Taipei 
City‘s urban planning; and simultaneously reflecting the theoretical framework in 
which several commentators (e.g. Edensor, 2002; Vale, 2006) have exemplified 
how the state can enable imposed national identity to be represented within urban 
landscapes, one can suggest that the imagined collective memory of the 
Taiwanese began to be systematically represented within the capital Taipei‘s 
urban landscape due to the Japanese colonisers‘ comprehensive urban planning. 
However, according to the case study findings, the Colonial Government did not 
set out to eliminate the urban legacies of previous rulers, due to its concern for 
their historic and cultural value. Therefore, the Taiwanese‘s imagined collective 
memory can be traced further backwards in time through the existence of these 
old urban elements. 
After the KMT Government/Chinese Settler State occupied Taiwan in 
1945, the new Government‘s political priorities were to legitimise its power and 
to benefit Chinese Mainlanders. The KMT‘s retreat to Taiwan in 1949 implied 
Chinese settler rule‘s further rooting in Taiwan. Meanwhile, ‗re-conquering the 
Mainland China‘ became the main policy of the KMT Government. Under these 
circumstances, the KMT Government dictatorially controlled Taiwan‘s political, 
cultural, and economic affairs. Both the literature (e.g. Manthorpe, 2005) and the 
case study findings indicate how the KMT Government used different media, such 
as the press, language control, and official publications, in an everyday context to 
forge hegemonic national identity serving its political priorities. These 
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identification schemes echo the academic studies (e.g. Billig, 1995; Hall, 1992) 
exploring how the state can affect national identification. 
Although the goal of re-conquering the Mainland eventually was 
abandoned, the original principles of the KMT‘s policy to secure its legitimacy 
and maintain the Chinese settlers‘ interests continuously dominated Taiwan‘s 
political landscape, evidenced by physical representations and biased urban 
policies implemented within the capital Taipei‘s urban landscape. Several 
academic works (e.g. Chou, 2005; Huang, 2005a; Tai, 2005; Tay, 1995) have 
described these phenomena. Through the present case study of Taipei City, new 
information has been explored to create a clearer picture showing how the City‘s 
changing images represented the implications of settler rule for Taiwan‘s political, 
cultural, and economic experiences: the factors that shape Taiwanese identity. 
Since the KMT was struggling in the war with the CPC on the Mainland when it 
was initially occupying Taiwan, it did not destroy Japanese colonial urban 
legacies, and used them to enable the KMT Government to swiftly settle in 
Taiwan. The colonial memory therefore is still embedded in the post-colonial 
capital Taipei. 
Under KMT Government rule, although Taipei City‘s urban landscape 
seemed to show the spirit of modernity, the spatial products generated from the 
Government‘s one-dimensional political doctrine ultimately caused issues 
including extreme nationalistic propaganda, unequal urban development, and the 
local minority‘s marginalisation. Not until the early stages of Taiwan‘s 
democratisation in the late 1980s, did the general public begin to be able to affect 
political decision making. From the literature and other data from the Taipei City 
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case study, it can be seen that, during the political transition period, some urban 
representations, used by KMT Government to make the home population 
‗remember‘ were physically demolished or functionally changed. Moreover, some 
collective memories that the KMT had, deliberately or not, made the home 
population ‗forget‘ were being represented in the form of newly constructed urban 
elements (e.g. the 2-28 Memorial to the conflict between the locals and the newly-
arrived KMT Government). Some of these changes were owing to the DPP, the 
main opposition party, winning the City‘s first ever mayoral election. Incidentally, 
in comparison to studies (e.g. Beall et al., 2002) demonstrating how South 
Africa‘s political transition affected previously biased urban policies, the case of 
Taipei City shows the potential of transitional settler rule to give rise to the city‘s 
physical changes. 
After democratisation developed in Taiwan, the KMT‘s single-party 
control was challenged by grassroots social movements and opposition parties. 
Ultimately, the KMT lost the presidential election to the DPP in 2000, which 
marks the beginning of the nation‘s post-settler era. This historical milestone 
supports Weitzer‘s study (1990) of the transformation from a settler to a post-
settler country, meaning that democratisation can undermine the settler state‘s 
superiority, and this political transition can ultimately enable the home population 
to gain state power. 
Following its election, the DPP Government predictably launched several 
identity policies, such as adding new education materials, to promote Taiwan‘s 
local roots. Some of the policies involved the capital Taipei‘s urban change (e.g. 
physically demolishing or functionally changing the KMT Government‘s urban 
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legacies; and preventing the minority from being marginalised in the city; and 
protecting the historic urban elements). Although it seemed to be easy for the 
transitional KMT Government/Chinese Settler State to change the urban scene for 
the sake of sustainable urban development and the nation‘s re-identification, the 
case study findings show that it has been difficult for the successor DPP 
Government/Post-settler State to deal similarly with settler-state urban legacies 
and their implications. I suggest that such a contradiction results from four 
interrelated factors: 
 
(1) Although the DPP symbolically ended Chinese settler rule by defeating the 
KMT in the 2000 presidential election, the new Government thereafter faced 
issues of economic downturn and political corruption. In these circumstances, 
despite the DPP‘s claim that it represented ‗local‘ power, the KMT and its 
allies began to take control at central or local governmental levels by winning 
the relevant elections. For instance, the KMT and its allies became the 
majority in the national assembly. It also won two consecutive Taipei mayoral 
elections in 2002 and 2006; and therefore has continuously administered the 
City Government. Hence, the KMT and its allies could influence or even 
block DPP Government policies that would affect settler-state legacies. 
 
(2) Many KMT policies were controversial (e.g. identity manipulation; turning a 
blind eye to illegally built houses), but the nation‘s successful economic 
development and rapid democratisation can be attributed to the continuity 
stemming from the KMT Government‘s single-party governing. It is 
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impossible to deny the Chinese settler rule‘s political, cultural and economic 
contribution to contemporary Taiwan. This is seen in the fact that settler-state 
urban legacies are prevalent within the everyday living environment of 
Taiwan; and it is therefore impossible to eliminate them totally, let alone 
‗forget‘ them. In fact, some of them have even become regarded as unique 
spatial products with cultural and historic importance. 
 
(3) In securing its political legitimacy by boosting economic development, the 
KMT Government enabled Taiwan to become involved rapidly in 
globalisation. However, since the KMT initially regarded Taiwan as a 
temporary settlement, it did not set up relevant urban policies concerned with 
the comprehensive development of Taiwanese cities, nor policies concerned 
with urban conservation. Consequently, urban regeneration and conservation 
became complicated problems, capable of causing conflict between the state, 
the public sector, the private sector, and the general public. 
 
(4) With the coming of Taiwan‘s democratisation, state power became less 
dominant. This enabled different actors, including the general public, the 
private sector, and even the public sector (e.g. local governments, banks, 
schools), to affect the urban landscape‘s creation against the state‘s plans. 
Specifically, for the transitional KMT Government, these ‗plans‘ were more 
concerned with urban regeneration and urban conservation. For the DPP 
Government, meanwhile, the ‗plans‘ also included the intention to remove or 
change settler-state urban legacies. The more liberal climate meant, however, 
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that, unlike the dictatorial KMT Government, the post-martial-law 
governments have been unable to create or maintain a hegemonic imagined 
collective memory among people in Taiwan through shaping the nation‘s 
urban landscape. 
 
From these four factors explaining why the DPP Government has been 
unable to modify the Chinese Settler State‘s urban legacies, I argue that although 
there have been some ‗good signs‘ related to changes in the capital Taipei (e.g. 
removing symbols of authority; former suppressed ethnic groups being no longer 
marginalised in central urban areas; trying to make the balance between 
development and conservation), the City‘s urban landscape, consisting of these 
(re-)remembered and (re-)forgotten urban elements representing shifting 
Taiwanese identity, was still ‗stuck in transition‘ during Taiwan‘s early post-
settler era (from May 2000, when the DPP began to represent the state of Taiwan, 
to January 2008, when the fieldwork for this study ended), in which the governing 
party, the opposition parties, the public sector, the private sector, and the general 
public all had the capability to affect physical representations of Taiwanese 
identity. This ambivalence suggests that, for the contemporary Taiwanese, 
Chinese settler rule is a part of imagined collective memory that is, as yet, 
unforgettable, even to those who may wish to forget it. 
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
11.1 Introduction 
Chapter 10 has concluded the case study findings in detailed ways. 
However, Chapter 11 provides further concluding comments on the thesis that set 
it in the context of the wider academic discourse. These comments are divided 
into four subjects presented in following four Sections respectively. Section 11.2 
reviews the entire research project by taking account of the various changes and 
outcomes concerned with Taiwan‘s political changes at government level, shifting 
national identity, and changing urban landscape so as to develop wider academic 
debates. Built upon the review, Section 11.3 outlines the thesis‘s academic 
contribution. Section 11.4 considers the limitations of this study. Finally, Section 
11.5 discusses how these contributions and limitations can drive this study to be 
taken forward in further work. 
 
11.2 Reviews of the Entire Study 
The driving motivation of this thesis is to improve our understanding of 
shifting Taiwanese national identity and its representations in the form of the 
nation‘s changing urban landscapes. The main research question ‗How has 
shifting state power in Taiwan, until the early beginning of the post-settler 
era, shaped the nation’s urban landscape in the form of (re-)remembered/(re-
)forgotten spaces?‘ leads to three specific sub-questions that emerge from a 
multi-disciplinary analytical framework explaining how a nation‘s government 
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change, developing multiculturalism, and involvement in globalisation can give 
rise to shifts in national identity and changes of its urban representations. 
By reviewing the entire research, three associated aspects of Taiwan‘s 
change are revealed. They are respectively discussed in the following three 
subsections: 
 
(1) Political changes at government level 
In 1624, the Dutch established the colonial base in southwest Taiwan 
Island. In 1662, Cheng Cheng-kung drove off the Dutch colonisers and turned the 
colonial base into his settlement in preparation for restoring the Ming Dynasty 
terminated by the Qing Empire on Mainland China. In 1683, The Qing Empire 
eliminated Cheng‘s remaining power on Taiwan Island. In comparison to the 
Dutch Colonial Government and Cheng‘s regime only focusing on controlling 
southwest Taiwan Island, the Qing Empire extended state power to the Island‘s 
north area. However, state power in east Taiwan Island was still absent, given that 
the Qing Empire did not want to face resistance from the area‘s Indigenous tribes. 
It means that those first three political entities in Taiwan‘s political history only 
‗ruled‘ different the regions. In other words, at the time, Taiwan was a pre-modern 
nation where state power did not really extend throughout. 
The significant change happened after the coming of the Japanese 
colonisers. By learning scientific technology and the concept of the modern state 
and colonialism from the Western modern nations, the Japanese Colonial 
Government dedicated itself to investigating Taiwan‘s ethnic, cultural, and 
geographical characteristics and therefore controlled the entire Taiwan completely. 
 292 
In other words, the Japanese Colonial Government made Taiwan became a 
modern nation that was ‗governed‘ by the modern state being able to systemically 
set up laws, orders, and even values throughout the entire country. 
In 1945, the KMT Government replaced the Japanese Colonial 
Government. As a newly-arrived political entity whose interests were sometimes 
in conflict with those of the local population, the KMT Government used public 
education, the mass media, and military and police forces to strongly control 
Taiwanese society as well as to secure its power. These circumstances were 
reinforced after 1949 when the KMT lost the war to the CPC on the Mainland 
China and Taiwan eventually became these Mainland refugees‘ permanent 
settlement. In other words, Chinese settler rule became deeply rooted in Taiwan 
and affected the local population‘s political, cultural, and even economic interests. 
From the 1980s, the KMT began to abandon the radical measures used to 
control the Taiwanese society. This change implied the beginning of a political 
transition period in which settler rule was eventually undermined by the nation‘s 
democratisation. Ultimately, the DPP, claiming to represent local power, defeated 
the KMT in the Presidential Election in 2000. However, although the DPP‘s 
victory symbolised the coming of the nation‘s post-settler era, the KMT and its 
allies subsequently played the role as the powerful opposition party coalition 
seriously affecting the DPP Government‘s political decision making. Meanwhile, 
due to democratisation taking place from the late 1980s, the general public have 
also become able to influence the Taiwanese Government through voting or 
organising social movements. In other words, in early years of post-settler Taiwan, 
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the state‘s power was limited due to intense party political competition and the 
empowered general public. 
 
(2) The key features of changing Taiwanese national identity 
The Dutch Colonial Government, Cheng Cheng-kung‘s regime, and the 
Qing Empire were three political entities once ruling part of Taiwan. Although 
their state power was unable to be practised over the whole region, they had 
similar impacts on Taiwanese national identification. That is to say, when they 
ruled Taiwan, the Han People emigrating from the Mainland China eventually 
became the majority in the region. Han Chinese culture therefore became 
dominant when cultural hybridisation took place among different ethnic groups. 
In addition, apart from the Dutch colonisers introducing Western culture to 
Taiwan and therefore giving rise to cultural hybridisation, the Qing Empire also 
swiftly imported Western culture into Taiwan. This was because the Qing Empire 
lost wars to Western countries and was forced to allow Western businesspeople 
and missionaries to enter the region. 
As the first political entity governing the entire Taiwanese territory, the 
Japanese Colonial Government applied public education to forge colonial identity 
among the native Taiwanese. The educated natives thereafter became useful 
human resources for the colonisers to exploit colonial Taiwan‘s natural resources. 
However, the educated Taiwanese eventually began to question and even 
challenge Japanese colonial rule. In other words, the collective identity of ‗being 
Taiwanese‘ among the natives began to form. Incidentally, during the Japanese 
colonial era, aspects of Western culture were continuously introduced to Taiwan, 
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given that the Japanese colonisers were keen to adopt Westernised practices at the 
time.  
After the KMT Government took over Taiwan, the Chinese settler rulers 
strongly imposed Chinese national identity on the local population by using public 
education and the mass media. However, since the 1980s, the KMT Government 
began to loosen its control over the Taiwanese society. Hence, the issue in relation 
to Taiwanese national identity began to emerge. Meanwhile, the minority became 
able to reclaim their cultural identities once suppressed by the KMT 
Government‘s policies. As a result, the nation‘s multiculturalism was able to 
develop. To improve Taiwan‘s economy to secure its legitimacy, the KMT 
Government became involved in global economic interactions. As a result, 
Western cultural products were imported to Taiwan and gave rise to cultural 
hybridisation. Meanwhile, the nation‘s rapid economic development caused 
polarisation and labour shortage. Hence, the number of immigrant spouses and 
immigrant workers rapidly increased. The condition reinforced the development 
of Taiwan‘s multicultural society and cultural hybridity. 
Taiwan‘s political transition ultimately made the DPP win the Presidential 
Election in 2000. The new Government began to promote Taiwan‘s local roots by 
introducing new public education materials and political discourse. However, 
such an intention and relevant actions were criticised by the KMT and its allies 
claiming that the DPP Government was populist. These party political debates 
over the nation‘s collective identity implied the ambivalence of post-settler 
Taiwanese national identity. 
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(3) The significant impacts of changing Taiwanese government and national 
identity on the capital Taipei’s urban landscape 
Like Cheng Cheng-kung, the Qing Empire set up its administrative centre 
in southwest Taiwan Island where the Dutch had built the colonial base and basic 
infrastructures. Given that foreign countries kept invading north Taiwan Island, 
thereafter, the Qing Empire finally established Taipei City to be the administrative 
capital. However, the Japanese Colonial Government was the first to apply 
modern urban planning knowledge to develop Taipei City. After all, the Qing 
Empire was even unable to accurately measure the area of the City. 
The Japanese colonisers built their own living quarters packed with 
traditional Japanese-style houses. Moreover, the public facilities, such as public 
traffic services, were concentrated in the areas where the colonisers were the 
majority. The arrangements indicated the difference between the colonisers and 
the native Taiwanese. However, the colonisers did not really ignore the natives‘ 
living conditions in the capital Taipei. It was because the colonial rulers intended 
to make Taipei City into an ‗Oriental Paris‘, representing their eagerness to pursue 
Westernisation. Under these circumstances, meanwhile, many mixed Western-
style buildings and public spaces were built in colonial Taipei City. Although 
colonial urban planning significantly changed Taipei City‘s urban form, the 
Japanese colonisers did not destroy all of the Qing Empire‘s urban legacies. In 
fact, the colonisers even conserved some of those legacies in consideration of 
their historic and cultural values. 
After the Japanese colonisers departed from Taiwan, these colonial urban 
legacies made the newly-arrived KMT Government quickly settle down in Taiwan. 
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It was important for the KMT, given that it was struggling in the Chinese Civil 
War with the CPC on the Mainland China. Some of the colonial urban legacies 
that constituted public properties were even used to accommodate the newly-
arrived Chinese social elites and KMT soldiers. 
After the KMT lost the Chinese Civil War and retreated to Taiwan in 1949, 
the capital Taipei‘s subsequent urban changes reflected the KMT Government‘s 
intention to secure settler rule and the settlers‘ interests. For instance, monuments 
symbolising state power were erected. New public housing schemes were 
implemented to accommodate the KMT soldiers and their dependents. 
Furthermore, new business districts were formed to boost the economy as well as 
to legitimise the state‘s achievement. In addition, US troops were allowed to be 
stationed in the City because of the CPC‘s military threat. The surrounding areas 
of these US military bases were therefore subject to Western influences. 
Nonetheless, the KMT still regarded Taiwan as a temporary settlement for 
its preparation for re-conquering the Mainland China and ignored Taipei City‘s 
comprehensive urban planning. Consequently, the increasing population caused a 
sharp increase in illegal-built dwellings. There was also a lack of public facilities, 
such as parks and community centres. The minority groups were marginalised 
within the urban space. The old communities were declining. 
After Taiwan‘s political transition took place in the late 1980s, the KMT 
Government began to remedy those consequences of its early dictatorial rule 
alongside ignorance of comprehensive urban planning. Meanwhile, new issues 
began to emerge. For instance, the government institutions acted slowly to 
accommodate rapidly increasing migrant workers. Furthermore, it was difficult to 
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implement urban regeneration and conservation, given that the relevant law was 
insufficient in the context where the nation‘s economic/urban globalisation has 
made the general public and even the public sector concerned more about the 
properties‘ economic values, rather than about the image and historic meanings of 
the capital Taipei. 
After the DPP seized state power, it continuously dealt with those urban 
issues that the KMT Government had been unable to resolve. Specifically, 
because of the DPP‘s insufficient performance of being the governing party, the 
KMT and its allies eventually controlled the national assembly by winning the 
relevant election. Under these circumstances, when the DPP Government 
proposed to affect certain settler urban legacies, such as the monuments and 
museums essentially built to legitimise settler state power and Chinese national 
identity, the opposition parties were able to block the proposals. 
 
The various changes and outcomes concerned with Taiwan‘s transforming 
state power, shifting national identity, and changing urban landscape shown in the 
above three subsections collectively converge to the ultimate conclusion of 
findings of the thesis: post-settler Taipei City, in which more stories concerned 
with (re-)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces were expected to emerge, was 
‘stuck in transition’. The condition reflects the deep impacts on Taiwanese 
identity caused by Chinese settler rule. Meanwhile, the discussion in these three 
subsections reflects on several crucial points given in the original theoretical 
framework, several divergences of the findings from the literature review can also 
be indicated. The relevant comments are formed in five points given below: 
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(1) Weitzer‘s study (1990) concerned with settler rule‘s transformation does not 
suggest how settler rule can have implications for the nation‘s collective 
identity. From this thesis, it can be suggested that like post-colonial identity 
(Hall, 1992; Papastergiadis, 1997), post-settler Taiwanese national identity 
was ambivalent. In the post-colonial countries, however, colonial rule has 
collapsed and is unable to affect the country‘s imagined collective memory at 
government level. The reason why colonial rule still has implications for post-
colonial identity is due to its cultural and even urban legacies. Meanwhile, the 
thesis shows that Chinese settler rule only ‗symbolically‘ collapsed and its 
remaining power was still influential in directly affecting Taiwan‘s political 
landscape as well as Taiwanese national identification during the nation‘s 
early post-settler era. 
 
(2) The story of why the native Taiwanese became able to show their resistance to 
Japanese colonial rule reflects on how nationalism stemmed from non-
Western countries, meaning that the native population eventually ‗learnt‘ the 
concept of the modern nation from their suppressors, such as colonisers or 
invaders, and thereafter took the relevant action to reclaim their land (Held, 
1992; Kohn, 1975; Snyder, 1954). The Taiwanese‘s nationalist movements did 
persuade the Japanese Colonial Government begin to empower the natives in 
the 1920s. However, why the Taiwanese were still unable to become self-
governed was because with the breakout of the Second World War, the 
Japanese Colonial Government began to use strong cultural-assimilation 
policies to control the Taiwanese. After the colonisers departed from Taiwan 
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in 1945, the local population immediately faced the dominance of newly-
arrived settler rule using more radical methods to affect their political, cultural, 
and economic interests. 
 
(3) In his study, published in 1990, Weitzer indicated that it would be interesting 
to observe transforming settler rule in Taiwan, given that the nation began to 
experience democratisation. After ten years, the DPP defeated the KMT in the 
Presidential Election and symbolically ended Chinese settler rule. This result 
supports Weitzer‘s viewpoint suggesting that democratisation may play an 
important role in undermining settler rule; it could even make the nation 
transform into a post-settler country. 
 
(4) Although Weitzer‘s study only focuses on the settler country‘s changes at the 
government level, his idea is applied in this thesis to consider how settler 
rule‘s transformation in Taiwan could have implications for the nation‘s urban 
planning. Before the fieldwork was implemented, the literature (Beall et al., 
2002; Bollens, 1999; Saff, 1998) concerned with post-settler South Africa‘s 
urban changes inspired me to consider whether Taipei City‘s urban landscape 
would be ‗stuck in transition‘ in Taiwan‘s early post-settler era. The findings 
of the thesis support this initial assumption. Meanwhile, in comparison to 
those policy-oriented urban South Africa studies, this thesis shows that the 
DPP/Post-settler Government was unable to affect physically certain settler 
urban legacies, such as monuments and public places, initially built to 
legitimise settler rule and Chinese national identity. In other words, the thesis 
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demonstrates the idea of ‗stuck in transition‘ can be applied to illustrate the 
condition of a post-settler country‘s physical urban elements. 
 
(5) In terms of Taiwan‘s urban changes and issues related to the nation‘s 
developing multiculturalism and involvement in globalisation, such as the 
unexpected formation of global immigrants‘ diaspora spaces and the 
ignorance of urban conservation in rapidly globalising Taipei City, the 
relevant stories echo the existing literature examining similar issues in 
different cities of different countries (Boyer, 1996; Gensheimer, 2001; 
Hannigan, 1998; Harvey, 1993; Hayden, 1995; Mazrui, 2001; Sklair, 2006). 
Nevertheless, how Taiwan‘s government changes, from its Japanese colonial 
era to the post-settler era, affected the nation‘s urban form differs from the 
existing literature. Unlike many studies indicating how Western colonisers 
used colonial planning to marginalise the natives in Asia and Africa (Fuller, 
1992; Hall, 2000; Mazrui, 2001), the Japanese colonisers to a certain extent 
still paid much attention to the native Taiwanese‘s living conditions in 
colonial Taipei City, given that the colonisers intended to build a spectacular 
built environment being able to represent the Japanese Empire‘s state power in 
its first colony. More importantly, only a few of the existing papers investigate 
post-settler Taipei City‘s conditions. Meanwhile, the thesis shows that 
although the KMT Government started to deal with urban issues caused by its 
early dictatorial rule as well as ignorance of comprehensive urban 
development, the issues remained in Taiwan‘s post-settler era. In fact, those 
issues became more complicated and difficult for the DPP Government to deal 
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with, since the opposition parties and the general public were able to affect the 
government‘s decision making related to their interests, which could be a 
specific urban element‘s economic value, particular function, or even 
symbolic meaning. 
 
Taking account the discussion given above, the entire research project is 
able to give rise to wider academic debates about the relationship between settler 
rule, national identity, and urban landscapes. They are discussed in following two 
subsections: 
 
(1) Comparing settler rule with conventional colonial rule 
In colonial cities in Asia and Africa, Western colonisers usually erected 
new buildings combining Western and native architectural styles. These hybrid 
architectural features not only symbolised the beginning of a new history in the 
colony, but also implied the superiority of the colonisers‘ culture. After all, the 
colonisers regarded the colony as a land with exploitable resources, rather than as 
a part of their motherland. 
Like colonial rule, settler rule constitutes an ‗outside‘ regime. However, 
the Chinese settlers initially regarded Taiwan as part of China‘s territory, rather 
than just a colony with exploitable resources. Under this condition, although the 
Chinese settlers also created ‗new‘ history in Taiwan, that new history was 
regarded as part of the Chinese history. In other words, the KMT Government 
imposed the imagined collective memory of ‗Taiwan is part of China‘ alongside 
‗being born to be Chinese‘ on the local Taiwanese. Meanwhile, Taipei City‘s 
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urban landscape also reflected this condition. For example, although the unequal 
housing distribution still implied the newly-arrived Chinese settlers‘ political 
dominance, the KMT Government constructed many new public sites and subtle 
urban elements simply featuring Chinese-architectural styles, rather than specific 
hybrid styles. 
Overall, the Chinese settler rulers‘ and the Western colonisers‘ different 
approaches to shape built environments serving their identification schemes lead 
to different attitudes towards the lands they respectively governed. Moreover, 
these different approaches to creating the urban form also serve as an explanation 
for why Chinese settle rule has such deep impacts on Taiwanese identity. That is 
to say, given that the conventional colonial city implicitly represented the 
difference between Western colonisers‘ cultural roots and those of the colonised, 
the natives were still able to identify their identity. On the other hand, through 
these urban elements built by the Chinese Settler State, what the local Taiwanese 
were able to ‗remember‘ was their close ties to China, rather than to the land 
where they were really born. 
 
(2) The post-settler rule 
In this study, I suggest that with the abolition of martial law in 1987, 
democratisation was accelerated and settler-governed Taiwan entered the political 
transitional era. Moreover, I indicate that after the DPP ended the KMT‘s 
governing in 2000, the nation was entering the post-settler era. One may think that 
such a political history timeline seems too functional. For instance, it can be 
argued that Taiwan‘s democratisation began to develop after the death of Chiang 
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Kai-shek, who established settler rule, in 1975. It implies that significant shifts in 
Taiwanese identity had already taken place prior to 1987. Furthermore, after the 
DPP gained state power, the KMT and its allies have still been influential in 
shaping Taiwan‘s political landscape. It means that the DPP‘s victory in the 2000 
presidential election did not bring about a clean break in settler rule. 
From this study, it can be seen that the relevant urban changes and policies 
(e.g. the removal of nationalist landmarks; the construction of the sites paying 
tribute to minority ethnic groups; and the participation of the local community and 
the private sector in urban development projects) were not implemented until after 
the ending of martial law in 1987. It was because the end of martial law enabled 
the general public and the DPP, the main opposition party, to begin actively to 
affect the state‘s political decision making. 
It can also be seen from this study that the DPP has been politically against 
the KMT. Nonetheless, after it became the governing party, the DPP was unable 
to use its political resources to successfully change settler-state urban legacies, for 
example, the urban elements associated with dictatorial rule still stand. 
Fragmented land ownership has become an obstacle to urban regeneration, and 
thus, government institutions have problems with implementing urban 
conservation. This was because, in a democratic society, everyone, including the 
KMT, the main opposition party now, and its allies and supporters, has been able 
to give voice to or even affect the state‘s policies. 
Thus, although it might be argued that my arrangement of Taiwan‘s 
symbolic political history timeline seems to too be functional, it is a reminder of 
how democratisation can play a key role in undermining settler rule, how such a 
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political transition can affect national identity and its urban representations, how 
this transition can ultimately transform the nation into a post-settler state, and how 
settler rule can still be influential despite its electoral defeat. What is more, this 
timeline shows that when Taiwan‘s political transition was creating ambivalence 
about the nation‘s collective memory and the capital Taipei‘s urban scene, it was 
also beginning to show the outline of post-settler Taiwanese identity and post-
settler Taipei City. After all, the prefix ‗post-‘ implies that settler rule‘s influence 
still exists in the nation‘s post-settler era. 
 
In short, instead of just describing the colonisers‘ and the settlers‘ different 
attitudes towards the land they governed, the study has used ‗shifting Taiwanese 
identity‘ and ‗Taipei City‘s changing urban landscape‘ as the themes to enable an 
understanding of the difference between colonial rule and settler rule. Meanwhile, 
within these themes, the study also highlights why settler rule has had significant 
impacts on the political, cultural, and economic experiences of the local 
population. 
 
11.3 Contributions of the Thesis 
Section 11.2 reviews the entire research project and highlights how the 
thesis reflects the robustness of the original theoretical framework, and how the 
findings can provide the inspiration for rethinking the existing literature. Building 
upon that discussion, it can be stated that the significant contributions of the thesis 
are: 
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(1) Producing a more comprehensive theoretical framework on the relationships 
between shifting national identity and changing urban landscapes 
The theoretical framework derived from Chapters 2 and 3 is an analytical 
framework enabling one to consider how changing national government, 
developing multiculturalism, and globalisation can affect national identity and its 
urban representations. It was a combination of this theoretical framework, 
Weitzer‘s study of settler countries (Ibid) and the policy-oriented studies about 
post-settler South Africa‘s urban changes [see Section 4.2] that inspired me to 
carry out the Taipei City case study to examine how the transition and collapse of 
Chinese settler rule affected Taiwan‘s imagined collective memory and (re-
)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces. 
Clearly, Weitzer‘s definition of the settler country is debatable. The only 
two cases, namely South African cities and Taipei City, cannot necessarily be the 
basis for a generalisable conclusion applicable to every settler country. However, 
the approach adopted in this thesis can be said to justify the theoretical framework 
built on an existing literature that is not much concerned with the nation in the 
context of a settler state, nor with the nation in the context of a post-settler state. 
 
(2) Recording contemporary post-settler Taipei City’s changing urban landscape 
The Taipei City case study in this thesis is a contemporary record of how 
the DPP Government/Post-settler State dealt with the settler-state urban legacies 
from 2000 to early 2008. This is a new piece of work and the thesis therefore 
provides a starting point for future research on post-settler Taiwan‘s shifting 
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national identity alongside its changing urban scene. This is further discussed in 
Section 11.5. 
 
In summary, the reason why this thesis makes an academic contribution is 
that it establishes links between three subjects, namely Chinese settler rule, 
shifting Taiwanese national identity, and Taipei City‘s changing urban landscape. 
In doing this, the study provides a broader theoretical framework that can be 
applied in examining the urban representations of national identity in a post-settler 
country. Moreover, the case study findings not only fill a gap in the literature 
about the relationship between shifting Taiwanese identity and the capital Taipei‘s 
urban changes, but also provide contemporary data for potential future research. 
 
11.4 Limitations and Inspirations 
Although the thesis has the potential to inspire future research, it also has 
three main limitations. They would therefore need to be taken into account in 
planning future research. 
 
(1) Seeking for the stories behind party political competition 
According to the case study findings, the DPP Government tried to 
physically or functionally change some settler-state urban legacies for different 
reasons. For instance, the DPP Government changed the location for welcoming 
important foreign guests to the front of the Presidential Building, rather than at the 
CKS Memorial Hall‘s front square, and claimed that the new arrangement would 
enable guests to save the additional time of travelling from the Hall to the 
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Building to meet the President. Moreover, the CKS Memorial Hall was 
transformed into the Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall in order to mark the DPP 
Government‘s dedication to transitional justice practice. 
Meanwhile, the KMT and their allies accused the DPP of using these 
changes as an ethnic card as well as an election issue. In some other cases, the 
opposition parties even prevented the DPP Government from altering settler-state 
urban legacies. For example, when the DPP Government proposed to make the 
National Palace Museum exhibit more international cultural relics, rather than 
only those related to Chinese history and culture, the opposition parties, with their 
combined majority in the National Assembly, argued that the proposal implied the 
DPP‘s intention to practise de-Sinicisation, and therefore rejected it. 
Although viewpoint and claims of the KMT and their allies are worth 
thinking about, it is difficult in this study to interview the DPP‘s central decision 
makers, such as people in the policy think tank, to explore the background to these 
issues. In fact, it can be questioned whether these key actors could provide ‗real‘ 
answers. I tried to identify the specific times at which the DPP proposed to affect 
the settler-state urban legacies. Although not all of the proposals were made near 
election time, it remains difficult to judge which side (if any) was telling the true 
story. 
A future study would need to consider how to carry out a deeper 
investigation of Taiwan‘s party political debate on Taiwanese identity and its 
urban representations. 
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(2) Extending the data collection period 
As mentioned in Section 5.7 [p. 95], the data collection process was 
initially planned to be finished in the end of May 2008 to coincide with the end of 
the DPP‘s second governing term as well as the end of a symbolic period in 
Taiwan‘s political history. But due to lack of time and financial support, the data 
collection process ended in January 2008. 
Given this limited timescale, one can argue that if there were relevant 
events happening between January and May 2008 that the thesis could not include. 
In fact, the limited time span also meant I was unable to review some government 
archival sources since the application process would take too long. 
These limitations show how an independent researcher, with limited 
resources, may encounter unexpected difficulties when investigating a 
contemporary phenomenon within a limited time period. They suggest also that 
the Taipei City Case study could have been enriched further by extending the data 
collection period. 
 
(3) Considering a multiple-case-study approach 
The theoretical framework [pp. 33-5] has indicated that the capital city is 
usually the nation‘s political, cultural, and economic centre with many urban 
elements constituting physical representations of the nation‘s identity. When I 
reviewed the literature on Taiwanese national identity and its urban 
representations, I also found that much of it focused on the capital Taipei. These 
considerations and the limited time and financial support available influenced my 
choice of Taipei City as the case study city. 
 309 
Although the choice of Taipei City as the case study was successful in 
providing answers to the research questions, it might have been beneficial also to 
investigate other Taiwanese cities. Finally, although the subject of the thesis is 
Taiwan, the entire study may inspire one to look into other settler countries or 
post-settler countries, and to make a comparison between these countries. 
 
11.5 Directions for Future Research 
Given the contributions made by and the limitations of the thesis, the 
research could be extended in future by widening the range of enquiry and 
deepening the investigation of issues raised by the case study findings and 
analysis. For instances, a study over a longer period of time might show how 
Taiwan‘s party political debate or the further development of a multicultural 
society can give rise to more urban changes. Furthermore, a multiple-case study 
could be designed to examine the implications of Chinese settler rule for urban 
landscapes in other Taiwanese cities. An international study of Taiwan and other 
settler or post-settler countries could also be undertaken. 
It is worth noting that after the end of the fieldwork in January 2008, on 
22nd March of the same year, the KMT‘s Ma Ying-jeou, a second-generation 
Mainlander, won the ROC Presidential Election by defeating the DPP‘s Frank 
Hsieh. In view of the fact that the DPP Government, which claimed to represent 
‗local power‘, was criticised for the nation‘s economic downturn and many 
political scandals, it may be suggested that the KMT‘s victory (gaining 58 per 
cent of votes) implies that ‗origin‘ is not an important factor that may influence 
the course of an election. In fact, before the 2008 Presidential Election, the KMT 
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and their allies had already achieved a majority in the National Assembly by 
winning the relevant election. Changes such as these may suggest that Taiwan‘s 
democracy is evolving in to a more mature system. 
Meanwhile, an emerging question is how the ‗new‘ KMT Government 
will affect the nation‘s imagined collective memory and the relevant (re-
)remembered/(re-)forgotten spaces. That is to say, will Taiwan continue to be 
‗stuck in transition‘, meaning that the ambivalence about Taiwanese national 
identity and its urban representation will remain or even become more complex? 
Or will the ‗transformed‘ KMT Government/Chinese Settler State be able to forge 
a more cohesive national identity, and thus reduce that ambivalence? As a young 
post-settler country with a changing political landscape, Taiwan is full of potential 
to continue providing interesting stories of representing national identity within 
urban landscapes. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
TAIWAN BEING AN OPEN LAND 
 
In the mid-sixteenth century, the Ming Empire, which was ruling the 
Mainland China, sent troops to explore Taiwan Island. The troops returned to the 
Mainland and reported that the Island‘s natural environment was uncultivated. 
Therefore, the Ming Empire, the political entity closest to the Island, regarded 
Taiwan Island as an insignificant land. Under these circumstances, different ethnic 
groups in the Island were living in the absence of state control. Meanwhile, the 
region became an important resting and trading spot for traders and pirates 
voyaging around the west Pacific (Manthorpe, 2005). 
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APPENDIX 2: 
ANCIENT TAIPEI’S DEVELOPMENT 
 
In 1644, the Dutch colonisers began to permit Han Peoples to explore the 
Taipei Basin. Gradually, most of Indigenous tribal lands in the Basin became 
occupied by the Han. After Cheng Cheng-kung drove off the Dutch colonisers in 
1662, a new Han immigrant wave from the Mainland China came to Taiwan 
Island. However, the Han population in the Taipei Basin did not grow 
significantly. In fact, ancient Taipei‘s development was limited due to the fact that 
Cheng focused on exploring the southwest of Taiwan Island (Su, 2005). 
Not until the Qing Empire took over Taiwan Island in 1683, did the Taipei 
Basin begin to develop due to an another greater wave of Han immigrants from 
the Mainland China. In the mid-eighteenth century, with its natural harbour upon 
present-day Danshuei River; the area called Mengjia (around present-day Wanhua 
Administrative District; see Figure A.1, p. 331) became the business centre as 
well as a densely populated area in ancient Taipei. Although the predominant 
population in Mengjia was the Han Peoples, violent conflicts occurred between 
different Han subgroups and clans. Hence, after 1853, a segment of the populace 
moved north to Dadaocheng (around present-day Datong Administrative District; 
see Figure A.1, p. 331), the other area accommodating a natural harbour upon 
Danshuei River (Ibid). 
After losing the war to the West countries‘ coalition in the mid 1800s, the 
Qing Empire was forced to open its harbours to Western businesspeople. 
Therefore, increasing number of international traders began to visit Taiwan Island 
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via Mengjia‘s and Dadaocheng‘s ports from the early 1860s. At the beginning, 
those newly-arrived foreign entrepreneurs attempted to cooperate with local 
businesspeople in Mengjia, the Taipei Basin‘s most significant business district. 
However, they eventually found that it was difficult to establish business relations 
with the locals who had a strong aversion to them. In these circumstances, they 
could only settle in Dadaocheng to found their international trade business. As a 
result, Dadoacheng began to develop and eventually surpassed Mengjia (Ibid). 
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APPENDIX 3: 
SHIFTING JAPANESE COLONIAL IDENTITY 
 
In consideration that using the armed forces to control colonial Taiwan 
would not be a permanent solution, especially when the Japanese Empire intended 
to exploit the colony‘s human and natural resources, the Colonial Government 
decided to begin to ‗civilise‘ the natives. Since 1904, therefore, public education 
was executed to teach the natives to be efficient farmers or semi-skilled labourers. 
Unsurprisingly, they were also taught to obey the colonisers (Manthorpe, 2005; 
Roy, 2003; Su, 2005). 
However, public education eventually affected colonial rule, because it 
broke the natives‘ clan tradition that had bound specific families or villages 
together. That is to say, due to public education, the native youth of different clans 
had to leave their spheres to interact with other native youth with different social 
backgrounds. Under these conditions, the imagined collective memory of ‗being 
the suppressed Taiwanese‘ began to emerge among the young generation. 
Ultimately, several anti-colonial social movements were launched by the educated 
natives in the 1920s (Su, 2005). 
After negotiating with the natives, the Colonial Government modified 
some policies initially against the natives‘ interests. For instance, the natives 
began to have the right to vote in basic-level elections. Moreover, a quota of 
positions in low-level government institutions was given to enable the natives to 
participate in political decision making. In addition, the low-income natives began 
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to be able to receive higher education through passing public examinations 
(Manthorpe, 2005; Roy, 2003; Su, 2005). 
According to the independence history of many one-time colonies, it 
seemed that since the Japanese Colonial Government began to loosen its political 
oppression, the Taiwanese would one day be able to reclaim their sovereignty. 
However, such a generalisable process was ultimately disrupted by Japan‘s 
ambition to control the entire East Asia. Given that ambition, Japan planned to 
attack China in 1937. Since the Han Peoples were both the majority in China and 
colonial Taiwan, the Colonial Government worried that the Taiwanese Han 
People would be upset by the 1937 attack. As a result, Japanisation was practised 
in colonial Taiwan from the middle 1930s. The natives were encouraged to use 
Japanese names, speak Japanese, wear Japanese clothes, and adopt Japanese 
religion. Thereafter, the natives even joined the Japan military in the Second 
World War. Under these circumstances, it was unsurprising that the natives were 
unable to organise independence movements (Ibid). 
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APPENDIX 4: 
THE ORIGIN OF THE CHINESE SETTLER RULERS 
 
In 1911, the Qing Empire was overthrown by the revolutionary troops 
headed by Sun Yat-sen, a doctor by profession as well as a Chinese nationalist 
himself. The Republic of China (ROC) was established to represent ‗China‘ in 
1912. Meanwhile, Sun, inspired by the Western party-political system, founded 
the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang/KMT) that was intended to govern the 
state of China (Manthorpe, 2005; Roy, 2003). 
Due to his desire for democracy, Sun welcomed the establishment of other 
political parties. Hence, the Communist Party of China (CPC) was established 
with the USSR‘s support. It ought to be noted that although the KMT was meant 
to act as the ‗state‘ of modern China, it lacked total control of the Mainland in 
view of its continuous conflict with warlords following the ROC‘s establishment. 
Moreover, after Sun Yat-sen‘s death in 1925, his deputy Chiang Kai-shek 
regarded the growing CPC as a threat to his power and began to eliminate it. 
Eventually, the KMT and the CPC became arch rivals, which triggered the 
Chinese Civil War which began in 1927 and continued until 1949 (Ibid). 
The KMT and the CPC cooperated to fight against Japan when it aimed to 
extend its power in East Asia and attacked northeast China in 1937. Nevertheless, 
in view of the modern Japanese troops‘ steady territorial gains, the KMT 
ultimately lost the capital Nanjing and retreated to the west Mainland. 
Simultaneously, the KMT-CPC coalition also broke up. Under these 
circumstances, the KMT had to face threats from both the CPC and Japan (Ibid). 
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In 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, whereupon the US declared war on 
Japan. The Asia Pacific region became one of the main war zones in the Second 
World War. Chiang Kai-shek took this opportunity to ‗formally‘ declare war on 
Japan, because he predicated that the US would subsequently aid the KMT in 
fighting against Japan and it would relieve the KMT to fight against the CPC and 
Japan at the same time. Eventually, Chiang‘s strategy was rewarded. Meanwhile, 
the ROC became one of the Allies led by the UK, the US, and the USSR in the 
War (Ibid). 
The battles between the KMT and the CPC continued after the end of the 
Second World War. Driven by his efforts and backed by the USSR, the CPC 
leader Mao Zedong enabled Communist power to rapidly extend across north 
China. Meanwhile, the KMT had become a corrupt political organisation since the 
1930s. Hence, as the CPC progressively gained the masses‘ trust, the KMT kept 
losing its power on the Mainland. However, in order to prevent Communist‘s 
influence from spreading throughout East Asia, the US continuously aided the 
KMT to battle with the CPC (Ibid). 
Meanwhile, post-war Taiwan‘s international status became a debatable 
issue. The story dates back to 1943, in which three main powers of the Allies—the 
UK, the US, and the ROC—met in Cairo, Egypt, to discuss post-war affairs. The 
conclusion of the discussion was summed up in the so-called Cairo Declaration, 
issued as a press release. According to the Declaration, Taiwan ‗shall‘ be restored 
to the ROC following the War‘s termination. It ought to be noted that although the 
Cairo Declaration mentioned post-war Taiwan‘s possible future, it was neither a 
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treaty nor a composition of binding documents. In reality, Taiwan was still 
included in the Pacific War Zone under the US‘s charge at the time (Ibid). 
After the end of the War, the US allowed the ROC to take charge of 
Taiwan since it had to cope with more complicated post-war tasks with Japan. 
Interestingly, after the Japanese Emperor Hirohito announced Japan‘s surrender 
on 15th August, 1945, no significant changes happened in Taiwan until two 
months later. On 15th October, KMT troops were airlifted by the US from the 
Mainland to Taiwan to preside over post-war affairs. On 25th October, General 
Chen Yi—the Governor of Taiwan appointed by Chiang Kai-shek—arrived in 
Taipei City to receive the Japanese surrender. On that day, Chen announced 
Taiwan‘s restoration under the sovereign administration of the ROC (Ibid). 
The Allies objected to Chen‘s action since relevant treaties concerned with 
Taiwan‘s status were neither negotiated nor signed by the Allies and the defeated 
Japan. Although he was made aware of this, Chiang Kai-shek ignored the Allies‘ 
dissatisfaction. In fact, the Allies did not strongly ask the ROC to re-declare 
Taiwan‘s status since the majority of them were preoccupied with their own post-
war affairs. Meanwhile, the only allied country that was truly committed to the 
ROC and Taiwan was the US, which was supporting the KMT in its conflict with 
the CPC and considering the region‘s strategic importance. Given that the Chinese 
Civil War was still intense, the US decided to focus more on the risks posed by 
the CPC‘s growing power than on Taiwan‘s international status (Ibid). 
In 1947, Chen Yi‘s government and the local Taiwanese population 
engaged in a severe conflict, which resulted in the bloody 2-2-8 Incident [see 
Appendix 5]. In the light of the KMT‘s behaviour in Taiwan and its continuous 
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loss of ground to the CPC on the Mainland, the US National Security Council 
released a draft report in January 1949 indicting that the US would resolve 
Taiwan‘s status by granting it independence. Nevertheless, the formal proposal, 
launched in the autumn of the same year, was abandoned since the KMT was 
finally forced to retreat to Taiwan in October. Thinking the CPC was likely to 
take over Taiwan sooner or later, on 5th January 1950, the US announced that it 
would stop its aid to the KMT (Manthorpe, 2005). 
In fact, Chiang Kai-shek had already charted his future whilst his territory 
on the Mainland was gradually occupied by the CPC. For instance, in October 
1948, he ordered that war-supply exportation from Taiwan was stopped in 
preparation for a ‗possible‘ retreat. Moreover, higher class Mainlanders and 
significant Chinese cultural assets were transported to Taiwan during the late 
1940s. After Chiang‘s formal retreat to Taiwan in 1949, Taipei City was declared 
the ‗Temporary Capital‘ on 10th December. Meanwhile, the CPC formally 
established the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) on the Mainland (Ibid). 
In June 1950, North Korea attacked the South Korea and triggered the 
Korean War. Fearful of Communist control reaching the entire Western Pacific 
region, the US decided to re-establish relations with the KMT by signing the 
Mutual Defence Treaty. After all, the KMT Government‘s sole territory—
Taiwan—lies in one of the region‘s strategic positions. Meanwhile, this re-
established US-ROC relations and to a great extent relieved Chiang Kai-shek of 
his intense worry over the CPC matter (Ibid). 
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APPENDIX 5: 
THE 2-2-8 INCIDENT 
 
After the KMT occupied Taiwan in 1945, conflict between the local 
population and newly-arrived Chinese officials and soldiers frequently occurred 
due to the collapse of the domestic economy and social order. Ultimately, an 
accident on 27th February 1947 triggered widespread riots the next day. On 27th, 
a local widow selling cigarettes on Taipei City‘s streets was accosted by six 
Monopoly Bureau agents accusing her of selling smuggled cigarettes. When they 
tried to take her in for further questioning, the resisting widow was hit on the head 
by an agent‘s pistol butt. The crowd, on hearing the widow‘s cries for help, 
quickly surrounded the agents. Consequently, one of the agents fired his pistol in 
an attempt to escape from the crowd and caused one man‘s death (Kerr, 1965; 
Manthorpe, 2005; Simon, 2003). 
On the morning of 28th February, several thousand people marched to the 
Monopoly Bureau with a petition demanding an official response to what had 
happened the day before. This resulted in the Bureau being damaged and the 
officials being hit or even killed. Thereafter, the locals surrounded the Monopoly 
Commission. After discovering that the building was locked and guarded, they 
turned to Chen Yi‘s Governor‘s Office (it was the Municipal Hall in the Japanese 
colonial era, and it is now Taiwan‘s Executive Yuan). They arrived around noon 
and some people were killed by soldiers with a machine gun. The news spread 
rapidly. Consequently, by the late afternoon, several riots targeting KMT officials 
erupted in Taipei City. Meanwhile, stores were closed, and workers and students 
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went on strike. Conflict between ordinary Mainlanders and local people also 
broke out (Ibid). 
On that afternoon, a group of young local people occupied the Taiwan 
Broadcasting Station next to Taipei Park and radio-broadcasted the events across 
the whole Taiwanese territory. As a result, numerous riots occurred in the entire 
Taiwan. On 1st March, Governor Chen Yi met with a group of local civic leaders 
to discuss how to solve the problem. The next day, Chen announced via a radio 
broadcast that a compensation claim for the widow would be processed. Moreover, 
he called on the formation of a Settlement Committee which was composed of the 
local civic leaders in order to reduce the tension between the KMT and the local 
population. Thereafter, conflicts between the KMT officials and the local 
population continued, the Committee ordered militias to protect ordinary 
Mainlanders (Ibid). 
On 7th March, the Committee presented Governor Chen with a list of 
demands, including the end of the military rule, the formal recognition of Taiwan 
as an autonomous Chinese province; and the democratisation of the region‘s 
political and economic affairs. Chen rejected all proposals and forced the 
Committee members to moderate them. In fact, Chen had already sent a message 
to the Mainland China on 2nd March to request military aid from Chiang Kai-
shek. On 8th March, 10,000 troops arrived at Keelung port in north Taiwan whilst 
another 3,000 touched down at Kaohsiung port in the south. Consequently, 
indiscriminate violent suppression was put into effect. By 13th March, the whole 
Taiwan was subjected to the KMT troops‘ control (Ibid). 
 322 
Afterwards, the troops began to hunt down locals who could potentially 
influence public opinions. Apart from several Settlement Committee members, 
many scholars, lawyers, entrepreneurs, and journalists were caught or even killed. 
It is generally suggested that such tactics continued until 16th May 1947. There 
was no accurate number as to how many people were killed during that period. 
The estimates ranged between 10,000 and 20,000. The end of the bloodshed did 
not stop the KMT Government further enhancing the combined power of the 
military, police, and secret agents to secure its legitimacy. Even ordinary 
Mainlanders could be threatened. Meanwhile, the 2-2-8 Incident became a taboo 
subject among Taiwanese society until the coming of Taiwan‘s democratisation 
(Ibid). 
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APPENDIX 6: 
THE ROC, THE PRC, AND THE US 
 
Since the KMT Government‘s retreat to Taiwan and the PRC‘s taking full 
power on the Mainland in 1949, the dilemma of ‗which people and places 
belonged to which state‘, in conjunction with the issue of ‗two Chinas‘, not only 
exacerbated the rift between the KMT and the CPC, but also perplexed other 
countries. 
The ROC was a founding member of the United Nations (UN) in 1945. 
However, in 1971, with the support of the USSR, the PRC gained admission to 
the UN General Assembly. This forced the ROC to relinquish China‘s seat in the 
UN Security Council and to leave the UN. In the aftermath, a number of countries 
cut official relations with the ROC in order to establish ties with the PRC. On 1st 
January, 1979, the US also established diplomatic relations with the PRC, causing 
more countries to do the same. Against this background, Taiwan became a land 
identified with the ROC but recognised neither by the UN nor the majority of the 
international community (Manthorpe, 2005; Roy, 2003). 
It ought to be noted that after the US terminated the Mutual Defence 
Treaty [see Appendix 4, p. 319] with the ROC in 1979 due to the end of both 
sides‘ diplomatic relations, the US Government then introduced the ‗Taiwan 
Relations Act‘ on April 10th of the same year. According to the Act, the US 
would continue to sell weapons to Taiwan in order to stabilise the ‗cross-strait 
relations‘ (a commonly used phrase within academic literatures and the mass 
media reports with reference to the complicated relations between China and 
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Taiwan, which are separated by the Taiwan Strait). Arguably, the US used the Act 
as a means of maintaining its influence in the Asia Pacific region. Meanwhile, the 
US presumed that an ambivalent yet steady political balance could actually be 
forged and maintained; since both the KMT Government and the CPC 
Government continuously claimed to be ‗real China‘. Nonetheless, the US failed 
to foresee that Taiwan‘s democratisation emerging in the 1980s would undermine 
the KMT‘s single-party political monopoly and eventually raise the issue of 
Taiwan‘s independence. The condition subsequently affected the cross-strait 
relations (Manthorpe, 2005). 
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APPENDIX 7: 
TAIWAN’S DEMOCRATISATION AND POLITICAL CHAOS 
 
After Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975 during his fifth term as ROC President, 
Vice President Yen Chia-kan succeeded as President. Nonetheless, Chiang‘s 
‗imperial‘ regime was destined to remain. In 1978, the National Assembly, 
formed by the Mainlanders, elected Chiang Kai-shek‘s son—Chiang Ching-kuo—
as the new President. However, Chiang Ching-kuo was different from his 
dictatorial father. Apart from frequently socialising with the general public, 
Chiang Ching-kuo believed that the KMT had to be identified as the ‗people‘s 
party‘, rather than the ‗Mainlanders‘ monopoly‘; and thus began to appoint the 
local Taiwanese, regardless of whether they were KMT members, to important 
government posts. In addition, he considerably tolerated the anti-KMT 
movements and the illegal formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
in 1986. More importantly, martial law was lifted on 7th July 1987, whereupon 
Taiwan‘s democratisation began to be accelerated (Manthorpe, 2005; Roy, 2003). 
Following the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988, only six months after 
he abolished the martial law, Vice President Lee Teng-hui, a local Taiwanese born 
in the Japanese colonial era, assumed Chiang‘s positions as the ROC President 
and the KMT Chairman. Lee continuously promoted democratisation, including 
freeing the mass media and recognising ideologically disparate political parties. 
Nevertheless, the crucial difference between Chiang‘s and Lee‘s democratisation 
movements lay in Lee‘s assertive emphasis on the notion of ‗Taiwanisation‘. For 
example, he introduced concepts such as ‗New Taiwanese‘, ‗the ROC is Taiwan‘, 
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‗Taiwan is already sovereign‘, ‗the cross-strait relation is a special state-to-state 
relation‘; and ‗Taiwan Nationalist Party‘ (whereas the KMT stands for ‗Chinese‘ 
Nationalist Party in Mandarin). He even openly called the KMT ‗a regime from 
outside‘ during his presidency (Manthorpe, 2005). 
Apart from fostering such a political discourse that stirred up the CPC and 
the US, President Lee deliberately pursued strategies that highlighted the 
‗difference‘ between China and Taiwan. For instance, although martial law had 
been lifted in 1987, the ‗Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of 
National Mobilisation for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion‘ remained 
intact since its release in 1948. The Provisions directly superseded the 
Constitution and therefore gave Chiang Kai-shek virtually unshakable power 
during that ‗period of national mobilisation for the suppression of the Communist 
rebellion‘. However, Lee ended the Provisions in 1991. The change symbolised 
not only a further step towards democracy, but also the KMT‘s recognition that 
the PRC, governed by the CPC, was a ‗legal‘ political entity. Moreover, policies 
regarding the Taiwanese visit to Mainland China, for tourism, academic research 
or business, were loosened. Furthermore, in 1992, the PRC‘s athletes, artists, and 
scientists began to be able to come to Taiwan for special events. Meanwhile, the 
PRC‘s national anthem and flag were able to be sung and hung during these 
special occasions (e.g. sports events). In 1998, the Taiwan Provincial Government 
alongside other associated official institutions at the ‗provincial level‘, whose 
existence implied that Mainland China belonged to the ROC, were functionally 
eliminated due to their ‗administrative inefficiency‘. On the one hand, it may be 
suggested that Lee used this change to undermine the political influence of James 
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Soong, a Mainland-born politician as well as the last Taiwan Governor who was 
gaining a lot of public support at the time. On the other, one may view this change 
as symbolising that Taiwan was an independent political entity distinct from the 
Mainland China (Ibid). 
Since the early 1990s, some KMT politicians began to oppose Lee‘s 
Taiwanisation policies and ultimately left the KMT to establish other small 
political parties (Leitner and Kang, 1999). Despite this, Lee enabled Taiwan‘s first 
direct Presidential Election to take place in 1996. Prior to the election, the CPC 
Government launched a military exercise implying that Taiwan was the potential 
target. The CPC‘s purpose could be interpreted as warning the Taiwanese not to 
vote for Lee, given his Taiwanese nationalist attitude having become clear in the 
early 1990s. However, Lee won the Election by 54 percent of the vote against 
three other candidates; one of them represented the DPP, the other two were 
former KMT politicians against Lee‘s policies. A possible explanation for the 
CPC‘s failure to deter voters from electing Lee was that its military threats 
actually evoked Taiwanese nationalism and thus drove the masses to vote for Lee. 
A fact that might support this explanation was that the DPP, the small pro-
independence party at the time, actually gained the second highest vote (21 
percent) (Manthorpe, 2005). 
Prior to the second ROC Presidential Election in 2000, since Lee Teng-hui 
no longer represented the KMT and the governing party‘s corruption was being 
revealed through the liberated mass media, the DPP became the CPC‘s main 
preoccupation. Hence, the CPC Government launched the campaign via the mass 
media with the intention of warning the Taiwanese not to vote for the DPP 
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candidates. Nonetheless, the result of the Election disappointed the CPC once 
again. Former Taipei City Mayor Chen Shui-bian of the DPP defeated both the 
former Taiwan Governor James Soong (the former KMT politician who had run 
as an independent without political party support) and the Vice President Lien 
Chan of the KMT by 39 percent of the vote. In fact, the KMT received the fewest 
votes. Since then, the CPC Government has continued to use provocative rhetoric 
to warn the Taiwanese that if the DPP Government plans to announce Taiwan to 
be independent, it will launch a military attack (Ibid). 
After his unsuccessful independent bid for the Presidency in 2000, James 
Soong and his supporters established the People First Party (PFP). Meanwhile, 
President Chen Shui-bian‘s restrained pro-independence position disappointed his 
peers. As a result, in 2001, due to the former President Lee Teng-hui‘s 
coordination, a new pro-independence political party—the Taiwan Solidarity 
Union (TSU)—was founded. During the third ROC Presidential Election of 2004, 
the KMT Chairman Lien Chan and the PFP Chairman Soong, who were rivals in 
the 2000 Election, decided to form a political coalition to compete with Chen 
Shui-bian who intended to represent the DPP for re-election. Meanwhile, in their 
attempt to uphold ‗local power‘, the TSU sided with Chen. Such alliances led the 
Taiwanese media to label the KMT, PFT, and other conservative parties and 
supporters, the ‗pan-blue‘ force; and the DPP, TSU, and other relevant 
organisations and adherents, the ‗pan-green‘ force. The names stemmed from the 
base colours of the party symbols belonging to each coalition‘s majority; the 
KMT‘s being blue and the DPP‘s being green (Ibid). 
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Prior to the commencement of the third ROC Presidential Election in 2004, 
the CPC launched military exercises again. One may suggest that this time, as in 
2000, the CPC attempted to discourage the Taiwanese from voting for Chen Shui-
bian. Nonetheless, despite the CPC‘s action, the economic depression, and 
negativity surrounding both domestic and international political affairs during his 
term in office, Chen defeated the pan-blue alliance (Ibid). 
It is worth noting that the result of the 2004 Election was far from the 
long-time stereotypical claiming that the Mainlanders preferred the pan-blue 
politicians and the non-Mainlanders were inclined towards the pan-green 
politicians. Chen Shui-bian won by only 0.2 percent of the vote (29,518 votes), 
whilst the Mainlanders represented only about 14 percent of the Taiwan 
population. In addition, both sides‘ supporters, which included politicians as well 
as the general public, were multi-ethnic. Meanwhile, it would be far too dogmatic 
to suggest that the result of the Election implied that the Taiwanese can be 
classified into two groups—pro-unification and pro-independence. However, 
these stereotypical perspectives continue to haunt Taiwan‘s political landscape 
and the language of the mass media. 
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APPENDIX 8: 
TAIPEI CITY’S BASIC PROFILE 
 
Taipei City is located in north Taiwan. It had not really begun to develop 
until the growing number of Han People immigrating to the region during the 
Qing-ruling period. In addition, the Japanese Colonial Government upgraded it to 
a ‗modern‘ capital city. 
During the Japanese colonial era, the City‘s boundary only covered 
present-day Taipei City‘s southwest areas. After the KMT Government came to 
Taiwan, large number of newly-arrived Mainlanders caused the overpopulation of 
capital city. Thus, several areas outside the City, including present-day Neihu, 
Nangang Shilin, and Beitou, were officially included in the City‘s administrative 
boundary. After the reorganisation of its administrative boundary in 1990, the 
City nowadays consists of twelve administrative Districts, covering a total area of 
272 square kilometres (Taipei City Government, updated 22/02/2008) [see Figure 
A.1, p. 331]. At the end of 2007, the City‘s population was 2,629,262 
(Department of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, updated 22/02/2008), 
approximately 11 per cent of Taiwan‘s population (22,958,360) (Directorate 
General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, updated 23/02/2008). 
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Figure A.1—Contemporary Taipei City and its Administrative Districts 
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APPENDIX 9: 
THE ORIGIN OF THE TAIPEI 2-28 MEMORIAL MUSEUM 
 
The building of the 2-28 Memorial Museum was originated by the 
Japanese Colonial Government‘s Taipei Broadcasting Bureau. It was built beside 
the Taipei Park (the present-day 2-28 Peace Park) in 1930. During the colonial 
period, it was operated by the Information Office under the Governor-General‘s 
Propaganda Bureau of Taiwan. After the KMT took over Taiwan in 1945, it was 
renamed as the Taiwan Broadcasting Station. Nevertheless, its function remained 
as the nation-wide broadcasting of state-produced news. After the KMT 
Government came to Taiwan in 1949, the Station became the Broadcasting 
Corporation of China, a state-owned company at the time. Finally, in 1972, the 
Corporation moved out and the site became the City Government‘s Parks and 
Street Lights Office (Taipei 2-28 Memorial Museum, visited on 19/12/2006). 
On 28th February 1947, several young local people occupied the Taiwan 
Broadcasting Station to broadcast the news of conflict between the KMT 
Government and the locals in Taipei City, thereby causing the nation-wide riots 
[see Appendix 5, p. 321]. In view of its significant role in the 2-2-8 Incident, the 
DPP-led Taipei City Government in 1996 made a plan to convert the building to 
the Taipei 2-28 Memorial Museum. It opened on 28th February 1997 (Ibid). 
When I visited the Museum, I discovered that, apart from displaying information 
relevant to the Incident, the exhibition implicitly disclosed the KMT 
Government‘s authoritarian behaviour (e.g. deifying Chiang Kai-shek and 
restricting freedom of speech) during the martial-law era. Incidentally, as I 
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strolled within the Museum, I heard a visitor say to her companion ―it was all the 
DPP‘s idea‖. Such a claim may be understandable, since the Museum‘s 
establishment was due to DPP Mayor Chen Shui-bian. 
However, in his 1998 re-election campaign, Chen was defeated by the 
KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou. In his study of the 2-2-8 Incident, Simon (2003) 
consults documentary sources and suggests that after Ma became the Mayor, most 
of the Museum‘s staff, who happened to be local Taiwanese, were replaced by 
Mainlanders. Bearing this in mind, I interviewed a senior volunteer working at the 
Museum (personal interview, 19/12/2006) to confirm Simon‘s information. She 
told me that as a volunteer, she only knew that a few high-ranking staff were 
replaced when the new Mayor was elected and she was unable to say whether all 
of them were Mainlanders. Nevertheless, she revealed that, like many museums in 
Taipei City, the Taipei 2-28 Memorial Museum has been managed by the non-
profit organisation receiving funds from the City Government. Strangely enough, 
the Museum became the only one to be directly managed by Ma‘s City 
Government in 2003. Afterwards, the City Government began to plan changes to 
the Museum‘s displays that dealt with the KMT‘s dictatorial rule. However, such 
an attempt was dismissed under pressure from the Commission of Incident 
victims‘ families. 
Although the volunteer‘s interview cannot confirm Simon‘s report, one 
still can assume that, no matter for what reasons, the KMT-led City Government 
has attempted to affect the Museum‘s operation as well as its original purpose. In 
other words, the Museum can be the battle ground of an identity contest. 
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APPENDIX 10: 
THE ORIGIN OF  
THE NATIONAL 228 MEMORIAL MUSEUM 
 
The building of the National 228 Memorial Museum is a Japanese colonial 
legacy, featuring mixed Western architectural styles [see Figure 6.15, p. 126]. It 
was built in 1930 to serve as the Taiwan Education Association Hall. After the 
KMT took over Taiwan, the building was briefly used as the meeting hall of the 
Provincial Assembly Council and the Taiwan Provincial Government. In 1958, it 
became the US Embassy‘s Department of Information. In 1977, it was the US‘s 
American Cultural Center. In 2002, however, the Center was moved. Since the 
building had already been designated by the City Government as a historic 
heritage in 1993, it was able to remain without being demolished. In 2006, 
ultimately, the Executive Yuan confirmed that the site would be revitalised as the 
National 228 Memorial Museum formally opened in 2009 (Hirsch, 28/02/2007; 
Taiwan Post Co., updated 11/01/2008; 228 Incident Memorial Foundation, 
updated 09/03/2007). 
On 28th February 2007, the same day of the announcement of the National 
228 Memorial Museum project, the Taiwan Post released a stamp featuring the 
future image of the Museum [see Figure 6.15, p. 126]. Specifically, it was the first 
stamp with the word ‗Taiwan‘, rather than ‗Republic of China‘, on it. It was 
because prior to the stamp‘s release, the DPP Government had announced that it 
would change several state-owned companies‘ official names related to ‗Chinese‘. 
For instance, ‗Chinese Petroleum Corp‘ became ‗CPC Corp, Taiwan‘, and ‗China 
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Shipbuilding Corp‘ became ‗CSBS Corp, Taiwan‘. Meanwhile, Chunghwa 
(meaning Chinese) Post Co. became Taiwan Post Co. Unsurprisingly, such a 
name-change policy immediately caused the opposition politicians‘ disapproval 
(Shan et al., 10/02/2007; Shan, 01/03/2007; Taiwan Post Co., updated 
11/01/2008; Wang et al., 10/02/2007). Regardless of whether the DPP 
Government‘s actions were justifiable, one can suggest that the 60th anniversary 
of the 2-2-8 Incident was a proper occasion for the DPP to introduce these bold 
re-identification schemes, including changing the CKS Memorial Hall‘s name and 
function [see Section 6.5, pp. 127-31]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 336 
APPENDIX 11: 
LIST OF INTERVIWEES 
 
Date Interviewees‘ Positions 
19/12/2006 Senior voluntary worker of the Taipei 2-28 Memorial Museum 
08/01/2007 
Staff of the ROC Ministry of National Defense being in charge 
of military dependent quarter affairs 
13/01/2007 
Representative of the Jinan Ward, where an old Japanese 
residence originally belonging to the Forestry Section of the 
Office of the Governor-General is located 
19/01/2007 
Former Representative of the Qingguang Ward, located on the 
Third Section of the Zhongshan North Road. Mr Cheng has lived 
in the region for about 30 years and has been the elected Ward 
Representative from 2003 to 2007 
23/01/2007 
Staff of the Second Division of the Department of Cultural 
Affairs, Taipei City Government 
24/01/2007 Staff of the Taipei Hakka Affairs Commission 
25/01/2007 Senior staff of the Taiwan International Workers‘ Association 
24/10/2007 Senior staff of the Taipei City New Immigrants‘ Hall 
20/11/2007a 
Senior staff of Indigenous Peoples Commission of Taipei City 
Government 
20/11/2007b 
Staff of Indigenous Peoples Commission of Taipei City 
Government being in charge of Donghu Indigenous Public 
Houses affairs 
22/11/2007 
Representative of the Kangning Ward, where Donghu 
Indigenous Public Housing are located. Mrs Liu has lived in the 
region for about 20 years 
11/12/2007 
The designer of King Shih Architects, having engaged in several 
historic building restoration projects in Taipei City 
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